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The report studies the impact of private labels on the competitiveness 
of the European food processing industry and investigates whether a 
system of producer indication may improve the functioning of the 
food supply chain. The impact is studied using economic theory and 
empirical and legal analysis. The study is completed with an impact 
assessment. 
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Summary 
 
 
S.1 Key results 
 
Innovation in the European food supply chain is not under pressure. 
The number of product introduction still increases. This holds both for 
industrial brands and private labels. Moreover, the profitability of the 
European food processing industry remains constant and the number 
of SMEs declines, but at a normal pace. 
 
The study does not provide a clear answer to the question whether 
product quality is under pressure. Most innovations in food processing 
are incremental. The food industry remains an important driver for 
more radical innovations in terms of food quality, while food retail 
invests in convenience and sustainability. 
 
S.2 Complementary findings 
 
- There is one major exception to the main conclusion. The number 
of product introduction goes down in Spain. This is due to two 
factors: the rapid increase of private-label market share and the 
reduction of the number of stock keeping units in many 
supermarket formulas. 
- The share of private label in new product introductions is growing 
with the exception of the UK where the share of private label in 
new product introductions remains high. 
- In Italy, the number of brands is increasing for many dairy and 
cereal products. Private labels gain market share, but do not have 
a negative impact on innovation. 
- French evidence points out that SMEs are less likely to produce 
private labels. At the same time, their share in private label 
turnover is larger than their share in overall turnover. 
- In terms of economic performance, as measured by profitability 
and innovation, the study does not observe a problem with 
respect to supplier-retailer relations or private labels. 
- A system of producer indications is not likely to have a substantial 
impact on innovation at the industry level. 
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- However, the study does not exclude that bargaining relations 
between retailers and suppliers are uneven and that some 
commercial practices - for instance copycatting or delays in 
payment - distort competition and/or the viability of specific firms. 
- The study provides a roadmap for governments to address any 
problem with respect to supply chain competition. 
 
S.3 Methodology 
 
The European Commission, DG Enterprise, wants to know whether 
private labels have a negative impact on value creation and 
innovation in the food supply chain and on the viability of SMEs in the 
food processing industry. 
 The study uses economic theory to derive hypotheses on the 
relation between private labels on the one hand and the viability of 
SMEs and innovation on the other hand. These hypotheses have 
been tested using data analysis and by interviewing around 40 
producers and retailers in the EU. The study also provides a legal 
analysis of policies dealing with supplier-retailer relations and an 
impact assessment of a system of producer indications. 
 
 
 
Acronyms 
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Part I Introduction 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 
Private label products are products that are sold under retailers' 
brands but are produced by firms further up the supply chain. The 
market share of private labels has grown steadily in recent decades. 
In the EU, private labels have a share of 23% of the groceries market 
(Poppe et al., 2008). Private label sales are growing on average by 
4% a year, especially in the new Member States and in the hard 
discounter sector. 
 Private labels influence both the competition within food supply 
chains and the range of food products that are available to 
consumers. Private labels increase the range of available products 
and thus increase inter-brand (price) competition. On the other 
hand, private labels change the relation between retailers and their 
suppliers. Suppliers of branded products face not only vertical 
competition from retailers but also horizontal competition, since 
retailers start 'producing' their own products. Retailers may replace 
industrial brands by private labels. When retailers do so, they reduce 
consumer choice. Suppliers of private labels may benefit from this 
development, but they may also lose. They get access to the 
customer base of the large retailers, but they may also become more 
dependent on specific retailers. Therefore, suppliers of private labels 
become more dependent on retailers, and independent suppliers of 
branded and non-branded products face more intensive 
competition. Both developments may enable retailers to exploit 
possible buyer power and to squeeze suppliers' profits. In the end, this 
may hurt consumers if consumer prices rise, consumer choice is 
limited and the innovation rate falls. 
 
We therefore analysed retailers' and processors' strategies with 
respect to private labels as well as the impact of private labels on the 
competitiveness of retailers, suppliers of private labels and suppliers of 
branded products. The study focused on the impacts on small and 
medium-sized food processors. 
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We concentrated on three mechanisms that influence retailer-
supplier competition, namely: 
 
1. The impact of possible differences in the application of listing fees 
for private labels versus industrial brand products. 
2. The impact of private labels on the value of industrial brands and 
the repercussions for innovation. 
3. The possible impact of a policy measure to be determined on 
private labels on competitive relations between retailers and 
processors. Possible policy measures include producer indicators, 
dependency law, trademark law and codes of conduct. 
 
 The study had two purposes. (1) To understand the strategies of 
both retailers and processors with respect to private labels, and the 
effects that private labels have on the competitiveness of retailers, 
suppliers of private labels and suppliers of branded products, with a 
focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We explored the 
extent to which the competitiveness depends on the nature of the 
players (processor or retailer), their size and the contractual relations 
they have with other players. (2) To identify possible imbalances in 
supply chain relations and to analyse the effects of these imbalances 
on the players' competitiveness and to provide possible solutions to 
the imbalances found. 
 The study was carried out in three stages. In the first stage, we 
established the state of the art with respect to the economic and 
policy literature, the structure of the European food supply chain and 
the legal framework. This stage was used to construct hypotheses 
assessing the pros and cons of private labels. These hypotheses were 
tested in the second stage of the study using data analysis and 
interviews among suppliers and retailers. In the last stage, the results 
of the previous stages were synthesized and complemented with an 
impact assessment of a voluntary or an obligatory system of 
producer indications. A system of producer indications refers to the 
inclusion of the producer's name, address or logo on the packaging 
of private label products. 
 
 
 
 
This report is made up of: 
 
Part I: This introduction. 
 
Part II: A literature review. 
 
Part III: An empirical analysis of the pros and cons of private labels, 
comprising three sections: methodology, data analysis, and a 
summary of the interviews carried out. The data analysis describes 
and analyses the European food supply chain. The competitiveness 
of the food supply chain is assessed by analysing developments in 
the number of firms (in particular SMEs), profitability and innovation. 
Where possible, we distinguish between brands and private labels. 
 
Part IV: A legal analysis. This part describes legislation with respect to 
trademarks, industrial design, copyright and unfair competition, and 
assesses the enforcement of three laws. 
 
Part V: A synthesis, which includes an impact assessment of a system 
of producer indications and a final conclusion. 
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2 Terms of reference 
 
 
The following is a brief summary of the description of tasks in the 
tender document. 
 
1. Description of the state of play comprising: 
- Overview and analysis of the relevant literature and studies at 
the EU and the national level 
- Economic study of the supply chain structure and the 
relationship between retailers and processors 
- Relevant EU and national law 
 
2. Analysis of the following pros and cons: 
 
Pros 
- Private labels offer an opportunity for suppliers to grow and to 
benefit from the resources of retailers, allowing them to 
innovate and to improve their quality standards. 
- Consumers have more choice because a new range of 
products is offered. 
 
Cons 
- Consumers may be deceived by the fact that the retailers' 
rather than the processors' names are on the products. 
- There may be less choice for consumers if private label 
products replace branded and non-branded products. 
- Competition may be distorted if listing fees are applied 
differently to private labels than to processor brands. 
- Retailer buyer power might increase if suppliers become 
substitutable. Retailers might replace suppliers overnight. 
- The ability of suppliers to provide their own brand and to 
innovate is likely to diminish. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Impact assessment of three policy options: 
 
-  Introduction of a voluntary system of producer indications on 
private labels. 
- Introduction of a compulsory system of producer indications on 
private labels. 
- No policy change. 
 
The impact assessment is based on the following criteria: 
- The impact on competition between retailers and processors 
and between processors. 
- The impact on the value of private labels and industrial brands. 
- The growing market share of private label products. 
- Differences in the application of listing fees between private 
labels and industrial brands. 
- Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
provides for the taking of measures to remedy the deterioration 
of the European food industry. 
- The indication to be used: the producer's name, the producer's 
trademark or possibly another indicator. 
- Relevant EU and national laws, in particular competition law 
(Article 101 and 102 TFEU and their national equivalents, 
dependency laws) and trademark law. 
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PART II Literature review  
 
3 Literature review 
 
 
Food retailers allegedly have market (buyer) power in relation to 
suppliers. On the other hand, suppliers of branded products may very 
well have market (seller) power in relation to retailers. Bargaining 
relations between food processors and retailers have changed over 
the last decade due to the concentration in food processing and, in 
particular, food retail, and factors such as the rise of the private-label 
market share. The steady rise in private-label market share in recent 
decades has made supplier-retailer competition more intricate and 
has probably shifted bargaining power from food processors to food 
retailers. 
 The bargaining power of suppliers in relation to retailers 
determines transaction terms. Bargaining power is reflected in both 
price terms and non-price terms. Non-price terms - notably lump sum 
payments - have received considerable attention in the last two 
decades. Non-price terms including lump-sum payments may very 
well be more important tools for generating retailer profits than per 
unit prices. An imbalance in the bargaining positions of suppliers in 
relation to retailers may distort competition. Consumer prices may 
become too high, supplier prices may become too low and 
innovation may be adversely effected. However, market power may 
also generate positive effects; for instance, retail buyer power may 
lead to lower consumer prices and spur processor innovation. 
 This section provides a state-of-the-art review of the academic 
and policy literature on supplier-retailer competition and the role that 
private labels play in this respect. Although this section focuses on 
retail buyer power, it also addresses the possibility of manufacturer 
seller power. Section 3.1 elaborates such key concepts as buyer 
power and economic dependency. Section 3.2 describes positive 
and negative effects of retail buyer power for price and non-price 
contract from a theoretical perspective. Section 3.3 elaborates the 
exercise of retail buyer power on price and non-price terms in 
practice. Section 3.4 analyses the role private labels play in supplier-
retailer relations and the impact this may have on innovation and 
prices. 
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3.1 Key concepts 
 
Buyer power is essentially the ability of particular buyers to obtain 
from suppliers more favourable terms than those available to other 
buyers or that can be expected under normal competitive 
conditions. Similarly, seller power is the ability to obtain more 
favourable terms from customers. Market power may arise as a 
consequence of size differences among buyers (or sellers) or if there 
are a limited number of buyers (or sellers) of a certain scale. Yet, 
market power represents more than just the ability to extract 
discounts and premiums and obtain low prices from suppliers or high 
prices from customers. Market power also manifests itself in the 
contractual obligations that firms are able to impose on their 
partners. For instance, powerful business customers may use their 
buyer power to negotiate or impose restrictions and particular 
conditions of trade beyond price on suppliers of goods and services, 
amounting to buyer-driven vertical restraints. 
 The extent to which a retailer has buyer power depends on the 
nature of its relationship with the supplier in question. In respect of 
economic analysis, it is usual to make the distinction between market 
relationships - whereby prices are established through a market 
mechanism - and bilateral relationships, which entail negotiation 
between trading parties. Relationships of the first type tend to be 
characterised by situations in which there are numerous suppliers, but 
all retailers pay their suppliers a single 'market price' for the product in 
question (this is referred to as a 'market framework'). Relationships of 
the second type arise in situations in which suppliers are relatively 
concentrated and prices and other terms are negotiated bilaterally 
with retailers (a 'bargaining framework'). The former situations may, for 
instance, be applicable to certain agricultural or commodity 
markets. However, it is the latter situations that usually characterise 
retailer-supplier relations in grocery goods markets, where bilateral 
bargaining takes place between suppliers and retailers, or groups 
thereof. 
 Both market and bargaining frameworks are relevant to food 
products. In the Netherlands, fresh produce is contracted on a 
weekly basis, while a product like bread is contracted for a period of 
between 6 and 12 months. Bread prices are laid down for this period. 
Supermarkets let a number of suppliers submit offers with respect to 
price and possibly other characteristics. Based on such offers, 
suppliers are selected for one week, six months, one year or a season. 
This is also the case for private label products in Hungary. However, 
even if there are long-term contracts, supermarkets may continue to 
renegotiate the contract terms. Supermarket chains regularly 
lengthen the payment term, unilaterally or otherwise. Discounts are 
negotiated while contracts are in force. But the extent to which this 
occurs differs from case to case. 
 Suppliers that are economically dependent on major buyers are 
under considerable pressure to agree to price discounts or non-price 
requirements. Suppliers are economically dependent if they depend 
on a specific customer for a substantial part of their sales. In this 
situation, failure to concede to the buyer's demands may result in a 
significant loss of trade for the supplier that cannot easily be made 
up through other contracts. This would undermine the economic 
viability of the supplier. Moreover, the share of purchases made by 
the buyer may not necessarily have to be very high for the buyer to 
exercise substantial bargaining leverage, since even a small loss of 
sales for the supplier can affect its viability, especially when 
economies of scale are vital to the profitable functioning of the 
business. Similarly, retailers may be dependent on suppliers of must-
stock items. For example, because consumers expect Coca-Cola to 
be on the shelves, retailers have a relatively weak bargaining position 
in relation to the Coca-Cola Company. 
 Within a market framework, an important factor in determining 
both market power and economic dependency is the size of the 
supplier's and retailer's sales of a product relative to the supplying 
industry's total sales of that product. A further relevant factor is the 
degree of concentration in food retail and food processing in relation 
to the sales of the product. In a bargaining framework, the factors 
that may confer buyer power are essentially those that affect the 
extent of a retailer's reliance on its supplier in respect of the 
availability of outside options (such as alternative sources of supply or 
backwards integration). These factors include the size of the retailer 
relative to the size of the supplier, the absolute size of the retailer and 
of the supplier, and the supply of competing products (including 
private label and branded items) that compete with the supplier's 
product. 
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 Suppliers in the Netherlands and the UK consider their bargaining 
power in relation to large grocery retailers to be small. This holds in 
particular for small suppliers, suppliers of fresh produce and suppliers 
of private label products. This is due to, for example, excess supply at 
the wholesale level. Small suppliers face barriers to entry in terms of 
quality standards, IT investments and distribution capacity. However, 
they do play a role in supplying new and niche products to large 
retailers. Food retailers assist some small suppliers in order to able to 
retail the niche products. 
 
 
3.2 Effects of buyer power 
 
3.2.1 Potential beneficial effects of buyer power 
 
Market power, notably buyer power, is not necessarily detrimental to 
overall economic welfare. Indeed, it might be usual to consider an 
increase in retailer buyer power good for consumers. In particular, the 
exercise of buyer power may allow a retailer to obtain discounts, but 
competition at the retail level could then oblige it to put these 
benefits back into the market through lower prices or an improved 
retail offer (such as a better retail service and/or improved store 
amenities). Furthermore, this may benefit not only the retailer's own 
customers but also its rivals' customers, since the competitive 
response by retail rivals may be to lower their prices and otherwise 
improve their retail offer. In other words, buyer power may act as a 
benign countervailing force that spurs on supplier competition and 
encourages greater supplier efficiency, with the retailers' buying 
muscle used to negotiate discounts from suppliers, which are then 
either partially or fully passed on to improve consumer welfare.1 
 This benign view of buyer power clearly applies if suppliers can 
afford to make these discounts without damaging their own welfare 
to such a degree that it undermines their competitive position, 
efficiency and/or incentives to invest and innovate; that is, if they 
can afford to lower consumer prices at no real economic cost. 
Indeed, it may be possible that a squeeze on supplier profits, rather 
                                                 
1 For a formal model, see Dobson and Waterson (1997). For related work, see Chen 
(2003), Erutku (2005), Inderst and Shaffer (2007) or Inderst and Wey (2007). For a concise 
survey, see Snyder (2005).  
than discouraging investment actually serves to encourage it, 
whereby suppliers are induced to fight to attain a competitive 
advantage over their rivals through innovative effort and thereby 
ensure their own survival and perhaps future prosperity through 
product differentiation or superior efficiency. This holds not only for 
the food processing industry, but also for agriculture, which faces 
increasing demands and pressure from the food processing industry 
to meet requirements with respect to economies of scale and 
product quality. 
 Moreover, retailer-led vertical restraints that arise through the 
exercise of buyer power may deliberately restrict supplier behaviour, 
but do so in a way that allows for closer alignment of the incentives 
of the trading parties, perhaps serving to enhance efficiency through 
overcoming free-rider and hold-up problems, encouraging greater 
product quality control and uniformity of standards, and gaining 
economies of scale in distribution with more efficient supply 
arrangements. 
 
H1A Retail bargaining power lowers consumer prices. 
H2A Retail bargaining power spurs innovation. 
H3A Vertical constraints improve supply chain efficiency. 
 
 Food retailers enhance supply chain efficiency by, for example, 
reducing the number of suppliers to a limited number per product 
category (UK Competition Commission 2008; LEI 2009). For instance, 
UK's Waitrose reduced the number of its food suppliers from 100 to 15 
in the early 2000s. For specific items, supermarket chains have 
between one and five suppliers; however, they typically have more 
than one supplier in order guarantee supply, quality and 
competition. This implies that both small and large suppliers sell a 
substantial proportion of their products to a limited number of 
supermarket chains. The UK Competition Commission (2000) found 
that, on average, British grocery suppliers sold one third of their UK 
sales to the biggest British customer and nearly 70% to their top five 
customers. Numbers for the Netherlands are comparable (LEI 2009). 
Although the dependence of grocery suppliers on food retailers is 
substantial, this also holds vice versa. 
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Table 3.1 Market share of the top UK grocery retailers in UK suppliers' 
UK sales 
 Minimum Average  
Top 1 8.1 32.2 
Top 2 14.4 46.8 
Top 3 19.1 56.4 
Top 4 21.9 63.3 
Top 5 23.7 68.5 
Source: UK Competition Commission 2000, p. 232. 
 
 Moreover, suppliers and supermarkets increasingly make 
arrangements about a wide range of issues, such as logistics and 
planning, traceability, product specifications and packaging. The 
purpose of these arrangements is to guarantee and improve food 
safety and quality, supply and transparency. By doing so, 
supermarket chains differentiate themselves from other chains. The 
arrangements are made not only with the direct suppliers, but also 
with the suppliers of suppliers. Some supermarket chains also contract 
farmers. The arrangements are made under framework contracts, as 
well as in detailed written contracts. These arrangements are made 
by all types of supermarket chains, that is, discounters, convenience 
and value for money supermarkets. Large supermarket chains make 
arrangements throughout the chain, while small supermarket chains 
confine themselves to arrangements with relatively large players. 
Retailers' ability to integrate backwards is limited, because 
wholesaling is not part of the core competence of chain stores. 
Because suppliers and retailers make agreements with respect to an 
increasing number of issues, the interdependence between suppliers 
and supermarket chains is continually increasing. This increases the 
switching costs for both suppliers and supermarket chains. 
3.2.2 Potential harmful effects of buyer power 
 
Despite the potential benefits of buyer power, there are three ways in 
which retailers' buyer power might adversely affect competition and 
ultimately harm consumers: (i) demand withholding; (ii) suppression of 
supplier investment; and (iii) 'waterbed effects', which distort retail 
competition.1 
 
(i) Demand withholding 
In a market framework, if suppliers display unit production costs that 
increase with the volume produced, powerful buyers might withhold 
demand so as to reduce the purchase price and generate a better 
margin on the sales of these goods. If these buyers also have some 
selling power in relation to the final consumers they serve, they can 
sell the reduced quantity purchased at higher prices to consumers in 
the downstream market. In this case, consumers pay higher prices 
and purchase a smaller volume of these goods. 
 
(ii) Suppression of supplier investment 
Buyer power might suppress investment by suppliers in process and 
product innovation as well as in maintenance and upkeep if it 
reduces suppliers' expected returns from such investment. Consumers 
are harmed by a lower rate of innovation and product quality. If the 
exercise of buyer power results in fewer new products coming to 
market, a reduced variety of products and/or a reduction in product 
quality, consumer welfare could be harmed. This is likely to hinge on 
the existing profitability of suppliers: the more profitable they are, the 
less likely that such effects will materialise. However, if suppliers are 
currently struggling to earn sufficient profits to permit them to make 
the necessary investments or even stay in business, then increased 
buyer power could have these detrimental welfare effects. 
 
(iii) Waterbed effects 
Within a bargaining framework, if the terms of trade to retailers with 
less buyer power worsen when retailers with stronger buyer power 
obtain better terms - the so-called 'waterbed effect' - then the offer 
to final consumers by retailers with less buyer power may also worsen. 
For instance, the price charged by these retailers to final consumers 
may increase. Depending on the way in which retailers with stronger 
buyer power set their retail offer, the net effect in the short term on 
downstream prices or quality might be negative. Furthermore, any 
differences between the offerings of retailers may lead to some 
retailers exiting the market or reducing their offer, thus progressively 
                                                 
1 See Competition Commission, Working Paper on Buyer Power (Jan. 2007). 
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increasing concentration and leading to an increase in prices or a 
reduction in quality in the medium to long term. 
 
H1B Retail buyer power leads to lower supplier prices and higher 
consumer prices. 
H2B Retail buyer power reduces investment and innovation in 
food processing. 
H4 Retail competition is weakened due to the fact that the 
improvement of contract terms gained by the largest retailers 
is paid for by small and medium-sized retailers. 
 
 
3.3 Exercise of buyer power in practice 
 
While retailer buying power can be exercised in various ways, it can 
be considered as broadly serving two purposes: (i) obtaining the 
lowest possible prices from suppliers for their goods, and (ii) 
controlling the non-price terms and conditions of trade in such a way 
as to benefit the buyer at the expense of suppliers and possibly rival 
retailers as well. 
 
3.3.1 Price terms 
 
It might be expected that the greater the market share of the 
retailer, the greater its ability to obtain lower prices from its suppliers 
both in terms of bulk buying economies and in terms of negotiating 
discounts because of the volume of sales that it can offer suppliers. 
The clearest evidence of this is the empirical analysis conducted by 
the UK Competition Commission (CC) in three separate enquiries 
conducted over an eight-year period, with the consistent finding that 
larger firms tend to obtain larger discounts from suppliers (UK 
Competition Commission 2000, 2003 and 2008). 
 In the CC's supermarkets inquiry, which was concluded in 2000, 
the retailer with the largest market share - Tesco - was generally 
found to secure the lowest prices, followed by the other major 
supermarket chains. All other retailers paid above average prices. For 
example, compared to the price paid by Tesco, a number of smaller 
chains paid around 10% more - a level that potentially placed them at 
a serious competitive disadvantage relative to Tesco and other major 
multiple operators. More generally, the CC's findings pointed to a close 
relationship between market share and buying effectiveness, in terms 
of obtaining relatively low prices. Furthermore, the extent of the price 
differentials points to these being down to differences in retailers' 
buying muscle rather than simply being cost-justified. 
 In the CC's groceries market inquiry, which was completed in 
2008, the evidence again pointed to a statistically significant 
relationship between price and volume. The CC found that retailers 
and wholesalers with high market shares often, but certainly not 
always obtained more favourable trade terms than smaller players. 
Using econometric analysis, the CC estimated that the difference 
between the volume purchased by a very small customer and that 
purchased by a very large customer would result in a price 
differential net of variable (i.e. per unit) discounts of approximately 
13% and a price differential net of both variable and fixed (i.e. lump 
sum payments) discounts of approximately 11%. 
 
This result supports a part of hypothesis H4: large retailers, wholesalers 
and buying organisation are able to get better terms than their small 
and medium-sized counterparts. Some of the advantage the larger 
buyers enjoy is due to their bargaining power rather their cost 
efficiencies. 
 
3.3.2 Non-price terms 
 
In addition to securing direct price concessions, retail buyer power 
can also be used to obtain other favourable non-price terms of 
dealing. These additional terms and conditions of trade beyond the 
unit price may be aimed at providing the buyer with a direct 
financial benefit, such as requiring suppliers to pay lump sum 
payments to initiate or continue trading with the buyer. Alternatively, 
they could be used as a means of securing more indirect financial 
benefits. For example, most-favoured-customer clauses - which 
oblige the supplier not to sell to another retailer at a lower price - 
ensure that the buyer will not be placed at a cost disadvantage 
relative to another buyer. Similarly, exclusive supply arrangements 
deny other buyers access to the supplier's product, which may allow 
the buyer to gain a product differentiation advantage over its rivals in 
downstream markets. Furthermore, the terms and conditions of trade 
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applied by a powerful buyer may also be about shifting the burden 
of any financial risk squarely on to suppliers. For instance, the buyer 
may require the supplier to accept the return of unused or unsold 
supplies, or impose long delays in payment (to protect its own cash 
flows - at the supplier's expense). In a similar vein, if there is the 
prospect of a supply disruption or delay, a powerful buyer may insist 
that it receives supplies ahead of other buyers, thereby shifting the 
risk of non-availability on to its rivals. 
 However, while a position of control by a buyer over its suppliers 
may greatly assist in the imposition of vertical restraints, this is not a 
prerequisite for buyer-led restraints to arise. First, they may arise 
through mutual consent between broadly matched trading parties, 
for example as part of the bargaining process, whereby in agreeing 
to a restraint a supplier gains something in return, such as financial 
recompense (for any foregone income) or perhaps a reciprocal 
restraint placed on the buyer. Second, these restraints may be in the 
context of standard 'custom and practice' arrangements that might 
have emerged in the industry over time and are respected by most 
or all buyers, perhaps to ensure an even playing field and that there 
is no discrimination between buyers. Third, the restraints may arise in 
the context of a buyer facilitating a suppliers' cartel, for example 
supporting a conspiracy of producers to prevent a price collapse 
through, say, agreements on resale price maintenance or exclusive 
supply. Fourth, such restraints may be associated with a group of 
buyers acting in unison, for example seeking to prevent a more 
efficient retail operation from capturing their customers. For the most 
part, though, the kind of buyer-led vertical restraints that might be 
expected to occur most commonly are those in which the buyer 
holds some bargaining advantage over suppliers that ensures their 
compliance or consent. 
 These practices can be wide ranging and quite diverse in nature. 
One way of viewing them is to consider how they affect the 
behaviour of trading parties and their impact on competitors. With 
this perspective in mind, table 3.1 provides a simple classification of 
types of buyer-driven restraints, providing examples for each of the six 
categories mentioned. 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3.1 Buyer-driven vertical restraints 
Category Nature Examples 
1. Conditional 
purchase 
requiremen
ts 
Supplier required to 
provide significant 
concessions concerning 
the other parties it may 
trade with or what it 
uniquely will provide the 
buyer as a condition of 
purchase 
- Insistence on exclusive supply 
- Minimum supply obligations 
- Exclusive distribution 
- Reciprocal dealing 
- Tying purchases  
2. Additional 
payment 
requiremen
ts 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplier required to 
provide lump sum 
payment or special 
discounts to gain/retain 
access to a key distribution 
system or to ensure that 
the buyer is rewarded for 
its efforts and 
compensated for any 
failings on the part of the 
supplier 
- Listing fees 
- Slotting allowances 
- Retroactive (overriding) 
discounts 
- Joint marketing contributions 
- Special payments (e.g. buyer 
merger 'wedding gift') 
3. Non-
discriminati
on clauses 
 
 
 
 
 
Requirements placed on a 
supplier either to ensure 
that it does not offer 
significantly better terms or 
products to other 
purchasers or to help the 
purchaser compete on 
effective terms against 
other purchasers (e.g. in its 
downstream markets) 
- Most favoured customer clause 
- Requirement to provide best or 
matching product/service 
quality 
- Margin support guarantee 
- Open book accounting 
requirement 
4. Refusal to 
buy 
 
 
 
Purchaser boycotts a 
supplier or limits its 
purchases in such a way as 
to weaken the supplier's 
competitive position or put 
- Refusal to initiate trading 
- Terminating long-standing 
trading relationship at short 
notice 
- Delisting certain products 
 28 
 
 
 
 
it out of business 
(potentially distorting 
supplier competition and 
perhaps raising other 
purchasers' costs) 
 
5. Deliberate 
risk shifting 
Purchaser pushes on to its 
supplier the financial risk 
that it faces from 
uncertainty over its own 
performance and realised 
demand in its downstream 
markets 
- Delayed payments 
- Enforced sale-or-return 
- Payments to cover product 
wastage on unused/unsold 
items 
- No written contracts 
6. Service or 
input 
requiremen
ts 
As part of the terms and 
conditions of supply, the 
purchaser requires a 
supplier to provide 
particular services or to use 
particular inputs (beyond 
those normally offered) to 
suit its own specific needs 
- Tailored delivery terms 
- Customized product 
presentation 
- Obligations to use third-party 
contractors 
- Category management 
services 
 
H3B Vertical constraints distort retailer competition because large 
retailers use these constraints to reduce horizontal 
competition from their small and medium counterparts. 
H3C Vertical constraints are used by retailers to extract profits from 
suppliers and to shift risks to suppliers. 
H3D Vertical constraints are used by suppliers to extract profits 
from retailers and to shift risks to retailers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The United Kingdom 
A good illustration of the complexity of buyer-driven arrangements in 
practice, and the wide range of competitive issues that they throw 
up, is provided by the CC's detailed investigations of buyer power 
practices in the UK grocery sector over the last decade. In its 
supermarkets inquiry, the CC identified 52 practices associated with 
retailer buyer power that when practised by the major multiple 
grocery retailers could have potentially distorting effects on supplier 
and/or retailer competition. It found evidence that 42 of these 
practices had been used by the major retailers. The CC grouped 
these 42 practices into 8 categories in considering their effects on 
supplier competition and retailer competition, and whether they 
operated or could be expected to operate against the public 
interest.  
 
As summarised in table 3.2, the CC found that 30 of these practices 
distorted supplier competition, of which 18 also distorted retailer 
competition, and overall (after taking into consideration any possible 
offsetting benefits) deemed 27 practices as operating against the 
public interest. 
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Table 3.2 UK Competition Commission assessment of supermarket 
supplier practices (2000) 
Category of practice No. of 
practices 
No. of 
practices 
distorting 
supplier 
competitio
n 
No. of 
practices 
distorting 
retailer 
competitio
n 
No. of 
practices 
against 
the public 
interest 
Payments for access to 
shelf space 
8 6 0 4 
Imposing conditions on 
suppliers' trade with other 
retailers 
2 0 0 0 
Applying different 
standards to different 
suppliers 
1 1 1 1 
Im osing an unfair 
imbalance of risk 
12 10 10 10 
Imposing retrospective 
changes to contractual 
terms 
8 6 6 6 
Restricting suppliers' access 
to the market 
1 0 0 0 
Imposing charges and 
transferring costs to 
suppliers 
8 6 1 5 
Requiring suppliers to use 
third party suppliers 
nominated by the retailer 
2 1 0 1 
 
 In its 2008 research, the CC concluded that lump sum payments 
and practices that create uncertainty for suppliers in terms of 
revenues and costs are among the most prevalent practices. One 
fifth of the complaints collected by the CC in its 2008 research refer 
to lump sum payments; nearly half of the complaints create 
uncertainty for suppliers or shift risks to suppliers. A substantial 
proportion of the latter practices (15% of all complaints) concern 
retrospective payments. According to the CC, lump sum payments 
do not distort competition, at least not necessarily. For example, 
slotting allowances reduce retailer risks with respect to product 
introductions. However, buying practices that create uncertainty for 
suppliers influence the financial viability of suppliers and their ability to 
invest and to innovate. This holds in particular for the following two 
practices. First, retrospective and late payments create uncertainty 
and constitute unexpected risks and costs.  
Second, payments for alleged bad performance are not only a risk, 
but also involve a moral hazard problem: the payments are enforced 
without suppliers having the possibility to review the alleged bad 
performance. 
 
Table 3.3 Complaints gathered by UK Competition Commission in its 
2008 research 
Categorization of complaint Number of 
complaints 
In %  
Product mislabelling 5 1 
Influencing rivals' costs  4 1 
Lump sum payments 62 18 
Transfer of risks and unexpected costs  180 45 
    Of which retrospective changes of contract terms 59 15 
Other 129 35 
Total 380 100 
Source: UK Competition Commission (2008). 
 
Hungary 
According to a study conducted in Hungary (Dobos 2007), 64% of the 
interviewed suppliers mentioned that their trading partners wish to 
have some forms of refunds, and suppliers on average paid five types 
of refunds to one retail partner. The average refund rate is 16% of the 
price. Popp et al., (2008) provide a list of more than 80 possible 
payments required by retailers. The 'conditions' are most heavily used 
by the buyer groups. Suppliers are usually not dependent on one 
retailer, but the larger the retailer's market presence (often foreign-
owned companies), the more affected suppliers are. Czibik and 
Mako (2008) also found that larger retailers demand larger refunds. 
Company size is related to the exertion of buyer power. 
 Czibik and Mako (2008) found that 67% of the responding suppliers 
were required to meet one of the following three business practices: 
the most favourable conditions clause, third party use and delisting 
without reason. Dobos (2007) came to the conclusion that the 
business practices prohibited by the Trade Act (the most favourable 
conditions clause and third party service specification) hit medium-
sized and large companies harder than small companies. In addition, 
large firms are most affected by delisting without reason and other 
refund requests.  
 32 
Here, we need to note that some of the refunds are not necessarily 
detrimental, since in some cases, the companies receive real services 
(e.g. product handling, stocking fees). Both studies also indicate that 
late payments are an issue: 20-25% of all buyers frequently or always 
pay late. 
 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, slotting and listing fees are not common for fresh 
produce (LEI 2009). Bargaining concentrates on prices (including 
discounts). Supermarkets carry out pilots if they foresee risks in 
introducing new product varieties. Product and sales risks attached to 
fresh produce generally shift at the time of sale of the product from the 
supplier to the customer. The risks attached to perishable and unsold 
products therefore shift to supermarket chains after delivery (LEI 2009). 
Because stocks at the supermarket level are ever smaller, risks are not 
excessive. The risks associated with perishability are relatively large for 
small supermarket chains. Buy-back arrangements and product recall 
are not common in the Netherlands (except in the case of buy-back 
arrangements for bread). 
 
Italy 
A similar situation exists in Italy in the fruits and vegetables vertical 
chain. According to the Italian antitrust authority (AGCM), Italian 
retailers usually sign annual or seasonal contracts with large 
producers in order to guarantee the quantity and quality of the 
produce. Contract negotiations cover product standards, 
approximate volumes over the season and the discounts to be 
applied. However, prices are defined under a market framework on 
a daily or weekly basis, with the local wholesale price used as a 
reference. AGCM (2007) considers large retailers unable to exert 
forms of buying power in this sector, especially for vegetables. 
Several reasons can be argued: 
 
- The number of large producers in Italy is very limited. This creates 
high switching costs, since the alternative to a large producer is, 
at least in the short term, a large number of small producers, 
which would inevitably increase transaction costs and produce 
inefficiencies. 
- Retailers have to guarantee to their customers a complete set of 
must-stock items that have a constant quality. This way, they are 
not sufficiently flexible to capture market opportunities. 
- Only half of all sales of fruits and vegetables are made through 
the modern retail channel. 
 
 Therefore, AGCM stresses more the potential role of retailers in 
inducing a structural change and improving the efficiency of the 
fruits and vegetable vertical chain, rather than their exercise of 
buying power. 
 
Evidence for the UK and Hungary shows that retailers use several 
business practices to reduce supplier competition (hypothesis 3C) as 
well as retailer competition (hypothesis 3B). The UK Competition 
Commission argues that suppliers are particularly affected by retailer-
created uncertainty. This may have a negative effect on supplier 
investments (hypothesis 2B). Lump sum payments may be expected 
to increase supply chain efficiency (hypothesis 3A). Evidence for Italy 
(and the Netherlands) shows that concentration in supply and retail 
fosters supply chain efficiency and leads to mutual interdependence 
of suppliers and retailers. 
 
3.3.3 Economic effects of listing fees and slotting allowances 
 
 Listing fees, slotting allowances (i.e. shelf space charges) and 
other off-invoice fees commanded by retailers from their suppliers 
have attracted considerable attention in legal and policy circles in 
both Europe and North America.1 A large academic and practitioner 
literature considers the reasons for the phenomenon and the ultimate 
effects on competition and consumers. Theories from what might be 
termed the 'efficiency school' explain listing and slotting fees as 
arising from the efficient operation of a free market for new products. 
In contrast, the 'market power school' maintains that these payments 
are the product of a non-competitive market or serve to sustain the 
monopoly power of those involved. 
 As Sexton et al. (2002) summarise, on the efficiency side, six 
arguments are often used to explain why listing and slotting fees are 
                                                 
1 For summary views on the legality of slotting fees, see Cannon and Bloom (1991) and 
Valentine (2000). For policy analysis see FTC (2001, 2003).  
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levied in the context of a highly competitive, risky environment: (i) as 
an efficient signal of those products that are most likely to be 
successful, (ii) as a screening device used by retailers, (iii) as a price 
that is necessary to equilibrate the number of new products suppliers 
bring to market with the number that consumers demand, (iv) as a 
means by which retailers allocate shelf space among competing 
uses, (v) as a means of sharing the risks of failed products between 
supplier and retailer, and (vi) as a way for retailers to legitimately 
cover the costs of removing failed products, thereby charging lower 
retail prices.1 
 In contrast, Sexton et al. (2002) summarise the opposing school of 
thought as using five key arguments in respect of anti-competitive 
effects arising from listing and slotting fees: (i) that these fees 
represent a means by which retailers signal to other retailers that they 
will not compete aggressively on the retail price as they have taken 
their profits upfront;2 (ii) that listing and slotting allowances act as 
barriers to entry by small independent suppliers, sustaining the 
monopoly power of larger players; (iii) that off-invoice fees are merely 
creative ways of implementing two-part, discriminatory pricing 
schemes among cartels of retail buyers and are rarely uniform 
among suppliers; (iv) that, by monopolising a distribution channel, 
suppliers who pay slotting fees significantly raise costs for their rivals, 
thereby harming the rivals' ability to compete; and (v) that listing and 
slotting fees increase the total cost of bringing new products to 
market and thus reduce the rate of innovation. 
 Given that there may be both efficiency and market power 
explanations for listing fees and slotting allowances, antitrust and 
academic attention has increasingly focused on more specifically 
identifying, distinguishing and elaborating upon those circumstances 
in which competition is most likely to be adversely affected, resulting 
in harm to consumers. In particular, and as extensively detailed by 
Gundlach (2005), much of this attention has focused on the 
exclusionary role that slotting allowances may serve. Dominant 
suppliers may condition their payments to retailers on requirements 
that disadvantage their rivals, leading to anti-competitive exclusion.  
                                                 
1 For elaboration of the efficiency arguments, see Kelly, (1991), Sullivan (1997) and 
Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997). For some empirical evidence on efficiency benefits 
based on a specific retailer, see Wright (2007). 
2 For a formal treatment of slotting fees as a buyer-led strategic means of reducing 
competition, see Shaffer (1991).   
Other attention, particularly in the European context, has centred on 
how dominant retailers may be able to use slotting allowances and 
off-invoice fees by exploiting suppliers' dependency to shift risk, 
undermine supplier investment and distort supplier competition.1 
 In addition, a concern has arisen, notably in situations where 
below-cost selling is prohibited, that off-invoice payments may be 
used as a facilitating device to effect price coordination at the retail 
level. Here, artificially high invoiced supply prices can act as a base 
from which to set high retail prices, with retailers compensated 
through off-invoice lump sum payments.2 
 
This section repeats for listing fees and slotting allowances that they 
may both improve supply chain efficiency (hypothesis 3A), but also 
distort competition (hypotheses 3B and 3C). 
 
 
3.4 Private labels 
 
3.4.1 Consumer choice 
 
Private label penetration is steadily increasing in the EU. Private labels 
are products that are developed, branded and marketed by retailers 
rather than food manufacturers. Retailers develop and sell private 
label products in order to make their retail proposition more attractive 
to consumers by enhancing product choice and value for money. In 
this regard, private labels can serve three roles.3 
 
1. To fill gaps in product categories that are not served by brand 
producers - for example as 'generic' or 'budget' brands providing low-
price/low-quality alternatives to existing brands, as 'alternative 
flavour' brands providing different flavours/recipes/looks to existing 
brands, or as 'premium' brands serving to provide high-quality 
products at brand or better-than-brand level. 
                                                 
1 For Hungary, see Juhasz and Kozak (2009).  
2 For a theoretical analysis, see Miklos-Thal et al. (2008). For empirical evidence see 
Biscourp et al. (2008).  
3 For a range of examples for each of these cases, see Kumar and Steenkamp (2007), 
Lincoln and Thomassen (2008), Dobson and Chakraborty (2009), Bauer and Agárdi 
(2000) and Rekettye (2009).  
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2. To provide direct alternatives to brands - for example 'me too' or 
'copycat' alternatives to brands with a same-quality-but-lower-price 
proposition offering value for money to consumers. 
3. To pioneer new products and new categories - for example as 
'value innovators', delivering new, healthier or more ethically sourced 
products or opening up whole new product categories to satisfy 
latent demand (e.g. chilled ready meals). Retail labels function as an 
umbrella brand. They generate value for consumers and a rent for 
retailers by signalling the same information over various product 
categories (e.g. the Dutch retail giant Albert Heijn's 'Pure and Honest' 
corporate brand). 
 Private labels under 1 and 3 are complementary to industrial 
brands; private labels under 2 are substitutes for industrial brands. In 
as far as private labels are a complement, they increase consumer 
choice. This holds for 'budget' brands, 'alternative flavour' brands, 
'premium' brands and 'value innovators'. Private labels are simply 
brands in their own right (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007). Of course, 
these brands may crowd out industrial brands, but if they do, they are 
probably a better offer than existing brands. Copycat alternatives 
are intended to crowd out specific industrial brands. They are 
marketed as a lower price alternative to an existing product. 
Copycats are beneficial for consumers in the short term, because 
they are a better offer than existing brands. In Central Europe, price 
competition is still the main argument in private label development. 
Quality and price differences are substantial in such countries as 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Poland 
(Nevihostényi 2008). However, if copycats' free-rider behaviour on 
existing brands has a negative impact on the incentive to innovate, 
consumers may be worse off in the long run. 
 
H5 Private labels complement and substitute industrial brands. We 
expect the number and market share of private labels to increase, 
the number and market share of industrial brands to decrease, and 
the total number of brands to increase. The shift in market shares 
affects the variety and quality of the product offer, but in what way is 
not a priori clear. 
 
 There are two major strategies food retailers can follow to create 
value added for consumers beyond copycatting: by creating value 
innovators or premium quality products (Kumar and Steenkamp 
2007). Value innovators provide high-value private labels at a low 
price. A good example of value innovators are the Aldi and Lidl 
private labels. Aldi and Lidl market products that have a high 
physical product quality at a low price, while neglecting such quality 
aspects as packaging and brand image. The fact that one should 
not underestimate Aldi's product quality is illustrated by the fact that 
it performs well in independent quality and taste tests. Schwarz group 
Lidl was the second largest global trademark filer in 2009 after 
Novartis (Planet Retail 2010). 
 Premium private labels compete with industrial brands on quality 
and may actually be more expensive than industrial brands. Tesco, 
for instance, sells premium products at prices that exceed those of at 
least some must-stock items. Tesco Finest chocolate is more 
expensive than Cadbury's, and its orange juice is more expensive 
than Tropicana's and Minute Maid's. Like manufacturers' premium 
products, retailers' premium products are unique in terms of flavour 
and packaging and are supported by the development of premium 
product lines (Tesco Finest or Metro's Fine Food). 
 
3.4.2 Supplier-retailer competition 
 
Private labels are developed in order to improve the retailer's position 
not only towards consumers, but also towards suppliers and other 
retailers (Bontems et al., 1999; Bergès-Sennou, Bontems and Réquillart 
2004). 
 As a result of the success of private label, retailers have moved on 
from being merely intermediaries in distributing manufacturer-
branded items to consumers, to the situation where they taking 
centre stage in the supply chain, controlling to a large degree the 
product development and marketing process. In contrast, private 
labels serve to make manufacturers anonymous to consumers, 
placing them in a more subordinate role and leaving them to serve 
as mere agents, producing to order for the retailer. Private labels 
break the direct link between manufacturer and consumer (i.e. the 
bond posted by  the brand and reinforced by advertising), and 
instead allows the retailer to dictate product specification (possibly 
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even determining the nature of production) and to take over the role 
of marketing products, and thereby promote its own retail brand 
image through the private labels stocked (not least by promoting its 
own name on product labels). 
 This control within a principal-agent relationship means that 
retailers can generally exercise very significant buying power over 
private-label producers because they can easily substitute one 
producer for another with minimal switching costs while ensuring that 
producers compete vigorously for contracts (such as through an 
auction system where lowest unit price offers determine the award of 
private label supply contracts). With private-label producers 
economically dependent on critical retailers for their survival (if they 
have no viable alternative routes to market), it is possible for retailers 
to extract all the available surplus (profits) from their economic 
relationship. In the extreme, private-label producers may find it 
difficult to cover their fixed costs if competition for private label 
supply contracts is so intense that supply prices are driven down to 
variable cost levels. This would affect their ability to make future 
investments (such as in new machinery and technology to increase 
productivity and efficiency) and affect their long-term economic 
viability. In such circumstances, only those private-label producers 
with a significant cost advantage (e.g. through economies of scale 
or scope) or a differentiation advantage (e.g. through superior 
research and development facilities or proprietary technology) over 
rivals may prosper. 
 The development of private labels may affect not just private-
label producers, but also suppliers more generally. Specifically, the 
development of private label goods and the increasing amount of 
shelf space that they command means that there is potentially less 
shelf space available to branded goods. With increased shelf space 
allocated to private label, this may have the effect of forcing brand 
producers to compete more aggressively for the remaining space. 
Small brand producers may be particularly vulnerable to increased 
competition for this remaining shelf space, as they do not have the 
resources to support continuous brand building and struggle to 
match the ability of major brand producers to pay high access fees 
to guarantee shelf space (such as shelf-space payments, slotting 
allowances and special display fees). These requirements can 
potentially serve as a significant entry barrier to the branded goods 
sector and may also lead to the exit of existing small brand producers 
and other producers of non-primary brands. 
 
H6A The bargaining power of retailers relative to private label 
suppliers is increasing. Sales, profitability and the number of 
private label suppliers are decreasing, as are their 
investments. 
H6B The bargaining power of retailers relative to industrial suppliers 
is increasing. Sales, profitability and the number of industrial 
brand suppliers are decreasing, as are their investments. This 
holds in particular for SMEs. 
 
 Beyond the desire to enhance choice for consumers by adding 
private labels to the existing range of brands on offer, retailers may 
have strategic reasons for favouring private labels at the expense of 
brands if it offers other business advantages. In particular, brand 
producers may be concerned about the 'double agent' role that 
retailers serve in acting as both their customers (in buying and then 
reselling brands) and their competitors (in developing private label as 
direct substitutes for brands) (Bell et al., 1996; Dobson 1998, 2005). In 
this situation, retailers might be able to exploit their double-agent 
position to their advantage through their control of how products are 
marketed and sold in their stores, potentially using the retail 
marketing mix to undermine brands while advancing their own 
private label offering. To the extent that the use of such a practice 
were to prove successful, it would make it harder for brand producers 
to compete on effective terms with private labels. This could be 
expected to have a disproportionate effect on smaller and 
secondary brands, especially those made by small brand producers, 
that do not have the mass consumer appeal and consumer loyalty 
exhibited towards primary brands and/or a broad-based portfolio of 
brands supported by well-resourced major brand producers. 
 But why should a retailer deliberately favour private label? There 
are a number of possible business advantages for the retailer in 
favouring private label over brands. The main advantages commonly 
cited fall under the following six headings.1 
                                                 
1 This is not an exhaustive list but these are the main arguments that emerge from 
several surveys of the academic literature in the field, including Berges-Sennou et al. 
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1. Higher margins - by saving on brand marketing costs and free-
riding on brand investments, private labels can be supplied to 
retailers at significantly lower cost than brands, allowing the retailer to 
earn higher margins when pricing private labels just below brands.1 
 
2. Facilitating consumer segmentation - by using the brand as a 
reference point, the retailer may promote private label as a means to 
better target price-conscious consumers while developing multiple 
price-quality tiers to increase category sales. 
 
3. Promoting retailer's own name and status and building consumer 
loyalty - with the private label bearing the retailer's name, the retailer 
may be able to draw quality inferences from the leading brands 
while appearing to offer increased choice and value and so 
enhance its consumers' champion image and build loyalty with its 
customers.2 
 
4. Enhancing retailer differentiation and reducing price comparability 
- as private labels are unique to the retailer, they offer a point of 
differentiation from other retailers and make it more difficult for 
consumers to make like-for-like price comparisons, thereby easing the 
intensity of price competition with rival retailers.3 
 
5. Creating revenue synergies across categories - by successfully 
promoting private label in one category, consumers may be 
encouraged to experiment with private label in other categories and 
                                                                                                            
(2004), Mészáros (2007), Sayman and Raju (2007), Pauwels and Srinivasan (2009) and 
Sethuraman (2009). 
1 A large number of studies shows that percentage margins tend to be higher on private 
label goods, e.g. Hoch and Banerji (1993), Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998), Raju et al. 
(1995), Barsky et al. (2001), Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002), Pauwel and Srinivasan (2004) 
and Steiner (2004, 2009). However, the absolute margins can be lower, e.g. Corstjens 
and Lal (2000) and Ailawadi and Harlam (2004). 
2 See Corstjen and Lal (2000), Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) and Ailawadi, Pauwels and 
Steenkamp (2008). 
3 See Dobson (2003) for further discussion and Ailawadi, Pauwels and Steenkamp (2008) 
and Walters and Rinne (1986) for supporting empirical evidence. 
so become more accustomed to buying private label for a wider 
range of products.1 
 
6. Weakening brand producer's bargaining position - by having a 
credible alternative in place, retailers are less susceptible to 
withholding threats from brand suppliers, and in turn can extract 
more favourable terms in the form of increased discounts, funded 
price promotion support, and incentive payments from brand 
producers ('pay to stay' fees, slotting allowances, etc.).2 
 
 The last of these motives points to retailers using private label as a 
means to enhance their bargaining power over brand suppliers. With 
high retail concentration, major retail customers act as key 
gatekeepers that brand producers have to use if they are to obtain 
mass distribution of their products in order to reach a broad 
consumer base. This gatekeeper role is becoming increasingly 
important as a source of retail buyer power as shelf space becomes 
more limited and brands have to compete harder to gain access to 
the available space. With private label taking an increasing share of 
shelf space, there is less space available to brand producers. This 
provides retailers with increased bargaining power as it enhances 
their ability to play off brand suppliers against each other in 
allocating the remaining space. This increased bargaining power can 
allow retailers to gain bargaining concessions in the form of 
increased unit discounts and/or other favourable terms, such as 
increased promotion support payments, shelf space fees and 
volume-related discounts. 
 Furthermore, where private label products act as direct and 
effective substitutes for branded products, retailers are less 
dependent on those brands for generating sales if consumers are 
willing to switch to buying private label equivalents instead. This 
                                                 
1 Sayman and Raju (2004a) find support for the 'umbrella' effect. Chintagunta (2002) 
finds private label prices to be set lower than category profit-maximising prices. Similarly, 
Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) suggest that loyalty and differentiation benefits for the 
retailer arising from private label are linked to the breadth of the private label range. 
2 Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) present an analytical model of the 
retailer/brand-producer bargaining process showing how the retailer's development of 
private label as a direct substitute weakens the brand producer's bargaining position as 
the brand is no longer indispensable. Empirical evidence can be found in Narasimhan 
and Wilcox (1998), Sayman et al. (2002), Ailawadi and Harlam (2004) and Lal (1990).  
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reduces retailers' reliance on stocking these brands, which in turn 
provides a further source of bargaining power for retailers over the 
producers of these brands. In essence, the brand producers have 
greater need of the retailers' service as a provider of shelf space than 
vice versa; thus, in a relative sense, bargaining power shifts towards 
retailers and away from brand producers. The key exceptions are 
cases in which the brand is a 'must-have' or 'must-stock' item, such 
that consumers are not willing to buy another brand or private label 
equivalent, and so failing to stock the item means that the retailer 
may forego sales. However, as shown by the strong share of sales 
held by private label in most product categories, such instances are 
likely to be quite rare. In practice, any shift in bargaining power in 
favour of retailers comes from consumers' willingness to buy another 
product if the preferred brand is not stocked relative to consumers' 
willingness to shop elsewhere to buy that brand.1 The strength of 
private labels is illustrated by the fact that the market share of must-
stock items in Spain has remained constant over the last decade. It is 
secondary industrial brands that are crowded out by private labels. 
 The number of and shelf space for industrial brands also play a key 
role in the way retailers position themselves towards their competitors 
and consumers. 
 
H6C Retailers have a relatively weak bargaining position relative to 
suppliers of must-stock items. Sales, profitability and the 
number of industrial brands are not decreasing, or at least not 
as much as for other suppliers of industrial brands. 
H7 Retailers favour private labels over industrial brands. 
 
Given that retailers could have strong profit or strategic advantages 
to favour private label over brands, it is important to consider how this 
favouritism may be exercised in practice. As a stream of academic 
studies suggest, it is the retailers' power to set the retail marketing mix 
for the in-store treatment of brands and private label in regard to 
how they are priced, positioned and promoted relative to each 
other that can allow retailers to advance private label at the 
expense of brands (Hoch and Banerji, 1993; Raju et al., 1995; Hoch, 
                                                 
1 See Thomassen et al. (2006, pp. 22-42) for comparisons of different brands and for 
different countries. See also Corstjens and Corstjens (1999, pp. 196-218).  
1996; Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998; Dhar and Hoch, 1997; Kumar 
and Steenkamp, 2007; Dobson and Chakraborty, 2009). 
 
 
 
Box 3.1 Ways to promote private labels 
Retailers may use the following tactics to promote private labels' sales to the 
detriment of industrial brands. 
- Retailers may use high-profile delisting trials, whereby individual brands are 
removed from shelves and reintroduced only if there is a clear drop in 
category sales because consumers do not shift to private label or alternative 
brands (see Leyland 2006 and Smith 2009). 
- A more common form of favouritism towards private label comes from 
advertising and promotional campaigns that specifically encourage 
consumers to switch from buying brands to buying private label, for example 
through 'compare and save' in-store signage or through advertising leaflets 
(see Olbrich et al., 2009 for some examples for Germany). 
- A further aspect that continues to be a source of friction between brand 
producers and retailers is the development of copycat private label, where 
the store brand very closely imitates the manufacturer's brand in respect of its 
formulation, packaging and appeal (Dobson 1998; Dobson and Chakraborty 
2009). Copycat products free-ride on the image and goodwill that brands 
have built up through careful and continual product and marketing 
investment. 
- Another ploy that retailers can use to steer consumers away from buying 
brands towards private label is through shelf space allocation and positioning, 
for example by awarding private label with a greater number of facings and 
eye-level placement as well as special product displays (Györe et al., 2009). 
- Another tactic that might be selectively used is deliberate stocking out of 
brands to give shoppers the stark choice of buying the private label or 
shopping elsewhere to obtain 'temporarily unavailable' brands. This becomes 
feasible when the retailer is confident that shoppers' loyalty to the retailer is 
stronger than their loyalty to individual brands. 
- While retailers may seek to favour private label through product selection, 
placement and promotion, there is also the option to adopt strategic pricing 
as a perhaps more subtle form of private label favouritism. There are at least 
four pricing tactics that retailers could employ provided they are able to 
determine the in-store prices of individual items in a product category while 
maintaining the desired price image for the product category: 
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(i) raise brand prices to choke off demand, thus encouraging consumers to 
switch to the less costly, better value private label, while capturing increased 
surplus from those consumers who remain loyal to the brand (e.g. Kim and 
Parker 1999; Soberman and Parker 2006; Meza and Sudhir 2005, 2009); 
(ii) lower private label prices to enhance their perceived value for money and 
make brands look over-priced and poor value, thus more effectively targeting 
value-conscious consumers (Chintagunta 2002); 
(iii) price the private label close to the brand to encourage consumers to think 
they are of equal quality but with the private label offering slightly better 
value through its slightly lower price (e.g. Competition Commission (2000) on 
'umbrella pricing'); 
(iv) frequently raise and lower brand prices to confuse the consumer about 
their real value and encourage trial of more consistently priced private label 
(e.g. 'yo-yo pricing' with frequent temporary price reductions on the same 
brand item but 'every day low price' (EDLP) pricing applied to the equivalent 
private label). 
 
3.4.3 Effect on innovation 
 
In the introduction to this section, we referred to the impact of private 
labels on consumer choice. As such, private labels increase product 
choice, but they may also exert a negative influence on the ability of 
brand suppliers to develop and market new brands. For example, in 
as far as private label development involves free-riding on brand R&D 
efforts, as is the case for copycats, it may have a negative effect on 
brand R&D efforts. Private labels have an impact not only on the 
number, quality and variety of products in the markets, but also on 
branding. Private labels are simply retail brands. Retailers use their 
resources and reputation to challenge industrial brands by 
developing their own brands (i.e. private labels). This gives rise to the 
question whether food processors or retailers are most likely to 
develop and market new products and brands in the future. 
 Private label development may have significant cost advantages 
over the expensive, time-consuming and risky activity of brand 
development, in that a ready-made channel for marketing and 
distributing the goods is available through the retailer. In this way, 
many of the marketing costs incurred by brand producers can be 
avoided. Crucially, with retailers' support and sponsorship, private 
label offers non-branded goods manufacturers a straightforward and 
inexpensive means of entering markets, as they can supply retailers 
without having to go through the lengthy and expensive process of 
developing branded goods of their own.  
 
With the scale efficiencies offered by supplying large retailers and 
without the need for brand marketing support, private-label 
producers can operate at lower costs than brand producers and 
provide their retail customers with a basis on which they can afford to 
offer good value for money to consumers and undercut the prices of 
the leading brands. 
 According to food suppliers interviewed by Dobos (2007), in 
Hungary almost 40% of new product introductions in the previous 
three years (2004-2006) had been initiated by the retail partner. 
Foreign-owned large grocery retailers took such initiatives almost one 
and a half times more often than the average. Foreign-owned large 
grocery retailers and discounters are more likely to be related to 
product development and product line extension. The share of 
medium-sized and large enterprises in new product introductions is 
significantly higher than the share of small companies. Czibik and 
Makó's (2008) multivariate analysis shows that large foreign retail 
chains are more often associated with innovation than other 
companies. Market share has a positive relation with product 
introductions and product line extensions. The buyer also had a 
significant effect on the type of product development. 
 According to Popp et al. (2009), the neglect of innovation in the 
Hungarian food industry is due to several factors. On the one hand, 
technology is often in the hand of foreign investors. New products are 
developed and manufactured by the parent company, while 
subsidiaries take charge of the marketing. However, direct import by 
the retailers is more common. Medium-sized enterprises are usually 
deficient in funds; they have few resources for R&D. Moreover, 
because they usually have a broad product range, product 
development is even more expensive. 
 On the other hand, retail strategies to favour private label may 
reduce consumer choice. This holds in particular for outright brand 
foreclosure and for the disincentives for brand investment by brand 
owners due to the 'hold-up' and related problems. Because of 
uncertainty with respect to orders, payments, etc., suppliers face 
uncertainty with respect to the payoffs from the investments.  
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This makes them reluctant to make such investments in the first place, 
potentially leading to under-investment, and more generally to 
distorted investment patterns amongst suppliers.  
This under-investment problem is likely to be most acute for small 
suppliers, which are least able to resist the buyer power of large 
retailers and are likely to be the most vulnerable to changes in 
contract terms (e.g. due to financial constraints, tight cash flow and 
economic dependence on a limited number of key retail customers). 
Thus, not only can retrospective changes cause considerable 
uncertainty for suppliers and act as a disincentive to investment and 
innovation, but they may also increase barriers to entry for small 
suppliers and make it harder for them to compete on effective terms 
with larger suppliers (with consequent impacts on innovation and 
product choice for consumers). 
 Hungarian evidence from three surveys shows that private-label 
producers tend to have large market shares and high turnovers, and 
to be medium sized or large (more than 50 employees).1 Moreover, 
they tend to be foreign owned rather than Hungarian. Czibik and 
Mako (2008) also point out that small firms that produce private labels 
tend to take the initiative to do so, while large companies that 
produce private labels tend to be asked to do so by retailers. 
Retailers apparently contact large companies when they are looking 
for a private label producer, but the efforts made by small 
companies to become private-label producers may very well pay off 
(tables 2.4 and 2.5). 
Table 3.4 Production of private label according to enterprise 
characteristics in Hungary, per cent (N = 392) 
Foreign property No Yes  
 38.9 45.5  
Market share below 5% 5-49% over 50% 
 23.3 54.3 62.9 
Turnover <HUF 200 million  HUF 200-1,000 million  >HUF 1,000 million  
 25.0 44.6 57.6 
Number 
categories 
(31.12.2006) 
Small enterprises 
(1-49 people) 
Medium enterprises 
(50-249 people) 
Large corporations 
(over 250 people) 
 27.3 65.9 65.8 
Source: Czibik and Makó (2008).     
                                                 
1 Dobos (2007), Kapronczai et al. (2009), Juhász at al. (2010). 
  
Table 3.5 Initiator of the production of private label products 
according the company sales turnover in Hungary, per cent 
(N = 142) 
 Turnover 
 <HUF 200 million  HUF 200-1,000 
million  
>HIF 1,000 million  
Supplier 63.3 40.0 20.9 
Buyer 30.0 33.3 52.2 
Both (6.7) 26.7 26.9 
Cases 30 45 67 
Source: Czibik and Makó (2008). 
 
 As retailers consolidate their positions and increase their power as 
both sellers and buyers over time, the likelihood of economic harm 
arising from retailer practices to exploit their double-agent position 
increases.1 Consumers may now have plenty of choice and benefit 
from the continuing widespread presence of brands, offering the 
benefits of brand reassurance through consistent quality, value and 
innovation, together with an increasing number of private label 
options. However, as the challenge from private label grows further, 
backed by retailer power, there is the increased danger that a 
greater number of brands will disappear from supermarket shelves, 
and ultimately consumers will face less choice. 
 
H6B Private label development - in particular of copycats - and 
retail buying behaviour have a negative impact on brand 
suppliers' product development. Sales, profitability and the 
number of industrial brands suppliers are decreasing, as are 
their investments. This holds in particular for SMEs. 
H6D Due to the growth of private labels and retailer investments, 
the number of private label product introductions is 
increasing, as are the sales, profitability and number of private 
label suppliers. 
 
 
                                                 
1 On the why retailer buyer power and seller power may go hand in hand and serve to 
reinforce each other, see Dobson and Inderst (2007; 2008) and Dobson (2009). 
 48 
 The reformulation of Hypothesis 6B includes the effects of 
copycatting. Hypothesis 6D gives a counter argument of the alleged 
negative effect of private label growth on innovation in the food 
supply chain. Private labels are an innovation as such. Moreover, 
retailer resources may foster innovation. 
 
3.4.4 Effect on prices 
 
 As mentioned in section 3.2, the potential effect of retailers' power 
on consumer prices is ambiguous. On the one hand, competition 
among retailers has the result that discounts obtained from 
producers, as well as efficiency gains, are passed on to consumers. 
On the other hand, distorted competition may lead to increased 
consumer prices with withholding of demand.1 But what is the 
specific impact of private label development on food prices? 
 The price competition between private label and brands plays a 
central role. According to what may be labelled 'conventional 
wisdom' about the effect of private label development, brand 
suppliers should respond in three ways: lower brands' average prices, 
engage in more promotional activities focused on their products and 
further differentiate branded products from private label. 
 Focusing on the first type of response, the stylised fact that private 
label development should cause a decrease in brand prices is well 
established among both economists and industry representatives 
(see e.g. Mills 1995; Bontems et al., 1999). However, a number of 
authors have claimed that there are important reasons that may 
lead to an increase in brand prices as a response to private label 
development, mainly as a result of increased product differentiation 
(Soberman and Parker 2004; Gabrielsen and Sorgard 2007). 
 The empirical evidence is also ambiguous and has produced 
conflicting results. Some studies seem to support the view that brand 
prices may increase as a result of private label development (Ward 
et al., 2002; Bontemps et al., 2005, 2008; Gabrielsen et al., 2002; 
Bonanno and Lopez 2004), while others have come up with the 
opposite result (Putsis 1997; Chintagunta et al., 2002; Bonfrer and 
Chintagunta 2004; Sckokai and Soregaroli 2008). 
                                                 
1 For example, evidence of a positive correlation between local retail concentration 
and consumer prices is found in Barros et al. (2006) and Smith (2004). 
 
Part III Empirical analysis 
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4 Research methodology 
 
 
The key aim of this study was to establish the impact of private labels 
on the competitiveness of the European food processing industry. The 
focus was on the impact on the innovativeness of the food 
processing industry and considered suppliers of private labels and 
industrial brands, as well as retailers. Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 
developed above defined the research context, but were not 
explicitly part of the terms of reference. We therefore focused on 
hypotheses 5, 6 and 7, also given the time and resources available. 
Because hypothesis 5 covers hypothesis 2 as well, we dropped 
hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypotheses tested 
 
H5 Private labels complement and substitute industrial brands. 
We expect the number and market share of private labels to 
increase; the number and market share of industrial brands to 
decrease; and the total number of brands to increase. The 
shift in market shares affects the variety and quality of the 
product offer, but in what way is not a priori clear. 
H6A Due to retail buyer power, the sales, profitability and number 
of private label suppliers is decreasing, as are their 
investments. 
H6B Due to retail buyer power and copycatting, the sales, 
profitability and number of industrial brands suppliers are 
decreasing, as are their investments. This holds in particular for 
SMEs. 
H6C Sales, profitability and the number of industrial brand suppliers 
of must-stock items are not decreasing, or at least not as 
much as for other suppliers of industrial brands. 
H6D Due to the growth of private labels and retailer investments, 
the sales, profitability and number of private label suppliers 
are increasing. 
H7 Retailers favour private labels over industrial brands. 
 
Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 refer to two issues: (1) the competitive position 
of food processors; and (2) innovation efforts, the development of 
new brands, and the development of the number and market share 
of private labels versus national brands. 
Hypotheses on food processor competitiveness 
 
H6A Due to retail buyer power, the sales, profitability and number 
of private label suppliers are decreasing, as are their 
investments. 
H6B Due to retail buyer power, the sales, profitability and number 
of industrial brands suppliers are decreasing, as are their 
investments. This holds in particular for SMEs. 
H6C The sales, profitability and number of industrial brand suppliers 
of must-stock items are not decreasing, or at least not as 
much as for other suppliers of industrial brands. 
H6D Due to the growth of private labels and retailer investments, 
the sales, profitability and number of private label suppliers 
are increasing. 
 
 We tested the hypotheses as follows. First, we explored 
developments in the number, sales and profit rates of food suppliers 
based on both European and national statistics (INSEE etc.) with a 
focus on the development of SMEs versus large enterprises. The 
national focus was on France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK. Second, we used the interviews to uncover 
developments in the sales of suppliers of private labels versus other 
suppliers. 
 For France, we had access to a very comprehensive dataset. The 
INSEE database on the agrofood sector contains around 2,000 SMEs 
that were followed for, on average, 7-8 years in the period 1997-2006. 
The dataset contains a variable indicating the share of private labels 
in turnover as well as other economic variables, such as investments 
in advertising, revenues, etc. It would be interesting to test whether 
private label production has an impact on firms' revenues. One 
should take into account that food processors may sell both private 
labels and industrial brands. In fact, probably only a limited number 
of firms sell only private labels or only industrial brands. 
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Hypotheses on the number, sales and development of private labels, 
industrial brands and non-branded products 
 
H5 We expect the number and market share of private labels to 
increase; the number and market share of industrial brands to 
decrease; and the total number of brands to increase.  
The shift in market shares will affect the variety and quality of 
the product offer, but in what way is not a priori clear. 
H7 Retailers favour private labels over industrial brands. 
 
 We used scanner data to test hypothesis 5 for France and Italy. 
We investigated the development of the number, sales and market 
share of private labels, industrial brands and non-branded products 
with a focus on the introduction of new products, whether private 
labels or industrial brands. The scanner data also allowed us to 
investigate the role of prices of private labels, industrial brands and 
non-branded products on these developments. 
 We used the in-depth interviews conducted in six European 
countries to find out whether retailer purchasing and marketing 
policies have led to the deliberate replacement of industrial brands 
by private labels (hypothesis 7) and to establish the impact of this on 
the development of new products and brands, whether private 
labels or industrial brands (hypothesis 5). 
 We used data from a marketing bureau to investigate 
developments in the number of new product introductions in seven 
European countries and made a distinction between private labels 
and industrial brands. 
 This part of the analysis was carried out for three product 
categories: preserved and processed fruits and vegetables; dairy 
(milk, yogurt and cheese); and breakfast products (cereals and 
muesli, as well as bread and rolls). These products were selected for 
the following reasons: 
 
1. Private-label market shares are relatively high for these product 
categories. 
2. The market share of alternative distribution channels other than 
supermarkets is low for breakfast cereals, for cheese, milk and 
yogurt, and for canned and tinned food. This is not the case for 
bread. 
3. SMEs are relatively abundant in bread production as well as in fruit 
and vegetable processing. Dairy processing is more 
concentrated. 
4. We already had data for selected dairy and breakfast products 
for France and Italy and for preserved fruits and vegetables for 
France. For fruits and vegetables we depended on external 
sources. 
5. Finally, R&D intensity is relatively high in dairy and to a lesser extent 
in fruit and vegetable processing, and in other food (including 
bread production). 
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Table 4.1 Concentration and R&D intensity in the European food 
industry (2005) 
 Firms <20 
employees 
as % of total 
number 
Market share 
of firms >250 
employees 
R&D 
expenditure 
as % of 
turnover 
R&D 
personnel as 
% of all 
personnel 
Meat 84.5 44.5 0.46 0.25 
Fish 70.7 39.2 0.40 0.39 
Fruits and 
vegetables 
80.3 48.5 0.91 0.70 
Oils and fats 96.4 34.6 0.30 0.35 
Dairy 83.8 59.3 1.25 0.54 
Grain and starch 88.0 50.0 0.45 0.40 
Animal feed 76.0 34.2 1.38 0.88 
Other food 93.0 40.7 0.83 0.39 
Beverages 86.7 60.2 0.63 0.45 
Source: Eurostat 
5 Data analysis 
 
 
This section presents a description and an analysis of the European 
food supply chain, with the focus on France, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present an 
analysis of developments in supply chain structure, more in particular 
the number of firms, industry concentration, profitability and prices 
(hypotheses 1, 5 and 6). Section 5.1 gives a general description. 
Section 5.2 comprises an analysis of the extent to which private label 
production influences supply chain structure. Section 5.3 focuses on 
innovation (hypothesis 5), while Section 5.4 concludes. 
 
 
5.1 Supply chain structure 
 
5.1.1 The number of firms 
 
The total number of firms in the food industry decreased in the UK, 
Germany, Spain and Poland, as well as in many small and medium-
sized EU countries (Austria, Baltic States, Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Romania) between 2002 and 2007 (figure 5.1). The 
total number of firms in the food industry increased in France (2%), 
Italy (8%), Portugal (+28%) and Norway (+45%). 
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Figure 5.1 Total number of firms in the food and beverage industry  
(2002-2007; index: 2002 = 1). 
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 Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat. 
 
 Because most food processors are small, the development of the 
total number of small firms was similar to the development of the total 
number of firms (figure 5.2). There is one exception: the number of 
small food processors decreased in the UK but rose again, while the 
total number of food processors decreased. In general, the number 
of medium-sized firms rose more rapidly or fell less sharply than the 
number of small firms (Italy, Poland and small EU countries). France 
and the UK are exceptions: the number of medium-sized firms fell 
while the number of small firms rose (figure 5.3). The fall in the number 
of firms and in particular the number of SMEs reflects, for example, 
increases in the efficient scale of production and distribution. 
 
Figure 5.2 Total number of small firms (1 to 49 employees) in the food 
and beverage industry (2002-2007; index: 2002 = 1). 
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 Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat and UK National Statistics. 
 
Figure 5.3 Total number of medium-sized firms (50 to 249 employees) in 
the food and beverage industry (2002-2007; index: 2002 = 1).  
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Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat and UK National Statistics. 
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 The development of the number of food processors differs from 
one food category to another (table 5.1). The number of firms fell in 
meat processing, oils and fats, milling and sugar, but grew in fruits 
and vegetables, margarines, ice cream, pet food and such 
specialised food products as condiments and seasonings, food 
preparations and other food. The industries in which the number of 
firms fell are probably characterised by economies of scale and 
product homogeneity, and produce ingredients for consumer 
products (milling, sugar, oils and fats). 
 
The number of firms in the food processing industry has decreased. 
This holds in particular for small companies. However, the number of 
firms increased in some countries, including France and Italy, as well 
as in some sub-sectors of the food processing industry, in particular 
those making consumer products. The fall in the number of firms was 
due to, for example, increases in the efficient scale of production 
and of distribution and marketing, also further downstream 
(supermarket chains). 
 
Table 5.1 Change in the total number of firms in the food industry 
(2000-2007, 19 European countries a) 
1511 Meat slaughtering  -10.9% 
1512 Poultry slaughtering  -16.4% 
1513 Meat and poultry meat products -24.3% 
1531 Potato processing 10.2% 
1532 Fruit and vegetable juices 24.2% 
1533 Fruits and vegetables - NES 13.3% 
1541 Crude oil and fats -8.1% 
1542 Refined oils and fats -10.2% 
1543 Margarine 25.0% 
1551 Cheese -2.8% 
1552 Ice cream 14.4% 
1561 Cereals milling  -24.7% 
1562 Starch processing -2.1% 
1571 Farm animal feed -9.5% 
1572 Pet food 28.2% 
1581 Bread and fresh pastry -3.9% 
1582 Biscuits etc.  10.8% 
1583 Sugar -19.8% 
1584 Confectionery -3.5% 
1585 Pasta etc.  7.0% 
1586 Tea and coffee -3.3% 
1587 Condiments and seasonings 27.1% 
1588 Food preparations 48.5% 
1589 Other food - NES 24.7% 
Source: Eurostat. 
a) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
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5.1.2 Industry concentration 
 
Food processing 
Because there are many small and medium-sized firms in the EU food 
and beverage industry, concentration is moderate in many industries 
in many EU countries. This holds notably for Germany, Italy and to a 
lesser extent France. There are only a few food industries in Germany 
and Italy in which the market share of the four largest firms is 60% or 
higher (margarine and ice cream). However, retail scanner data for 
Italy show that industry concentration for more specific products is 
substantially higher. For products like pasteurised milk, UHT milk, pasta, 
tuna in oil, breakfast cereals and yogurt the market share of the four 
largest suppliers is around 60% or higher (AC Nielsen data). For 
cheese, industry concentration varies from one type of cheese to 
another. The French food and beverage industry is more 
concentrated than the German and the Italian food industry. In 16 of 
the 26 sectors on which we have data, the top-four food companies 
have a market share of 60% or higher. French beverage production is 
highly concentrated: the market share of the four largest firms is 70% 
or more, except for wine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Industry concentration in five EU countries 
 France 
(C4, 
2006) 
Germany 
(C4, 2008) 
Hungary 
(C4, 2008) 
Italy 
(C4, 2006) 
NL 
(C5, 2008) 
Meat slaughtering 24 30-35 35 30 65 
Poultryslaughtering 29 30 44 72 85 
Meat processing 16 5-10 81 30 30 
Fish 26 45 98 >40 45 
Potato products 90 25-40 98 n/a 90 
Fruit and vegetable 
juices 
62 30 89 45 100 
Fruits and 
vegetables - NES 
40 25 31 >40 20 
Other oils and fats 92 20 92 >40 85 
Margarine 100 >65 100 n/a 100 
Dairy n/a 35-40 55 n/a 80 
 Milk 50 n/a n/a 60 n/a 
 Butter 56 n/a n/a 30 n/a 
 Cheese 31 n/a 56 2-64 n/a 
IIce cream 70 65 93 60 20 
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Table 5.2 Industry concentration in five EU countries (continue) 
 France 
(C4, 
2006) 
Germany 
(C4, 2008) 
Hungary 
(C4, 2008) 
Italy 
(C4, 2006) 
NL 
(C5, 2008) 
Milling 42 15 59 n/a 40 
 Flour 62 n/a 42 n/a 70 
 Starch 94 n/a 100 n/a 90 
Bakery products n/a 5 n/a n/a 5 
 Fresh bread and 
pastry 
n/a 10 11 n/a 5 
 Other bread and 
pastry 
n/a 40-45 72 n/a 20 
 Pasta n/a n/a 67 60 n/a 
Sugar 79 20 100 n/a 100 
Confectionery 60 25 82 54 40 
Coffee and tea 68 30 63 n/a 90 
Condiments and 
seasonings  
72 35 84 n/a 35 
Spirits 75 n/a 46 n/a 20 
Wine 22 40 32 7 n/a 
Beer 94 30 99 >60 95 
Malt 91 10 100 n/a n/a 
Mineral water and 
soft drinks 
n/a 35 76 n/a 100 
 Mineral water 73 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Soft drinks 79 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
C4 = Market share of the sector's 4 largest companies. C5 = market share of the sector's 5 largest 
companies. Source: Dutch, French and German Statistics. Nielsen, IRI, and Databank for Italy and 
Tax Office Data for Hungary. 
 
 Industry concentration is high in the Netherlands. The market share 
of the four largest firms is typically well above 60%.1 Moreover, many 
Dutch industries are dominated by one or two firms that have a 
market share of 50% or higher. In the Netherlands, this holds for VION 
for pork, Plukon and Storteboom for poultry, Van Drie for veal, 
CampinaFriesland for dairy, Unilever for margarines and other oils and 
                                                 
1 For the Netherlands, we have numbers on the market share of the five largest 
companies.  
fats, Heineken for beer, Sara Lee for coffee and tea, CSM for sugar 
and Avebe for starch (Bijman et al., 2003). Even when industry 
concentration seems low, for instance for bread, industrial bread 
production for food retail is again dominated by two firms 
(Bakkersland and Bake Five) (NMa 2008). In Hungary, industry 
concentration is high in sectors with a small aggregate turnover (oils 
and fats and confectionery), but less so in sectors with a high 
turnover. 
Food retail 
Food retail is concentrated throughout the EU, with the exception of 
some regions of Italy1 and some Central European countries. Food 
retailers have become large as a result of merger and acquisition 
activities in the 1990s and 2000s. In the same period, buying 
associations arose in many European countries and have since 
grown in size. Concentration on the buying (retailer-supplier) side 
tends to be higher than concentration on the selling (retailer-
consumer) side (figure 5.4). 
 Note that not all supermarket chains are centrally organised. 
Many are made up of franchisees and independent entrepreneurs 
who decide on the products to list and where to source. For 
example, the independent entrepreneurs of a retail chain in the 
Netherlands are obliged to buy 90% of their purchases from the 
parent organisation, and are free to purchase the other 10% 
elsewhere. The entrepreneurs buy elsewhere if supplies are cheaper 
(or better) elsewhere. Central buying organisations thus face 
competition from representatives at the outlet level who are in 
charge of buying. This limits the possibilities for central buying 
organisations to act, as is illustrated by the delisting of Gillette by IKA. 
IKA's central buying organisation decided to delist Gillette in a 
commercial conflict over the terms of delivery. However, local 
                                                 
1 The density of hypermarkets and supermarkets varies across regions of Italy. 
Considering the square metres per thousand inhabitants, in 2006 values ranged from 223 
sq. m (Friuli V.G.) to 92 sq. m (Campania) (CERMES - Bocconi, 2008). These differences 
depend not only on the different economic development of the regions, but also on a 
different implementation by the regional governments of the national law regulating 
the opening of new supermarkets. This issue has been frequently raised by the antitrust 
authority as an impediment to the modernisation and improved efficiency of the Italian 
food chain (see e.g. AGCM, 2008). 
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entrepreneurs refused to delist Gillette and bought Gillette products 
directly. 
 
Figure 5.4 Concentration in European food retail (Top 5, 2006)  
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Source: OECD (2006). 
 
 Many sources argue that European wholesale markets are not 
well integrated and that retail selling and buying are still primarily 
national activities (European Commission 1997; UK Competition 
Commission 2000; Grievink et al., 2002; NMa, 2009; this report). Even 
the few global retailers one might have been able to identify in the 
2000s organised most of their buying and selling activities at national 
levels. In recent years, multinational retailers have started sourcing 
across national borders. Global retailers have set up their own 
international buying divisions. Moreover, there are also several 
European buying organisations. Even so, a substantial part of retailers' 
purchases still take place nationally. This is due to national differences 
in preferences and consumption, and a certain preference for 
national products. Dutch supermarkets, for instance, source fresh 
food nationally unless it is unavailable due to climatic reasons (LEI, 
2009). 
 Both food retail and food processing are concentrated in many 
European countries. Large retailers and large food processors are 
mutually dependent. Choice is limited on both sides. However, there 
is some choice beyond each other. Food processors may export, and 
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food retailers may import. Moreover, there are distribution channels 
other than supermarket chains.  
A study by IfH and BBE for the German food supply chain shows, for 
example, that food service and SME food retail have a major share in 
food distribution (figure 5.5). For many products, supermarket chains 
command less than 50% of the consumer euro.1 Supermarkets have a 
relatively low market share in bread, fish, beverages and frozen food. 
Supermarket chains have a major share in the distribution of 
breakfast cereals, baby food, confectionery, snacks, canned food 
and ready-to-eat meals. 
 
Figure 5.5 Market share of supermarket chains in overall distribution 
(Germany; consumer prices) 
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Source: IfH/BBE. 
 
  
 
                                                 
1 It is not completely fair to compare the consumer euro spent on food service with the 
consumer euro spent on food retail. Service and gross margins are much higher in food 
service. Nevertheless, figure 5.5 clearly shows that there is more than supermarket 
chains.  
  
A study conducted in Italy by ISMEA (2007) shows that small and family-
owned grocery shops (defined as traditional retail) sell half of all fresh 
food products and thus compete with larger supermarkets. In 
particular, bread and fish are still sold in small and often specialised 
groceries, and a significant proportion of fruits and vegetables are sold 
in specialised shops and street markets. 
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Table 5.3 Market shares of retail channels for home food consumption 
(euros, 2006) 
  Modern retail Traditional retail  Others 
Total food 77.0 14.8 8.2 
Non-fresh food 88.0 5.8 6.2 
Fresh food 61.8 27.1 11.1 
Meat 66.1 29.7 4.2 
Eggs 79.7 8.8 11.5 
Milk 82.0 17.4 0.6 
Fish 51.6 36.7 11.7 
Bread 55.2 40.9 3.9 
Vegetables 51.5 19.5 29.0 
Fruit 55.4 21.5 23.1 
Source: ISMEA (2007). 
 
Food processing is concentrated in many Member States. This holds 
for small Member States, but also for countries like France and the UK. 
Concentration is moderate in German and Italian food processing, 
but is high for specific products. Food retail is highly concentrated 
throughout the EU with the exception of southern Italy and some East 
European countries. When assessing supply concentration, one 
should note that there are alternative distribution channels for the 
food processing industry (food service and SMEs in food retail) and 
that not all food retailers are monolithic buying blocks. 
 
5.1.3 Profitability 
 
Food processing 
Average profitability1 in the European food and beverage industry 
remained constant in 2000-2007. Profitability declined sharply in 
Poland and fluctuated wildly in the Netherlands (possibly due to 
incidental profits of the large multinationals). The Dutch food and 
beverage industry had two profitable years, namely 2005 and 2008.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this study, profitability is measured as gross operating surplus as a 
percentage of turnover.  
Profitability also remained more or less constant for small firms (figure 
5.7), as far as we have information in this respect. Small firm 
profitability decreased in Italy, increased in Spain and remained 
constant in Germany, Portugal and Hungary. 
 
Figure 5.6 Gross operating surplus in the European food and beverage 
industry (as a % of turnover).  
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Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat and Dutch Statistics. 
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Figure 5.7 Gross operating surplus in the European food and beverage 
industry (as a % of turnover) (small firms: 1-19 employees) 
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Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat and Hungarian Statistics. Data for Hungary refer to 
profits before taxes and firms with 1-10 employees. 
 
 Tables 5.4A to 5.4C break down average profitability of the 
European food processing industry for the period 2005-2007 for 9 sub-
sectors1 and for 3 size classes, namely 1-19 employees, 20-49 
employees and 50-249 employees. These tables show that on 
average profitability was positive for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
                                                 
1 The sub-sectors identified in tables 5.4A to 5.4C refer to the 3 digit level in the NACE 
classification rev. 1.1.  
  
Table 5.4A Gross operating profits as percentage of turnover  
(2005-2007; 1-19 employees) 
 Meat Fish Fruit & 
veget
ables 
Oils & 
Fats 
Dairy Cere
als 
Anim
al 
feed 
Other 
food 
Bever
ages 
Belgium 6.27 8.30 8.90 5.27 6.77 6.23 4.13 18.80 10.57 
Bulgaria 0.40 6.30 11.30 7.00 2.30 1.80 4.00 4.60 13.00 
Czech Rep. 8.80  10.60 2.90 0.07 9.17 4.07 12.67 10.45 
Denmark 4.33 4.97 6.87 3.20  13.45 6.50 13.67 8.83 
Germany 10.83 6.83 12.60 5.40 5.63 12.97 8.57 16.13 7.27 
Estonia 4.73 5.10 9.27  7.33 14.40 13.40 6.37 6.67 
Ireland 15.40 18.60 14.17 4.10 14.13 17.40 8.90 15.90 26.10 
Greece 13.73 14.43 11.00 15.33 13.47 11.83 10.47 15.50 15.30 
Spain 10.23 8.87 19.97 7.63 9.33 5.67 4.67 14.20 15.23 
France 6.40 3.57 5.77  3.33 5.87 4.00 13.87 8.90 
Italy 10.80 7.30 8.50 8.17 11.03 9.53 10.15 18.03 10.97 
Cyprus 9.00  12.47  16.33 16.80 4.93 12.37  
Latvia 10.80 16.10 40.70  31.47 12.50 13.60 17.90 11.30 
Lithuania 2.13 6.97 8.10  -0.57 6.93 12.60 3.63 5.00 
Hungary 3.70  5.57  2.40 14.07 5.87 5.90 11.10 
Netherland
s 
8.70 15.20 1.00 4.40 6.33 8.40 3.00 13.80 8.95 
Austria 14.70  31.65  38.17 20.93 30.10 20.47 26.30 
Poland 7.30 6.60 10.55 5.90 7.00 8.05 6.80 8.95 14.30 
Portugal 5.00 4.70 7.30 9.27 4.20 9.20  7.87 9.60 
Romania 4.33 2.73 5.83 -2.73 4.37 2.23 3.10 6.07 5.80 
Slovenia 3.97 6.00 13.40  6.07 10.40 11.60 12.07 -2.17 
Slovakia 4.23 3.70  4.50 7.10  12.50 10.43 11.27 
Finland 26.03 9.85 8.63  2.80 11.83 7.57 17.20 4.55 
Sweden 8.70 17.10 11.77 8.25 10.00 8.13 5.30 18.97 7.67 
UK 16.87 4.60 13.30  11.17 14.50 10.10 23.37 13.27 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat. 
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Table 5.4B Gross operating profits as percentage of turnover  
(2005-2007; 20-49 employees) 
 Meat Fish Fruit & 
veget
ables 
Oils & 
Fats 
Dairy Cere
als 
Anim
al 
feed 
Other 
food 
Bever
ages 
Belgium 5.37   9.30   2.93 9.73 2.97 10.67 9.30 
Bulgaria 7.10 14.70 4.10 6.70 9.50 3.40 8.80 7.00 19.70 
Czech Rep. 5.13   2.75   3.30 9.90 11.30 7.80 7.10 
Denmark 3.50 5.80 7.55   2.85   8.30 10.37 7.63 
Germany 8.60   6.53   2.60 8.67 6.10 11.40 8.30 
Estonia 5.17 6.15 8.70   3.63     4.80 3.75 
Ireland 6.63 4.73 13.10 10.40 8.30 8.30 0.10 4.80 9.15 
Greece 4.13 -1.90 7.47 7.50 0.70 6.75 11.90 11.83 2.07 
Spain 7.47 10.50 8.40 12.33 5.80 6.80 5.40 9.97 17.83 
France 2.93 4.87 5.40   3.40 6.00 2.60 7.40 8.40 
Italy 4.93 5.47 8.67 4.77 5.77 5.15 5.40 11.20 9.47 
Cyprus 2.80           7.87 14.20   
Latvia 16.10 6.10 27.50   9.90     17.27 7.35 
Lithuania 3.50 4.10 5.95   7.93 10.40 3.70 9.93 10.77 
Hungary 6.87   7.80   3.10 6.37 21.60 7.87 10.07 
Netherland
s 
6.60 18.90 7.80   6.17   4.87 10.80 11.45 
Austria 5.23   11.20   8.80   10.25 13.63   
Poland 4.30 6.30 12.75   5.70 8.35 9.90 12.95 10.80 
Portugal 6.00 5.70 8.50 4.53 8.60 9.43 5.00 10.53 14.00 
Romania 5.30 8.57 13.30 13.80 6.17 3.37 7.35 7.17 7.50 
Slovenia 6.43             6.27 0.90 
Slovakia -10.17   6.90   12.80 7.70 9.50 6.07 6.00 
Finland 6.27 8.10 9.40     15.60 8.80 8.47   
Sweden 7.93       6.03     16.60 11.20 
UK 11.87 20.80 16.93 7.80 10.83 15.00 5.17 21.53 10.65 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat. 
  
Table 5.4C Gross operating profits as percentage of turnover  
(2005-2007; 50-249 employees) 
 Meat Fish Fruit & 
veget
ables 
Oils & 
Fats 
Dairy Cere
als 
Anim
al 
feed 
Other 
food 
Bever
ages 
Belgium 4.63   9.20   2.27     9.20 8.33 
Bulgaria 10.40 12.00 7.00 3.80 11.60 13.30 4.00 8.70 10.10 
Czech Rep. 5.30 1.70 8.70   2.70 7.50 6.00 8.87 12.95 
Denmark   3.10 7.15   8.63 6.10 5.05 7.53   
Germany 4.80 2.70 4.23 0.30 3.63 7.97 6.30 11.80 11.20 
Estonia   3.67 10.20   5.23     5.83 10.05 
Ireland 5.80 8.53 3.55   6.40 10.90 13.05 18.37 4.20 
Greece 9.83 8.50 8.65 6.50 8.83 10.40 6.05 8.10 23.00 
Spain 5.80 6.20 8.20 4.77 6.20 7.10 5.10 11.47 15.53 
France 2.50 4.40 4.60   3.10 4.13 2.87 6.17 10.20 
Italy 4.60 6.90 6.60 3.63 6.73 5.95 1.90 9.47 9.67 
Cyprus 6.83   14.65   7.70     9.90   
Latvia 10.63 9.20 15.50   10.50     14.80 13.43 
Lithuania 2.73 4.37 12.63   6.30   4.40 9.50 12.63 
Hungary 4.97   9.27   6.65 22.37 4.85 10.80 10.40 
Netherland
s 
4.03 4.37 8.67   6.93 9.30 5.00 10.63 10.43 
Austria 7.13   13.30 1.50 5.60   10.95 11.10 12.65 
Poland -0.10 8.60 12.05   5.65 11.35 9.60 14.75 10.90 
Portugal 4.90 6.23 7.65 4.33 7.07 9.10 6.20 9.80 13.85 
Romania 6.80 4.00 12.55 6.73 8.87 2.33 10.70 10.95 12.07 
Slovenia 2.53             5.60 1.85 
Slovakia -1.17 6.45 6.37   3.65   2.70 15.10 9.07 
Finland 3.90 0.15 12.10   4.90 5.30 6.00 12.60   
Sweden 8.67 5.90 17.20   9.40 19.95   12.37 8.87 
UK 10.50 17.65 7.50   7.77 15.20 6.43 17.23 15.70 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat. 
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A comparison of the data in tables 5.4A-5.4C with the period 2002-
2004 shows that profits increased in most food processing sub-sectors 
in the 2000s for all three size classes (table 5.5). Profitability decreased 
in the fruits and vegetables industries for firms with 20 employees or 
more. It also decreased for two of the three size classes in the 
beverage industry. There are also countries in which profit developed 
less favourably. In Hungary, profits before taxes decreased between 
2002 and 2008 (Appendix 1A). This held in particular for medium-sized 
firms (50-249 employees). 
 
Table 5.5 Change in gross operating surplus between 2002-2004 and 
2005-2007 for three size classes 
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1-19 1.11 -0.04 3.77 3.25 2.12 1.80 0.22 1.04 -0.85 
20-49 -0.48 1.65 -0.53 3.03 1.57 0.50 0.18 0.40 0.61 
50-249 0.83 1.59 -0.34 -1.56 1.90 2.05 0.14 -0.50 -0.65 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat. 
 
Food retail 
Profitability varied between 3% and 6% in European food retail. It 
remained constant from 2000 in France and Spain as well as, on 
average, in the smaller European countries. This also holds for 
Germany, with the exception of 2007, when profits doubled relative 
to 2006. In the UK, profitability declined in 2001 from its very high level 
in 2000 (8%), and continued to fall. In Italy, profitability declined from 
4% in 2000 to 1% in 2005, and then recovered. In Poland, profitability 
fluctuated wildly between 2000 and 2005, then stabilized at 6%. There 
is no evidence of a structural improvement in food retail profits. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that the Dutch and Belgian competition 
authorities both concluded that food retail transmits changes in 
supply prices into consumer prices (SPF Economie 2008; NMa 2009). 
 Two qualifications can be made. First, note that profitability 
measured by gross operating surplus as a percentage of turnover is 
higher in food processing than in food retail (compare figures 4.6 and 
4.8). However, one should take into account that food processing 
and food distribution are different activities.  
One cannot directly compare their 'profitability numbers'. In the end, 
the relevant criteria is return on investment and return on equity. 
Profitability in terms of turnover is higher in food processing than in 
food retail, because investment is higher. The main conclusion of this 
section is that there was no overall deterioration in profitability in 
either food processing or food retail. 
 Second, there may be large differences in the profitability of 
individual firms. This holds for agriculture, food processing and food 
retail. Differences in profitability tend to be higher within agricultural 
sectors than among sectors (see e.g. ABN 2003). In Dutch retail, 
Ahold's Albert Heijn has a market share of 31% but gains 57% of 
industry profits (Rabobank 2010). This implies that Albert Heijn has a 
much deeper purse than its competitors. The same is likely to hold for 
the dominant retailer in the UK (Tesco), which obtains substantial cost 
advantages over its rivals on its purchases. 
 
Figure 5.8 Gross operating surplus in European food retail (supermarkets 
selling predominantly food, beverages and tobacco; % of 
turnover) 
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Retailers make larger gross profits on private label than on industrial 
brands. However, industrial brands may very well remain more 
profitable per square foot, because their turnover rate is still higher. 
Ailawadi and Harlam (2004) illustrate this for the US grocery retail 
chain (see table 5.8). There are major differences between product 
categories in this respect. 
  
Table 5.6 Differences in retailer profitability between private labels 
and industrial brands 
 Private labels Industrial brands 
Net margin 23.2% 15.9% 
Price a) $1.00 $1.45 
Dollar contribution $0.23 $0.23 
Turnover rate b) 90 100 
Direct product profitability  21 23 
a) Normalized to $1.00; b) Index. 
Source: Allawadi and Harlam (2004) as cited by Kumar and Steenkamp (2007). 
 
At the aggregate level, there were no major developments in 
profitability in either food processing or food retail. This also holds for 
SME food processors. Profitability in food processing was positive for 
most sub-sectors and most countries. Profitability increased in most 
sub-sectors during the 2000s, although there were exceptions. 
 
 
5.2 Impact of private labels on industry structure 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
The market share of private labels differs throughout Europe. Private 
labels have a market share of 17 to 54% for groceries. The market 
share is particularly high in Switzerland, the UK, Germany, Belgium 
and Spain, and low in the Netherlands, Poland, Greece and Italy. 
There is no obvious geographical pattern to the penetration rate. The 
market share of private labels is relatively high in most Western 
European countries and low in Southern and Central Europe, but 
there are exceptions. Between 2003 and 2009, the market share of 
private labels increased by 2-7% in Western and Southern Europe 
(with the exception of Spain), and by 10-26% in Spain and Central 
Europe. 
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Table 5.7 Market share of private labels based on volumes, % 
  2003 2009 Change 
Switzerland  n/a 54 n/a 
United 
Kingdom  
41 48 7 
Germany  35 40 5 
Belgium  38 40 2 
Spain  29 39 10 
Austria  n/a  37  n/a 
Slovakia  11 37 26 
France  28 34 6 
Portugal   n/a 34  n/a 
Denmark  25 28 3 
Hungary  17 28 11 
Finland  24 28 4 
Czech Rep 13 28 15 
Sweden  22 27 5 
Netherlands  22 25 3 
Poland  7 21 14 
Greece  n/a 18 n/a 
Italy  14 17 3 
Source: PLMA. 
 
 The market share of private labels differs from one product 
category to another. Private-label market share is high for frozen 
products and delicatessen, followed by dairy and dry groceries. 
Market share is low for fresh produce, confectionery and beverages. 
Private-label market share of specific product categories amounts to 
100% for the UK. It is indeed higher than 98% for the top 5 (the 
product categories with the highest private-label market share) in the 
UK. The market share of the top 5 is above 80% in Germany, above 
70% in France and Spain, above 60% in Italy, above 50% in Hungary 
and the Netherlands, and above 40% in Poland (PLMA Yearbook 
2009). Private label is particularly high for specific preserved fruits and 
vegetables, dairy, bread, rolls and pastry, and oils, seasonings and 
condiments (see Appendix 1B). 
 On the other hand, must-stock items still command large market 
shares for many products (IfH/BBE 2009).1 Figure 5.9 illustrates that 
private labels gained market share in Spain at the cost of secondary 
brands. National brands hardly lost market share. 
 
Figure 5.9 Market share of industrial brands versus private labels in 
Spain 
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5.2.2 Private labels in France 
 
This section describes the development of private labels for milk, 
breakfast cereals, and processed fruits and vegetables in France. The 
data used were drawn from the TNS Worldpanel database, which 
stores data obtained from a panel of approximately 10,000 French 
households.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The exact level depends on the definition chosen. IfH/BBE (2009) comes to shares for 
Germany ranging from 23% for yoghurt and fresh cheese, to 40% for sekt (a German 
champagne-like beverage) and chocolate, and to as much as 50% for certain 
condiments and seasonings.  
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Each consumer scans his/her purchases from food retailers (mass 
retailing and hard discount), thus providing information on value and 
quantity of food products bought as well as other information (where 
the products were purchased, their brands, their prices, their 
characteristics, possible promotional offers, etc.).  
In the analysis, we identify the four largest suppliers of industrial 
brands as well as all private labels. 
 
 Table 5.8 Market shares and average prices for private labels and 
brands in France (2004-2007) 
 Market share Prices a) 
 C4 PL C4 PL 
2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007 
Milk  22.4 24.8 26.6 31.0 0.80 0.82 0.66 0.67 
Breakfast 
cereals 
67.6 66.9 19.0 20.5 6.13 6.02 4.34 4.28 
Processed 
fruits 
37.8 37.8 31.7 30.6 3.09 3.44 1.66 1.72 
Canned 
vegetables 
22.4 23.7 44.0 45.4 3.60 3.66 2.17 2.33 
a) Euro per litre for milk and euro per kilo for the other products. 
Source: TNS Worldpanel. 
 
 The market shares of private labels are around 25%, whereas the 
market share of the industrial brands suppliers ranges from 24% to 
64%. Indeed, for milk, there are numerous small firms selling mostly first 
price (generics) goods that are not store brands. On the other hand, 
the breakfast cereals sector is quite concentrated, leaving 
secondary brands a limited outlet: 85% of the market is shared by 
industrial brand manufacturers and private labels. Regarding the 
processed fruits industry, the performance of private labels (32%) is 
strong compared to the concentration index of the sector (37%). The 
market share of the top-4 suppliers and private labels did not really 
change during the period 2004-2007 (figure 5.10). The increase in 
market share of PL brands for milk was to the detriment of hard-
discount and/or generic goods. 
 Although this is not always the case, prices are usually higher for 
branded products than for private labels. For homogeneous product 
categories - such as milk and, to a lesser degree, breakfast cereals - 
private labels have the classic price differential of around 25%. In 
contrast, regarding fruits and vegetables, where product offer differs 
greatly across manufacturers (numerous varieties with disparate 
prices), private labels are more present in low-value goods, leading 
to a greater average price difference from the national brands 
(more than 43%). 
 
 82 
Figure 5.10 PL market shares 2004-2007 (4-week periods, France) 
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Source: TNS Worldpanel 
 
Between 1999 and 2009, private-label market share increased from 
22.3 to 32.3% in France. However, for the four products investigated 
(milk, breakfast cereals, processed fruits, canned vegetables), the 
increase in private-label market share did not entail leading national 
brand market shares. For milk, both private label and the market 
shares of the four leading national brands increased. Private label 
expansion seems to have been to the detriment of secondary 
brands. 
 
Private label production by SMEs versus big firms in France 
Private labels are an important outlet for SMEs, most of which do not 
have well-known national brands. This is illustrated by the fact that in 
France the share of SMEs in private label production exceeds their 
share in aggregate industry turnover (table 5.9). While the share of 
SMEs in private label production remained constant over the years, 
their share in aggregate industry turnover fell. This implies that SMEs 
have become more dependent on private labels, but also that their 
survival may be enhanced by private label growth. 
 
Table 5.9 Market share of SMEs in PL production in France  
(1999-2006) 
Year PL 
penetrati
on  
rate 
Market share 
of SMEs 
(<100 
employees) 
Market share 
of SMEs 
(<250 
employees) 
Market share 
of SMEs in PL 
production 
(<100 
employees) 
Market share 
of SMEs in PL 
production 
(<250 
employees) 
1999 22.3 24.8 28.2 19.6 30.8 
2000 23.3 24.3 27.2 23.2 29.8 
2001 24.6 23.5 26.7 24.1 30.3 
2002 25.0 23.0 26.0 21.7 27.2 
2003 26.3 22.5 26.5 23.6 31.1 
2004 27.2 22.7 26.0 29.0 28.1 
2005 28.6 22.7 26.0 22.0 26.8 
2006 29.1 22.4 25.1 21.6 31.5 
 
 In terms of percentage, there are fewer SMEs than large firms 
producing private labels. Just over twenty per cent (21.1%) of all SMEs 
produce private labels, while just over thirty per cent (31.1%) of large 
companies do so. This result is driven by firms in the meat, fish, dairy 
and other food products sectors (column 1 in table 5.10). In the other 
sectors, there is no statistical difference in this respect. 
 When a firm produces private label goods, the share of private 
label production in total production does not differ between small 
and large firms, except for the sub-sector 'Other food products' 
(bread, biscuits, chocolate) (column 2 in table 5.10). In this sub-
sector, the share of private label in company turnover is larger for 
SMEs than for big firms. SMEs that manufacture private label goods 
have a higher aggregate turnover than SMEs that do not 
manufacture private label goods. For large firms, there is no such 
difference between firms that produce private label and those that 
do not. 
 Finally, firms' investment rate does not differ across firms' size 
(column 3 in table 5.10).1 This suggests that private label production 
could be motivated by production capacity use. Appendix 1C 
provides an in-depth analysis. 
                                                 
1 Investment rate is defined as the ratio between the investment and the added value 
of the firm at the market price (INSEE definition). 
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Table 5.10 Differences between SMEs and large companies 
 PL production PL rate in case 
of PL production 
Investment 
151 Meat < = = 
152 Fish < = > 
153 Fruits and vegetables = = = 
154 Oils and fats = * * 
155 Dairy < = = 
156 Cereals and starch = = = 
157 Animal feed = = = 
158 Other food < > = 
159 Beverages = = = 
Total < > = 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of INSEE. 
<SMEs are less likely to produce private label, >The PL or investment rate is higher for SMEs than for 
large firms, = no statistical difference between small and large firms, * = no data. 
 
In France, SMEs are less likely to produce private labels than large 
companies. However, SMEs' share in private label production is higher 
than their share in total turnover. From 1999 to 2006, private-label 
market shares increased from 22.3 to 29.1%. The market share of SMEs 
in food production decreased from 28 to 25%, while their market 
share in private label food production remained more or less 
constant (increased from 30.8 to 31.5%). PL expansion leads SMEs to 
specialise in private label production. In terms of investment, there is 
no significant difference between SMEs that produce private label 
and those that do not. 
 
5.2.3 Private labels in Italy 
 
Developments in number of brands and suppliers 
Scanner data available for selected dairy and cereals products in 
Italy for the period 2004-2008 allowed us to analyse the development 
of the number of brands being sold and the number of companies 
supplying Italian supermarkets (table 5.11). The number of brands 
increased in most sectors (with the exception of butter), as did the 
number of companies (with the exception of butter and whole 
yogurt). It is worth noting that the number of brands also proliferated 
in markets that had growing private-label market shares.  
Private labels play a role not only in mature markets where the 
number of brands concentrates, but also in growing markets where 
brand proliferation is still present. 
 Without going into causes and effects, one may observe that 
growth in the number of brands is correlated with growth in total 
sales. For UHT milk, niche markets for enriched UHT milk show bigger 
changes in sales, brands and companies than more traditional milk 
segments do. 
 Functional yogurt is another interesting case. This segment is 
certainly the most innovative of dairy product categories. The market 
potential is high, with great opportunities for innovative products that 
exploit consumers' increasing health concerns and their preference 
shift towards functional foods. This is illustrated by the change in the 
number of brands and companies between 2004 and 2008. For 
regularity-promoting active yogurt and cholesterol-lowering active 
yogurt, only one company was operating in the market in 2004; in 
2008, 11 companies were producing regularity-promoting active 
yogurt under 15 brands, and 8 companies were producing cholesterol-
lowering active yogurt under 9 brands. The fact that in the most 
innovative segments the number of brands is not much higher than the 
number of companies can be taken as a further indication of the 
innovativeness of the category, with each company entering the 
market with only one product. With the exception of the other 
functional yogurt segment, the C4 ratio is very high. Private labels have 
a role only in the most mature segment of this category, where their 
share is low (6%) but increasing sharply. 
 The situation is different in the more mature segments. Butter shows 
virtually no change in the number of brands and companies on the 
market. Whole yogurt registered a small increase in the number of 
companies, but a reduction in the number of brands on the market 
for all segments. 
 
Developments in market shares and concentration 
The market share of private labels increased for many product 
categories, in particular butter and whole yogurt; it decreased only 
for muesli. However, the pattern differed. For example, figure 5.11 
shows that in the refrigerated milk category, the market share of 
private label increased suddenly for a specific segment (micro-
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filtered milk), probably due to the introduction of new private label 
products.  
The C4 increased mainly in the more innovative segments and/or 
niche segments, where total sales are growing and private labels are 
less present. In fact, at the segment level, the C4 was higher, and 
conversely the private label share was lower, in the most innovative 
(new products in the first phases of their life-cycle) and/or niche 
segments. 
 
Table 5.11 Development of number of brands and suppliers in the Italian 
modern retail channels 
 
  
Brands 
(units) 
 
 
Companies 
(units) 
 
 
Market share 
 
C4 PL 
  2004 2008  2004 2008  2004 2008 2004 2008 
Refrigerated milk 368 413 + 148 182 + 0.68 0.60 0.02 0.09 
Whole milk 117 115 - 29 25 - 0.49 0.36 0.01 0.03 
Semi-skimmed 110 126 + 29 28 - 0.63 0.59 0.01 0.05 
Skimmed 32 34 + 18 18 = 0.60 0.69 0.00 0.00 
High quality 87 99 + 25 26 + 0.77 0.69 0.00 0.06 
Micro-filtered 15 28 + 7 10 + 0.86 0.65 0.14 0.32 
Enriched 5 7 + 4 6 + 0.96 0.97 0.00 0.00 
Lactose-free 2 5 + 2 4 + 0.46 0.86 0.00 0.00 
UHT Milk 398 433 + 181 211 + 0.59 0.58 0.15 0.15 
Whole milk 135 145 + 79 90 + 0.48 0.43 0.18 0.19 
Semi-skimmed 165 182 + 99 112 + 0.61 0.61 0.14 0.14 
Skimmed 62 63 + 35 37 + 0.63 0.61 0.26 0.28 
Enriched with vitamins 15 20 + 7 9 + 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.00 
Enriched with flavours 21 24 + 15 20 + 0.81 0.82 0.01 0.02 
Butter 333 314 - 50 46 - 0.67 0.55 0.11 0.17 
Natural 129 117 - 44 42 - 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.27 
Salty 8 8 = 8 8 = 0.96 0.88 0.03 0.08 
Other special types 197 189 - 19 20 + 0.75 0.50 0.05 0.16 
Whole yogurt 366 345 - 187 197 + 0.65 0.64 0.10 0.13 
White whole yogurt 93 91 - 55 59 + 0.68 0.58 0.12 0.16 
Whole yogurt with 
fresh fruit 
119 112 - 78 82 + 0.57 0.58 0.10 0.12 
Whole yogurt with fruit 
pieces 
60 52 - 42 39 - 0.76 0.73 0.11 0.13 
Flavoured whole 
yogurt 
94 90 - 65 65 = 0.61 0.67 0.07 0.09 
Functional yogurt 44 102 + 30 66 + 0.62 0.59 0.01 0.01 
Natural defence 
active 
31 53 + 21 39 + 0.87 0.82 0.02 0.06 
Regularity-promoting 
active 
3 15 + 1 11 + 1.00 0.97 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5.11 Development of number of brands and suppliers in the Italian 
modern retail channels (continue) 
 
  
Brands 
(units) 
 
 
Companies 
(units) 
 
 
Market share 
 
C4 PL 
  2004 2008  2004 2008  2004 2008 2004 2008 
Cholesterol-lowering 
active 
1 9 + 1 8 + n/a n/a 0.00 0.00 
Other functional 
yogurts 
9 26 + 9 21 + 0.61 0.57 0.00 0.00 
Breakfast cereals 215 244 + 130 178 + 0.87 0.86 0.09 0.09 
Standard 88 98 + 62 68 + 0.87 0.83 0.09 0.11 
Enriched 85 105 + 53 62 + 0.92 0.91 0.06 0.06 
Muesli 42 42 = 36 39 + 0.83 0.83 0.13 0.10 
Source: own elaboration based on IRI Infoscan data. Data refer only to sales in the modern retail 
sector. 
 
Development of prices 
Prices of private labels decreased relative to market prices from 2004 
to 2008 (table 5.12). This probably explains part of the growth of the 
private-label market share for dairy and cereals in Italy. Private label 
does not have a profound impact on the consumer prices of either 
the top-4 firms or the market. Leading firms are able to raise prices 
and to compete by stressing innovation, product differentiation, 
reputation and product quality. Further indications can be obtained 
by comparing different category/segments. For butter, for example - 
where private labels hold the largest market share and the top-4 firms 
the lowest market share - the price premium of the top-4 firms is the 
highest. 
 
Table 5.12 Development of the sales, shares and prices of private labels 
and industrial brands for different food categories in the Italian 
modern retail channels 
 Year Total sales  
('000 euros) 
Total sales a) Share Price b) 
        C4 PL C4 PL Total 
Refrigerate
d milk 
2004 753,259 581,386 0.68 0.02 1.45 1.09 1.30 
 2008 924,932 642,020 0.60 0.09 1.57 1.13 1.44 
UHT milk 2004 898,452 1,041,024 0.59 0.15 1.65 0.95 0.86 
 2008 1,103,231 1,140,416 0.58 0.15 2.05 1.14 0.97 
Butter 2004 242,575 39,619 0.67 0.11 16.15 5.92 7.15 
 2008 278,904 39,333 0.55 0.17 21.41 6.29 8.86 
Whole 
yogurt 
2004 463,223 138,747 0.65 0.10 5.34 2.64 3.33 
 2008 519,854 150,846 0.64 0.13 5.35 2.61 3.44 
Functional 
yogurt 
2004 262,422 49,729 0.62 0.01 4.12 4.28 4.55 
 2008 575,567 102,347 0.59 0.01 4.85 4.22 5.01 
Breakfast 
cereals 
2004 276,138 43,022 0.87 0.09 8.84 4.57 6.47 
  2008 374,327 54,533 0.86 0.09 9.55 4.53 6.80 
a) '000 litres for milk and tons for the other products; b) euro/l for milk and euro/kg for the other 
products. 
Source: own elaboration based on IRI Infoscan data. Data refer only to sales in the modern retail 
sector. 
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Figure 5.11 Market shares of private labels in Italian refrigerated milk 
market 
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Source: own elaboration based on IRI Infoscan data. Data refer only to sales in the modern retail 
sector. 
In Italy, the number of brands increased for most product categories 
analysed, especially in the most innovative segments. The C4 ratio 
also increased, mainly in the more innovative segments and/or niche 
segments, where total sales are growing and private labels are less 
present. Private-label market share increased steadily due to the 
extension of private label product lines and the decrease in relative 
prices. The number of suppliers also tended to grow. 
 
Private labels provide products at lower prices. They have a limited 
impact on the prices of branded products. 
 
 
5.3 Innovation 
 
The impact of private labels on innovation was inferred by analysing 
the development of the number of new product introductions. We 
conjectured that this number had decreased. The number of new 
product introductions was derived from the INNOVA database 
(www.innovadatabase.com). INNOVA has a panel of 700 
professionals in 74 countries collecting data on innovations in a 
selected number of industries, including food and beverages.  
INNOVA covers on average 90% of all innovations in the market. 
Although the database is not complete, one may uncover trends 
with respect to product introductions. 
 The analysis was carried out for bakery and cereal products, dairy, 
and processed fruits and vegetables, including fruit juices. The 
number of products introduced is related to the size of the national 
market (table 5.13). Most products are introduced in France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK. The number of products introduced in 
Italy is high due to the fragmentation of the market and the 
associated high level of product differentiation. The number of 
products introduced in Hungary is lower, probably because of 
differences in economic development and lower per capita income. 
The number of new product introductions has become very low in 
Spain due to the fall in the number of new product introductions from 
2005 till 2009. This is probably due to the growing market share of 
discounters and other retail formulas with a limited product 
assortment (see section 6). 
 Figures 5.12 to 5.19 show that the number of new product 
introductions increased. In absolute numbers, this holds for both 
private labels and industrial brands. There is, however, one major 
exception: in Spain, the number of new product introductions 
dropped dramatically. This holds in particular for industrial brands. The 
number of new private label product introductions was more or less 
constant in Spain. The number of new product introductions in the UK 
decreased for fruits, potatoes and vegetables, but was stable or 
increased for the other product categories. The share of private label 
in the total number of new product introductions increased, except 
in the UK. Private label was dominant in new product introductions in 
the UK in 2005, but since then the share of private labels in product 
introductions has fallen. Industrial brands had a comeback in new 
product introductions. In the other countries investigated, the number 
of new product introductions increased. This corresponds with the 
results of the previous section, in which we showed that the number 
of brands increased in Italy for selected dairy and breakfast cereals 
products. 
 There are differences in new product development in the 
respective product categories. 
 The results of this and the previous section illustrate that the variety 
of products being offered has been extended. There are more 
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brands on the market and there are more new product introductions. 
This holds for both private labels and industrial brands.  
The analysis does not allow us to say anything about the quality of 
the new product introductions. However, the number of industrial 
brands being introduced increased in all countries except Spain. In 
Spain, retail chains that offer a small number of SKUs - including but 
not exclusively discounters - gained market share at the cost of 
hypermarkets. In Spain, price and product quality gained importance 
over product variety. 
 Appendix 1D shows that R&D expenditures in the European food 
and beverage industry are still rising. They grew spectacularly in 
Germany between 2002 and 2007. This corroborates the data 
analysis in the section. They also grew by almost 20% in France and 
the UK, and on average by 40% in eight small countries for which 
there are publicly available data. R&D expenditures in Spain were 
stable between 2005 and 2007. 
 
In terms of product introductions, there has been no slowdown in the 
food industry's innovation rate. The number of product introductions 
grew between 2005 and 2009. There is one major exception: the 
number of product introductions in Spain fell dramatically. The share 
of private label in product introductions grew, except in the UK. 
  
Table 5.13 Number of products introduced in 2009 
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Baking ingredients  33 124 15 72 74 6 54 378 
Bread & bread 
products 
104 94 37 218 151 32 65 701 
Breakfast cereals 42 75 22 40 66 7 71 323 
Cakes & pastries  90 166 18 202 95 16 230 817 
Cereal & energy bars 43 68 18 61 27 7 84 308 
Savoury 
biscuits/crackers 
29 85 20 89 60 7 42 332 
Sweet biscuits/cookies 187 251 60 232 122 26 159 1037 
Total 528 863 190 914 595 101 705 3896 
Cheese 218 202 71 350 34 13 43 931 
Creamers 11 17 18 18 2 0 12 78 
Dairy alternative drinks 11 3 4 20 21 5 13 77 
Dairy drinks 24 96 30 69 31 24 43 317 
Fats & spreads 10 17 35 28 6 0 11 107 
Other dairy products 1 7 2 3 0 0 0 13 
Yogurt 89 176 30 77 18 24 84 498 
Total 364 518 190 513 112 66 206 1969 
Fruits 86 66 10 103 38 6 51 360 
Potato products 39 36 2 43 10 5 13 148 
Vegetables 199 63 3 215 31 7 49 567 
Juice & juice drinks 191 148 34 174 88 14 92 741 
Total 515 313 49 535 167 32 205 1816 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database. 
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Figure 5.12 Number of new product introductions: fruits, potatoes and 
vegetables 
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Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database. 
 
Figure 5.13 Private label share in the number of product introductions: 
fruits, potatoes and vegetables 
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Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database.  
Figure 5.14 Number of new product introductions: juices 
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Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database. 
 
Figure 5.15 Private label share in the number of product introductions: 
juices 
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Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database. 
 
 96 
Figure 5.16 Number of new product introductions: dairy 
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Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database. 
 
Figure 5.17 Private label share in the number of product introductions: dairy 
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Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database. 
 
 
Figure 5.18 Number of new product introductions: bakery & bread & 
biscuits 
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Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database. 
 
Figure 5.19 Private label share in number of new product 
introductions: bakery & bread & biscuits 
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Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the INNOVA database. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
 
This section provided a quantitative analysis of the possible impact of 
private labels on the competitiveness of SMEs and innovation in the 
food and beverage industry. 
 The number of firms in the food and beverage industry has 
decreased. This holds in particular for small companies. However, 
there are exceptions. The number of firms including SMEs has grown in 
some countries and in some sectors, notably those producing 
consumer products. It is not likely that the decline in the number of 
firms is due to a decline in profitability. Gross operating surplus is 
positive throughout the food and beverage industry, and improved in 
the 2000s. 
 The market share of private labels has grown, particularly in Spain 
and Eastern Europe. French evidence indicates that SMEs are less 
likely than large firms to produce private labels. This holds in particular 
for meat, fish, dairy and other food. On the other hand, for the 
production of bread, biscuits and chocolate ('other food'), the share 
of SMEs in private label turnover is larger than their share in total 
turnover.1 For this sub-sector, the share of private label production in 
total turnover is higher for SMEs that produce private label than it is 
for large firms that produce private label. 
 In Italy, the number of brands increased for most product 
categories analysed. Private labels gained market share by 
extending product lines and by lowering prices relative to the market 
level. The most innovative segments show higher brand proliferation, 
increasing concentration and low private label share. Private labels 
provide products with lower prices. However, there is no clear 
evidence of their effect on the price of branded products. 
 The number of new products introduced grew between 2005 and 
2009 for fruits and vegetables, and dairy and cereals products, 
except in Spain. The share of private labels in product introduction 
grew, except in the UK. The share of private labels in product 
introduction was very high in the UK in the mid-2000s (90%).  
                                                 
1 Because of the size of the 'other food' sub-sector, this also holds for France as a whole, 
but it does not hold for the other subsectors of the food and beverage industry when 
analysed on a subsector basis.  
Industrial brands made a comeback in terms of product 
introductions. Product variety increased and both private labels and 
industrial brands contributed in this respect. 
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6 Interview results 
  
In order to assess the hypotheses formulated in Section 3, we 
conducted 44 interviews in 6 EU Member States: Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. We interviewed 17 retailers 
and 27 suppliers. In section 6.1 we discuss the questionnaires and 
outline the selection of the firms interviewed. In section 6.2 we present 
the (anonymised) results of the interviews. 
 
 
 6.1 Interview set-up 
 
The aim of this study was to assess the impact of private labels on the 
competitiveness of the European food processing industry, in 
particular with respect to the position of SMEs and the innovativeness 
of the food processing industry. Questionnaires were used to test the 
hypotheses formulated in Sections 3 and 4, with a focus on the more 
qualitative part of the hypotheses. 
 We drew up two questionnaires, one for retailers and one for 
suppliers (Appendices 2A and 2B, respectively). The questionnaires 
comprised three parts: (1) a general introduction; (2) innovation in 
private labels and industrial brands; and (3) bargaining relations and 
the implications for profitability and innovations. According to 
economic theory, the ability and willingness to innovate depends on 
the ability to appropriate profits from innovations. For this reason, the 
questionnaires addressed developments in bargaining relations and 
the possible impact on innovation. 
 The interviews were confined as much as possible to the cereals, 
dairy, and fruits and vegetables industries (see Section 3). We wanted 
to restrict the interviews with suppliers to a limited number of industries 
in order to be able to generalise the results as far as possible. At the 
same time, this allowed us to make the interviews with retailers 
concrete and to let the interviews with suppliers and retailers be 
complementary to the data analysis in Section 5. 
 We selected both suppliers and retailers in such a way that we 
ended up with a sample of SMEs, large suppliers and retailers, 
covering both private labels and industrial brands (table 6.1). Some 
firms supply both private labels and industrial brands.  
The main advantage of stratification is that the sample represented 
the entire spectrum of stakeholders on the side both of food 
processors and of food retailers. The companies in Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK were selected by research institutes on the 
basis of their knowledge of the national supply chain in such a way 
that they met the stratification requirements. For Spain and Germany, 
research institutes received help from national supplier and retailer 
associations in selecting the companies. 
 The sample was not based on a random selection method (i.e. 
drawing ad random from the yellow pages) for two reasons. First, the 
lead time and resources did not allow it. Second, the politicisation of 
the study and the opposition of food retailers and their associations 
did not facilitate the search for companies willing to cooperate; this 
holds in particular for retailers. Given the sensitivity of the study, any 
sample is bound to be biased towards firms that are willing to 
cooperate. The interviews were used to come up with qualitative 
arguments to be used in the impact assessment of the possible 
introduction of a system of producer indications (Section 8) without 
assessing the empirical importance of all these arguments. 
 
Table 6.1 The interviewees 
 Suppliers Retailers 
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Germany*  1 1  2   2 1 - 2 
Hungary 6  2 2 2   6  - 4 
Italy 3 3 1 3 2  1 3 2 2 2 
Netherlan
ds 
2   2   1  1 1 1 
Spain 2 4  6   1 2 3 - 2 
UK 1 3    4  3 1 1 2 
Total  14 10 4 13 6 4 3 16 8 4 13 
 27* 27 27 17 
* We do not have information about the size of two of the German suppliers.  
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6.2 Results 
 
The role of private labels 
There are differences in the development of private labels 
throughout the EU. In the UK, private label is advanced and is 
recognised by consumers as offering high quality, matching (and in 
many instances exceeding) the quality offered by industrial brands. 
Moreover, the innovation rate in private label is high in the UK, driven 
by retailer competition in striving to meet or beat competitors' offers. 
At the same time, brands - faced with competition from other brands 
as well as private label - are driven to keep innovating and improving 
their offer, either by changes in products and packaging, new 
recipes and formulations, genuinely new products or greater 
emphasis on promotional offers to drive sales. 
 In the Netherlands, private labels are as well developed as they 
are in the UK, but their market share is substantially lower. Premium 
industrial brands still play a key role in most product categories in 
Dutch food retail. Some of the smaller retail chains lag behind in 
private label development compared to their big counterparts, for 
example because industrial brands play a more important role in their 
category management. Because of this lag, the market share of 
private label will rise in the Netherlands in the years to come. 
According to the retailers interviewed in the Netherlands, private 
label constitutes countervailing power relative to the dominant firms 
in Dutch food processing. 
 Even though private labels are well developed in Germany, some 
retailers lag behind in their private label development. Moreover, 
private label policies differ from one retailer to another. While for 
some discounters private label constitutes the core of their business, 
for others private label is an important part of a much wider product 
category. Full-service supermarkets have a complete assortment of 
private label as well as A, B and C brands, which they continuously 
scrutinize. Full-service supermarkets have a wide range of products, 
because their consumers expect everything. The number of private 
label SKUs is limited (10-20%) in full-service supermarkets. There are 
also major differences in the private label products offered. Part of 
the private label supply is aimed at the discount segment. This also 
holds for full-service supermarkets, which have to follow the supply of 
the leading discounters.  
The other part of private label supply aims at the quality of industrial 
brands or even the premium segment. Some retailers choose to offer 
private label products in all product ranges; others offer private label 
products only in those ranges where private label adds value to the 
category. They may not even want to offer private label in some 
product categories. 
 In Italy, the private-label market is evolving rapidly. The economic 
crisis seems to have favoured the rise of the private label, as a way to 
offer consumers 'everyday low-price' products. However, private 
labels are also evolving in their segmentation and targeting, with a 
quality that is vertically differentiated. What is common to all retailers 
interviewed in Italy is the importance of regional and traditional 
products as a differentiating tool. Beside the fact that some regional 
brands are 'must-stock' in given areas, retailers stated that they 
specifically look for local producers that offer high-quality and 
traditional niche products. Their products can be placed on the shelf 
with the producer's brand or under the private label umbrella. 
 In Spain, the market share of private labels rose in the 2000s, and 
particularly in the last years of the decade. Retail chains actively 
increased the market share of private label in the last decade. They 
reduced the number of SKUs and increased private-label market 
share in order to achieve a new balance between price and variety. 
The growth of private label was due to the large price differences 
between private label and industrial brands as well as to retailer 
investments in supplier-retailer relationships and the subsequent rise in 
the product quality of private label products. These developments 
took place against the background of an increase in the market 
share of supermarkets and discounters at the cost of hypermarkets. 
The growth of hypermarkets came to an end due to planning policies 
and the prohibition on selling below purchase price. Contrary to 
hypermarkets, supermarkets and discounters have a limited number 
of products on their shelves. 
 In Hungary, retail competition focuses on prices. There is little 
differentiation between branded and private label products: brands 
and private label are close substitutes. This implies that the growth of 
private label products 'cannibalises' brand sales. 
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 There are differences in the private label policies of food retailers: 
- Large multinationals present a highly segmented portfolio with 
products that range from basic grocery products to premium 
quality items. Moreover, they cover specific segments with 
products targeted at children or at consumers who are looking for 
health claims, biological products, traditional products, fair trade 
or eco-sustainability. The share of private labels depends on the 
store format. 
- Smaller chains have a lower private label share and present a 
much less segmented portfolio, which they are trying to increase 
in response to their customers' search for cheaper products. 
 
 The declared strategic role of private labels is that of creating 
store loyalty through differentiation and a good quality/price ratio. 
Private labels enable retailers to differentiate themselves from each 
other, while industrial brands do not (a bottle of Coca-Cola is the 
same in any retail outlet). Investing in differentiation is especially 
important because consumer loyalty to retail chains is decreasing: 
consumers shop in more retail chains than they did in the past. The 
private labels of leading international retail chains also compete 
directly with leading industrial brands suppliers in terms of product 
quality. Private label products typically generate higher margins for 
the retailer than national brands, but this does not hold for all of 
them. Some private label products are listed not because they add 
margins, but because they make the category complete, especially 
the low-quality segment. 
 The role of private labels, and that of the various kinds of private 
label suppliers, differs considerably according to the product 
category. For very basic products, the private label is a 
homogeneous commodity and the price element is dominant. This is 
reflected in the type of contracts, which in some cases are based on 
tendering. However, in general the selection of the private label 
producer is an important element for the retailer, and the bargaining 
process is less problematic than with industrial brands. 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplier-customer relations 
Retailers depend on a limited number of suppliers for large parts of 
their turnover and vice versa. Retailers source food primarily 
nationally. Exceptions to this are, for example, food products that are 
not available nationally (during some parts of the year), for instance 
due to climatic reasons. Food tastes differ throughout the EU. In 
Germany, for instance, there are large regional differences with 
respect to products like sausages and beer. There are also 
institutional barriers. According to some of the retailers interviewed, 
European wholesale markets are not well integrated. Manufacturers 
are able to segment national markets. Segmentation is further 
enhanced by national legislation. 
 In the UK, there are no formal contracts between suppliers and 
retailers in the sense of the fixed contracts that are common in 
Continental Europe (e.g. in Germany); they are looser, ongoing 
agreements that can be subject to regular price adjustments or other 
changes in the nature of supply. For suppliers seeking to raise supply 
prices, a case has to be made with retailers, which can be very 
difficult and will generally only be granted if there is a proven case of 
bona fide cost increases (which may necessitate the supplier 
providing essentially open-book accounting to prove its case). In 
contrast, retailers make regular and in some instances continuous 
demands for lower prices and improved terms of supply, often driven 
by one retailer seeking to improve its own position in the market 
relative to other retailers. Agreements to supply are often awarded 
for private label products on the basis of competitive tendering, but 
there may be a preference given to existing suppliers if they have 
good relations and work well with the retailer. Termination of supply 
agreements, both for brands and private labels, can be as short as 
giving 12 weeks' notice. 
 In Hungary, retailers allocate the supply of private label products 
through online tendering procedures. For branded products, 
negotiations are carried out by the head offices of the various retail 
chains. The first negotiation with a retail chain is considerably longer 
(2-5 rounds) and tougher than the annual renewal of the contracts, 
although that is also becoming more and more difficult. Suppliers 
characterised negotiations as tough. Contract terms are always 
written and are rarely changed during the 12-month term of an 
average contract. Contracts can be between 2 and 50 pages long.  
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Retailers may require as many as 70 commitments and contributions. 
The main elements of a contract are the detailed obligations of the 
suppliers. Suppliers' prices can be fixed for a half or a whole year, 
especially for private label products. Contracts rarely specify 
volumes. Volume specifications are more common for private label 
products than for industrial brands. Termination of supply is dealt with 
in the contracts and the notice period is usually 30 to 90 days. 
Suppliers are frequently threatened with delisting during the annual 
negotiations, but delisting actually occurs in only a few cases. It is 
more common to delist a few SKUs of a company either for a short 
period in the case of ad hoc better deals or permanently in the case 
of decreasing the number of SKUs ('portfolio cleaning'). 
 In the Netherlands and Germany, food processors tender or 
bargain for private label supply and bargain over industrial brand 
supply. A retailer may change from one private label supplier to 
another, but cannot change from a supplier of premium industrial 
brands. Full-service supermarkets have a relatively weak bargaining 
position relative to suppliers of A brands, because they have to stock 
premium and even secondary brands. The way retailers bargain with 
suppliers depends on, for example, the type of product, the category 
policy and the strength of the industrial brand. Commodities are 
tendered. The supply of products with a complex content and/or a 
variable quality may involve careful and lengthy selection and 
bargaining processes. Retailers may also source PL from more than 
supplier. Continuity in the supplier-customer relation pays off, 
because suppliers may invest in the relation: they come up with 
suggestions. 
 For the products considered in the analysis (dairy, fruits and 
vegetables, and cereals), contracts for industrial brands are 
concluded for a period of up to 12 months, and for private label for 6 
to 24 months depending on fluctuations in the prices of raw materials. 
Contract specifications and general conditions for brands may be 
determined by both retailers and/or suppliers. Retailers determine both 
in the case of private labels. Contracts with private label suppliers 
include product specifications, brand protection measures and 
minimum volumes. Because of liability, private label contracts include 
such elements as recall. Contracts with brand suppliers include 
promotion, financial charges and brand support. 
 
 Suppliers indicated that retailers dominate the bargaining process 
and determine contractual conditions. If the conditions are not met, 
brands are delisted or retailers switch from one private label producer 
to another. Emphasis is put on prices. Retailers stressed that they 
develop long-term relationships with suppliers, with the exception of 
suppliers of commodities. Long-term relationships are especially 
important for products of which the quality may vary. Retailers 
agreed that suppliers may indeed face retailers' increasing 
bargaining power, but this is the result of overcapacity in the food 
processing industry. Moreover, retailers had found in the previous 
decades that it is necessary to tie suppliers down. Suppliers may 
promise private label supply on the basis of projections with respect 
to excess capacity, but do not meet this supply when sales of their 
own brands soar. For retailers, not only quality and innovation but also 
dedication, speed, flexibility and reliability are important selection 
criteria. 
 Supplier-retailer relations in Spain differ from supplier to supplier, 
from retailer to retailer, and from product to product. Major retail 
chains engage in exclusive long-term relationships with their private 
label suppliers. They build relationships for life. Retailers carefully 
select suppliers with which they want to develop long-term 
relationships. Product specifications are defined jointly by both 
parties or unilaterally by retailers. Long-term relationships are meant 
to encourage suppliers to actively think for the joint supply chain. 
Retailers may carry the name of the producer on the private label or 
stick to the retailer's name. Retailers have a limited number of 
suppliers for private label. However, other retail chains tender their 
private label supplies for short periods of time (a couple of months) to 
a larger number of SMEs. 
 For branded goods, and also many private label products, in 
Spain framework contracts are concluded for a year, a season or 
sometimes a couple of years. The most important negotiation item is 
the number of SKUs to be listed. This is particularly important because 
of the reduction in the number of SKUs in Spain by some of the largest 
retail chains. Some of the suppliers of branded products indicated 
that it is increasingly difficult to get products listed. Retailers have a 
stronger bargaining position because they control shelf space and 
the stakes for retailers are smaller than they are for suppliers, even 
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large suppliers. Another supplier said this is very easy: one simply has 
to pay.  
Many issues - prices, discounts, volumes, promotional activities - are 
negotiated on a weekly basis. Negotiations are never finished. 
Retailers and suppliers keep wheeling and dealing until, and 
sometimes even after supplies are shipped. 
 In Italy, the switch of private label supplier is more frequent in 
commodity type products (such as ready-to-eat salads), but in 
general switching is not very frequent. The notice period for ending 
the contract is important and it is usually based on the clearing up of 
packaging stocks by the processors. However, switching has costs 
and both retailers and processors stated that they have the incentive 
to develop relationships that could evolve into partnerships. In this 
way, a retailer can have a supplier it can trust and with which it is 
possible to jointly develop products. In the same way, producers, if 
sufficiently guaranteed by the retailer in terms of future volumes, can 
have the resources to make new investments in plants and 
technology. It is also difficult for retailers to find processors that have 
sufficient capacity to serve the whole Italian market. Therefore, 
processors of the right size that can guarantee timing and volumes 
are not easily substitutable. 
 Retailers usually do not ask for the exclusive supply of private label 
products: one retailer reported having an ethical code that states 
that it cannot purchase more than 20% of a supplier firm's turnover. 
On the other side, processors stated that they are very careful not to 
let a single retailer have a large share in their turnover. To avoid this 
dependency, most of the processors interviewed serve a variety of 
channels besides modern retail. Traditional and specialised shops, 
food service and the B2B channels are important alternatives. Some 
of the private-label producers were also producing for leading 
brands, as co-packers or as key input suppliers. 
 The main elements of the private label contract are a very 
accurate definition of the product characteristics, the logistic of the 
product and an indication of volumes. The price is defined as a net-
net price, with usually no other discounts (in some cases, retailers ask 
an end of the year premium to private label processors with a 
percentage value that is lower compared to brands). The price of 
private label supply might be linked and indexed to the market price 
of key inputs or renegotiated in the event of important changes in 
the market. 
 The contract for brands is very different and conflicts during 
bargaining are more common. Elements of the contract are the 
invoice price, invoice discounts (%) that might be linked to volumes, 
and out of invoice discounts, mainly represented by the end of the 
year premium, which might range from 1 to 4%. Fixed contributions 
are then related to co-marketing activities, shelf space and 
promotions. The planning of promotions in the contract varies a lot: 
leader brands normally have the number and level of promotions 
stated in the annual contract. However, many promotions are 
agreed upon during the year. 
 
Business practices 
The business practices relevant to the retailer-processor relationship 
are mainly those mentioned in the contract terms. Other practices - 
such as the buy-back of perishable products or the adjustments of 
the contract terms - seem to have a limited role. Retailers consider 
buy-back, rightly or wrongly, as a sign of goodwill. Buy-backs are 
more frequent for small independent retailers, whose turnover is low. 
 According to most of the retailers we interviewed, the delisting 
threat plays a marginal role in bargaining relations: if a brand has value 
to consumers, both parties have an incentive to have it on the shelf. 
Delisting occurs in a limited number of cases as a result of the 
'deterioration' of the relationships between suppliers and retailers. 
Retailers and some suppliers stated that it is usually a matter of revising 
and optimizing the product portfolio of the brand; some retailers give 
notice to producers when they do not plan further orders of some 
items, while other retailers simply stop ordering. Processors also stated 
that they might stop supplies of their branded products; however, this 
rarely happens, and usually only when they fear the failure of the 
retailer or when the chain is selling the product at a price that is 
definitely not in line with the brand positioning. According to other 
brands suppliers, though, the delisting threat is one of the crucial 
mechanisms in bargaining between suppliers and retailers. There have 
been instances in the last decade in which both retailers and 
processors gave notice to either their suppliers or their customers more 
or less overnight (1 week). 
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      Payment periods are not always respected, mainly for brand 
supply. According to processors, this is a common practice for some 
retail chains. However, they seem to fear the failure of a small retailer 
more than a large retailer not respecting the payment terms. 
Payments may take more time than legally allowed. 
 Promotions are widely used across product categories and 
brands, while having basically no role for private labels. Retailers 
have an incentive to make promotions since they can attract new 
customers to their stores and they can offer price benefits to the 
existing ones. Brands, especially for the more homogeneous 
products, are almost obliged to participate in promotions since it is 
the only way to increase volume sales. Opinions about the overall 
effect of promotions differ and are uncertain: for some actors, if 
promotions are well planned they can increase sales with little effect 
on the vertical chain; for others, it is a perverse game that makes 
everyone lose and that stresses the productive capacity of the 
vertical chain, creating inefficiencies. Several interviewees indicated 
that price promotions of industrial brands are effective in boosting 
the sales growth of industrial brands and stopping private label 
growth. 
 In the UK, the practices that retailers use in their dealings with 
suppliers are now governed by the Groceries Supply Code of 
Practice (GSCOP), following an investigation concluded by the UK 
Competition Commission in 2008. This code appears to offer benefits 
to both suppliers - by protecting them against certain abuses of retail 
buyer power - and retailers, by clarifying the legal basis for the use of 
practices and ensuring a level playing field amongst retailers in 
respect of their treatment of suppliers. 
 Even with GSCOP in place, it appears that brand suppliers are 
expected to provide extensive in-store promotional support for their 
products, through promotion support payments and by covering the 
cost of price promotions (e.g. special offers in the form of multi-buys 
or discounted prices). Retailers can also demand large sums as 
financial contributions, presented as 'pay to stay' fees 
('Nichtauslistungsrabatte'), backed by a threat of delisting products 
or offering reduced shelf space. 
 
  
 
Private label performance 
The impact of private labels on retailers' performance is obviously 
seen by retailers as positive, even if the private label share is low. 
Private labels are the tool to reach the strategic objectives of 
increasing product differentiation, raising store loyalty and 
generating higher margins. For this reason they have the best shelf 
position in many supermarket chains. However, some of the 
interviewees stated that branded products get better facings 
because of the financial contributions charged by retailers as well as 
the price promotions offered by brand suppliers. Small retail chains in 
fact lean on leading brands and even followers. Only some retailers 
said that private labels are also a way to gain bargaining strength 
over brands. Other retailers consider the private labels as a shelf 
'cleaning' tool: only those brands that mean something to consumers 
(in terms of distinguished benefits, values, innovation, etc.) remain on 
the shelf; the rest is private label domain. The value added created 
by private labels is reflected in the employment in the marketing, 
R&D and quality control departments in supermarket chains. 
 For suppliers, private label production generates positive effects 
due to stable and large volumes. Production capacity is better 
utilized, productivity increases and logistic costs decrease. The 
downside of private label production is its low margins and its impact 
on innovation and branding. Even though private-label producers 
may incur few marketing costs, some of the suppliers interviewed 
indicated that although they cover their production costs, they 
barely cover the innovation and design costs. Private label 
production typically involves a cost strategy. Price competition is 
fierce, but may be softened by product specialisation in the private-
label market, that is, by serving different segments of the market. One 
of the interviewees indicated that he followed this strategy with 
success. The interviewee develops a few products each year. The 
innovations are incremental and have high volume prospects. 
Industrial brands lead innovation (innovative recipes) and are able to 
deal with smaller batches. 
 For retailers, the risks associated with product introductions are 
smaller for industrial brands than for private labels. Industrial brands 
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receive promotional support from the suppliers, while private labels 
do not. Moreover, industrial brands generate fees. Private label 
production involves risks for the retailers with respect to unsold 
volumes and packages. Part of this risk is shifted to suppliers, who 
have to bear Copycatting successful products does not involve 
major risks, but cannibalises premium brands in the category, also for 
the retailer. The costs and risks of introducing premium private labels 
are as high as they are for brands suppliers. Because private label 
involves umbrella branding, retailers are eager to guard the 
reputation of their retailer brand. 
 
Innovation 
Private labels can play many roles in the market, but not that of 
product innovation. This is the opinion of most of the firms we 
interviewed. Retailers' direct contribution to innovation is low, except 
for some of the multinationals. They take little risk in introducing new 
private labels, they do not appear to promote innovative product 
concepts on their private label suppliers, they partially or fully cover 
the risk and the information asymmetry of new product introduction 
by brands using listing fees. Private labels enter the market at a later 
stage, usually copycatting a successful product of the leader. 
However, this delay is shorter (the retailers take more risk) if the new 
product fits the retailer's position in the market particularly well. 
Innovation is still left to brand leaders, which have the technological 
know-how and the resources to sustain both R&D and the 
introduction of the new product onto the market. Many of the 
specialised small and large brands' suppliers interviewed indicated 
that they were able to continue innovating and marketing their 
products. It is a major challenge to gain shelf space for new 
products. Success is dependent on obtaining listing from as many 
retailers as possible, especially the largest ones. Brand producers will 
typically be forced to cannibalize the space allocated to existing 
products in order to make space for new ones. 
 On the other hand, as some of the retailers interviewed indicated, 
the food industry has not taken up consumer demand with respect to 
convenience and social concerns. Private label products play a role 
in meeting these aspects of demand. The private label share in such 
convenience products as fresh ready-to-eat meals is usually well 
above 90% (PLMA, 2009). This is also a consequence of freshness 
requirements and the complexity of logistics. Retailers have a 
comparative advantage over processors in logistics. The food 
industry has also not responded to consumer demand for social 
concerns - fair trade, organics, environmental and animal welfare, 
and so on.  
Retailers stressed that their proximity to consumers helps them to 
develop new product categories that have been neglected by food 
processors. Although the innovations may not be radical, they 
definitely generate value. One should not overlook the fact that 
retailers have large product development and marketing 
departments. Retailers integrated backward into the supply chain 
and now perform activities that were previously carried out almost 
exclusively by food processors. 
 The number of new products introduced into the market varies 
depending on the sector and the country. In Spain, Italy and 
Hungary, the perception is that the recent economic crisis reduced 
the number of new product introductions, since both retailers and 
processors are less willing to take risks. Suppliers mentioned three 
reasons: 1) profitability is low, which leaves little financial scope for 
innovation; 2) large retail chains have reduced the number of stock 
keeping units (SKUs) in order to survive the crisis;1 and 3) there are no 
groundbreaking innovation ideas around in the food industry, apart 
from functional food and packaging, design, use and taste. Because 
of the reduction in product introductions, the selection of new 
products is more accurate and this might have increased the success 
rate of new introductions. In Germany, on the other hand, the 
number of product introductions and the number of products on the 
shelves are increasing, also in discounters. 
 Because the number of new branded product introductions is 
growing and branded products obtain less distribution, at least in 
some countries, revenues and profits on specific brands (SKUs) tend 
                                                 
1 Apart from this reduction, there is large discrepancy between the number of products 
available and the number of products on the shelves. The number of products on the 
market (1,000,000 SKUs) and the number of products introduced annually (120,000 SKUs) 
far exceed the number of products on the shelves of an average full-service 
supermarket (20,000 SKUs) or even a hypermarket (60,000 SKUs). Many products 
developed flop, and are bound to flop given the abundance of products available. 
According to some retailers, these numbers also illustrate that the food industry pursues 
a push strategy with respect to innovation and tends to develop products for which 
there is no consumer demand.  
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to fall. Some of the suppliers interviewed indicated that they had 
curtailed production and closed down factories in the previous 
decade. New product introductions receive less promotional support. 
Some suppliers feel obliged to reduce spending on R&D and 
innovation efforts. As a result, suppliers enter a vicious circle whereby 
sales drop further, they reduce R&D and advertising further, etc. 
Other suppliers indicated that they intend to speed up innovation in 
the decade to come. 
 The effect of private labels on processors differs according to 
whether they are brand leaders or private-label producers, or both: 
- The brand leader finds a new competitor. This may either foster or 
curtail innovation efforts. One brand leader explicitly stated that 
the company was forced to increase investments in R&D in order 
to be more innovative and, therefore, maintain its market share 
and margins. In the past, its rival processors were not sufficiently 
strong to be a threat, while private labels are now effectively 
reducing the shares of the company's brands and squeezing the 
corresponding margins. Other interviewees stated that the 
following practices are contributing to a decline in innovation: 
- The delisting of a large number of SKUs at short notice affects 
sales, profitability and investments. 
- A brands' supplier indicated that during a meeting with a retailer 
about a product introduction, the retailer said that his company 
would use the idea to make a private label product out of it (with 
the help of another private label supplier). 
- Another brands' supplier presented Nielsen data indicating that 
private label products have more shelf space and more SKUs than 
is warranted on basis of their turnover.1 
- Suppliers share information with retailers about their strategic 
plans, including product introductions. The information shared 
may be used by retailers to promote their private label policies. 
While competition law does not allow the sharing of information 
between horizontal competitors, it does allow information sharing 
between retailers and suppliers, even though they compete both 
vertically and horizontally. This information is abused, according to 
suppliers, in order to copycat. Of course, copycatting is relatively 
easy for new flavours and packaging, and relatively difficult for 
                                                 
1 Retailers may have other reasons to dedicate a lot of shelf space to private labels, for 
instance their proliferation vis-à-vis other retailers. 
more substantial innovation such as the use of newly developed 
ingredients. 
 
 
- The brand followers are in a more critical position, according to 
some of our interviewees. If their brands have a sufficient value to 
consumers, they might survive on the shelf; otherwise they will be 
out, and perhaps switch to private label production. 
- Local producers with good reputations appear to be attractive to 
retailers, either under the private label umbrella (to be sold in a 
larger territory) or under their brand (to be sold locally). This was 
confirmed by a local processor: the firm had decided to stay out 
of modern retail and to focus on traditional/specialty shops and 
food service; however, given their reputation in the area, retailers 
wanted the firm's products to be sold in the stores within the 
region. 
- Other firms specialise in private label production. In fact, the 
interviewed firms were not fully specialised, since they were also 
serving larger brand leaders or had their own brands. However, 
their dynamics are particularly interesting to mention: 
- One private label producer was initially a supplier of semi-
finished food ingredients. It decided to become a private label 
supplier and made the investments that were required to grow. 
The producer initially started copycatting branded products. 
However, the investments made and the resources generated 
by the larger volumes increased its processing know-how. This 
allowed the next step: supplying national brand leaders. The 
producer became an important partner of industrial brands, 
jointly cooperating in developing new products under 
partnership relationships. This reduced the risk of being 
substitutable, compared to the private label supply. 
- Two private-label producers stated that thanks to private label 
production, they had evolved from being regional firms into 
companies that supply private labels internationally. They 
focused on a cost leadership strategy. They are now investing 
in developing their own brands. 
- Another processor grew thanks to the private label production 
and became a co-leader in its sector. The resources generated 
by private labels were invested in innovation and the firm is 
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now one of the most innovative firms in the category with an 
own brand that is now growing in importance. 
 
- Urged by retailers, one producer started adding E numbers to 
its products. This boosted sales, because the physical attributes 
(i.e. the colours) of the products became more attractive, 
especially to children. 
 
 Not all food categories allow private label processors to evolve in 
this positive way and not all food processors are able to take this 
opportunity. For example, when the processed fruit or vegetable is 
more of a commodity type, the private label producer finds it hard to 
support its own brand and has virtually no alternative to private label 
production. 
 Some interviewees indicated that copycatting is a problem for 
brands and/or private labels. Brand dress, product formulation and 
packaging are copied by other brands and by private labels. Yet, it is 
also the case that a retailer's private label is copied by another 
retailer or a brand manufacturer. Copycatting is a problem if 
producers are not able to recoup their innovation costs. This, 
however, is a general rather than a private label problem. 
 The above points suggest that while retailers do not seem to 
directly promote innovation, private labels could have an indirect 
and positive innovation effect on both brand leaders and smaller 
processors. However, in some instances, some retailer business 
practices - whether or not they are related to the development of 
private label - also have a negative effect. 
 
Producer indications 
The interviewed retailers and suppliers in Italy and Hungary on the one 
hand and those in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands on the other 
hand had differing opinions about producer indications. Retailers and 
suppliers in Spain hold an intermediate position. It should be noted that 
many interviewees did not have strong opinions with respect to 
producer indications. The matter is not always being discussed in the 
companies concerned. Many interviewees gave personal opinions. 
 Producer indications are already common in Italy, Hungary and 
Spain. Many of the interviewed retailers (and suppliers) are 
favourable to the initiative of having an obligatory system of 
producer indications on private labels. Many retailers already write 
the name of the producer on their private label. They see it as a way 
to give transparency to consumers, creating a positive attitude 
towards the product. Brands' suppliers may even feel obliged to 
advertise that they do not produce private labels. The interviewees 
did not show concern about the possible consequences for the 
differentiating objective of the chain (the same producer can 
appear on the private labels of various chains) since the product 
recipes are different. Retailers stated that in some cases the 
processors do not want their name on the product; this applies 
especially to processors that have higher brand reputations. One of 
the suppliers we interviewed confirmed this. It is difficult to market 
both brands and private labels, especially for commodities. However, 
for large firms the problem is easily solved: they create a new 
company with a new name. For SMEs, it may be an issue. Brands' 
suppliers sometimes use private label to optimise capacity and to 
realise economies of scale. An obligatory system of producer 
indications may compel firms to opt for either private label or brands. 
The choice will probably depend on the strength of the supplier and 
its brands. For this reason, some of the interviewees said that there 
should not be an obligatory system. 
 Other, smaller processors see the indication of their name as a tool 
to advertise their companies to other firms and retailers. Concerning 
the effects on consumers, some firms see having their name as a 
warranty of domestic production, which could defend the product 
category from imported products of doubtful quality and be a sign of 
transparency to consumers. 
  In general, this last point is what producers want: more 
transparency in the information given to consumers and controls by 
authorities that are comparable across firms and Member States. 
Unfair competition among processors is seen as an important threat 
to their growth. 
 Finally, producer indications may shift liability with respect to 
private labels from retailers to producers. Other interviewees 
indicated that nothing will change in this respect given, for example, 
the traceability requirements. Retailers will remain liable and will hold 
their suppliers responsible for any damage caused to the retailers. 
 The interviewees in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain 
envisaged several problems with such a policy: 
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- It would deter brand producers from making PL products if this led 
to their brands being undermined in terms of the perceived value 
on offer. This holds for both SMEs and large firms. One producer we 
interviewed stated: 'I am not going to promote private labels by 
putting my name on them.' If producers were deterred, it would 
be harder for retailers to source good quality, competitively priced 
private label products in many categories. 
- As private label bears the retailer's name and is under the retailer's 
control regarding composition, formulation and image, the view 
expressed was that it was right for the retailer to carry the sole 
responsibility for that product's quality and reputation, and not to 
share that responsibility with a producer. 
- In terms of a pragmatic perspective, where would the line be 
drawn in terms of recognising that many products are multi-
sourced and are part of a lengthy supply chain (begging the 
question whether every supplier involved in bringing that product 
to market would have to be listed on the label)? 
- Food product labels are already complicated enough and 
loading further information on them was perceived as not only 
unnecessary but also undesirable, as it could confuse the 
consumer (e.g. who would consumers complain to if they were 
dissatisfied with the product?). 
- As suppliers indicated, producer indications may suggest to 
consumers that a PL and a branded product coming from the 
same firms are of the same quality. However, there may be 
important differences in recipes and quality. 
- Private-label producers indicated that they are not keen on 
developing consumer information services. Retailers, on the other 
hand, indicated that they want to hear consumer complaints 
themselves and be able to act upon it, to go to their own 
development and marketing departments to improve the 
product, to go to their suppliers in order to get a new recipe or to 
deal with possible defaults. 
- Changing suppliers may require replacing packaging. 
- If consumers really demanded such information, then retailers 
would find it worthwhile to supply it on a voluntary, case-by-case 
basis without the need for regulation (as happens in some 
instances). The information may also be deduced from existing 
information. 
- Regulation on a one-size-fits-all basis is inappropriate given the 
very wide differences across national markets in Europe, and 
national-level actions are more appropriate than pan-European 
ones given the disparities across Member States in terms of how 
national markets operate. 
- It may increase the administrative burden on companies. 
 
 Some interviewees indicated that a system of producer 
indications is not likely to realize a change in bargaining relations 
between suppliers and retailers. Retailers have bargaining power 
because of their multi-product nature, their control over shelf space 
and their dual role as producer and customer. The effects of a system 
of producer indications is likely to be limited. The interviewees 
referred to the code of conduct, which had not changed bargaining 
relations. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
 
Retailers contribute to product innovation by creating or stimulating 
the creation of additional product lines. They generate employment 
in their own R&D, marketing and design departments and enable 
their suppliers to grow, to invest and to innovate. What the impact of 
private label growth is on innovation at the industry level remains an 
unanswered question. Brand suppliers have more resources to pursue 
innovations. In many instances, private labels spur brand suppliers to 
intensify the use of these resources, but in many other cases private 
labels and retailer business practices do not. This section provided 
some examples of both. The interviews could not be used to give a 
final assessment in this respect. 
 Producer indications provide additional information to consumers. 
This is valuable as such, but one may wonder whether consumers 
really care who produces private labels. A mandatory system of 
producer indications may force SME suppliers to produce either 
private label or brands. This may limit the choices that are available 
to SMEs. Producer indications are not likely to have a profound 
impact on bargaining relations between suppliers and retailers. If 
retailers have bargaining power, buyer power will remain intact, 
because it depends on control over shelf space, their multi-product 
nature and the dual role as a customer and a competing supplier. 
 
 
Part IV Legal analysis 
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7 Legal instruments to prevent 
unfair competition 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Some producers believe that they are confronted by unfair 
commercial practices applied by retailers. Retailers are said to be 
able to exercise such practices on the basis of the power they derive 
from the combination of their control of shelf space (e.g. access to 
consumers) and private label products. 
 Perceived unfair practices are copycatting and unfair contractual 
requirements, such as listing fees, restrictions on suppliers' trade with 
other retailers, applying different standards to different suppliers, 
imposing unfair risks or retrospective changes to contract terms, 
transferring costs to producers and requiring suppliers to use third-
party suppliers nominated by the retailer, delisting and threatening to 
delist to gain advantages.1 Producers of products that are sold as 
private labels fear becoming anonymous to the consumer and thus 
interchangeable. Thus, instead of brand loyalty, private labels help 
building store loyalty (Marsden and Whelan 2009). 
 While the economic and empirical results of our study do not suggest 
the existence of a structural problem of economic relevance, this does 
not a priori discount the possibility that individual cases of unfairness 
occur. We therefore analysed whether and, if so, to what extent current 
law provides instruments to protect from such unfairness and if 
improvements of the legal framework are possible. 
 Three issues and perceived problems are discussed here. Section 
7.2 addresses the problem of copycatting, while the discussion of 
unfair contracting in section 7.3 forms the core of this section. Finally, 
section 7.4 looks into the possibility of producer indication on the 
label. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Section 3.3. 
7.2 Problem of copycatting 
 
Of the various roles that private labels can serve in the supply chain,1 
the one of providing cheaper alternatives to existing industrial brand 
products constitutes a specific area of concern for the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPR). Copycatting (or copycat packaging) 
refers to selling private label products with packaging displaying similar 
characteristics to the packaging of a rival brand, which may as result 
induce consumers to buy the private label instead, either by mistake or 
by (rightly or wrongly) assuming that the copycat label has the same 
reputation as the branded product (UK Competition Commission, 
2008). 
 Private labels but also other brands may copycat a product that 
has proved to be successful on the market and thus bear little or no 
risk of introducing new products onto the market. Such free-riding 
may raise specific concerns about a potentially negative effect of 
copycatting on the profits and innovation of the manufacturers of 
the products being copycatted. 
 The private labels that plagiarise the brand's dress make 
consumers think that the product is produced by the manufacturer 
and has the same characteristics or even is the same brand. These 
unfair commercial practices with regard to business-to-consumer 
transactions are dealt with in Directive 2005/29/EC.2 The Directive 
bans unfair commercial practices, which are categorised as 
'misleading' and/or 'aggressive'. The Directive also contains, in Annex 
1, a 'black list' of practices which are considered unlawful under all 
circumstances (i.e. to which the average consumer test is not 
applied). 
 According to the Directive, a commercial practice is misleading if 
marketing of a product creates confusion with any products, 
trademarks, trade names or other distinguishing marks of a 
competitor in a way that causes the average consumer to take a 
transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.3 
Annex 1 considers 'promoting a product similar to a product made 
by a particular manufacturer in such a manner as deliberately to 
                                                 
1 See Section 3.3.1. 
2 Dir. 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, 
O.J. 2005 L 149/22. 
3 Art. 6(2)(a) Dir. 2005/29/EC. 
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mislead the consumer into believing that the product is made by the 
same manufacturer when it is not' as an unconditional misleading 
practice. 
 
7.2.1 Intellectual property 
 
Legal protection against copycatting is the domain of intellectual 
property rights: trademarks and designs.1 Some level of harmonization 
of national law on intellectual property has been achieved through 
the influence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) TRIPs 
Agreement.2 At the EU level, an institutional system of protection has 
arisen from collaboration between Member States and the Office for 
the Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM), which is responsible 
for EU trademarks and designs. The national systems operate in 
parallel to the EU system.3 According to recent studies, industry has 
expressed support for a centralised and strengthened EU system (EU 
IPR Expert Group 2007). 
 Given that there is a considerable body of literature on the use of 
trademarks, designs and patents,4 our study concentrated only on 
aspects that are relevant to private labels. We do not present here a 
general description of the IPR and institutional framework that protects 
them at international and national levels. 
 
Informal protection 
 
Many surveys highlight the importance of the informal protection of 
commercial ideas and practices, especially where SMEs are 
concerned. Informal methods of protection include: 
- trade secrets and restriction on access to knowledge and sharing 
information: key knowledge is kept secret from external 
collaborators or information is disclosed only partially (business 
partners, retailers); 
                                                 
1 In exceptional cases, patents may play a role as well. 
2 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of the World 
Trade Organization.  
3 In addition, the European Patent Organisation - a non-EU body - delivers national 
patents based on a single application. 
4 For general information, see < www.ipr-helpdesk.org/ >. 
- confidentiality: working with reliable partners may sometimes be 
more efficient than formalised contractual or legislative 
agreements; 
- publishing: making the initial innovator immediately visible and 
known as the developer of a product or idea (through Internet 
websites, specialist journals, newspapers, etc.) (EU IPR Expert 
Group 2007, pp. 22-24). 
 
 These informal protection methods are difficult to put in practice 
in the relationships between suppliers and big retailers. In their role as 
customers (during their negotiations with suppliers), retailers obtain 
detailed information not only about the products, but also about the 
commercial plans of the suppliers. As indicated in the economic part 
of this study, this information can be abused by private label owning 
retailers in their role as competitor if the bargaining position of the 
supplier is not such that this can be prevented.1 In such situations, the 
supplier needs to be able to rely on more formal arrangements. 
 
Note that retailers may also need to rely on more formal 
arrangements in order to control the quality of private label products. 
Retailers and private-label producers conclude long-term 
relationships when product characteristics and product quality are 
hard to define and assess (Section 6). 
 
Design 
 
Design is becoming an increasingly important marketing tool that 
enables companies to differentiate their products on the market. 
Design is the appearance of the whole (or a part) of a product 
resulting from the features of, for example, the lines, contours, colours, 
shape, texture and/or materials of the product itself and/or its 
ornamentation.2 Although the main reason for registering designs is to 
prevent them being copied, a slightly different design can sometimes 
be registered as novel. Therefore, registration may not always offer 
                                                 
1 This asymmetry of information also concerns prices: retailers know the prices of 
branded products, which allows them to fix prices for their own private labels in reaction 
to the producers of branded products. Clearly, the producers are not able to readjust 
their prices (See Procter & Gamble/Gilette (COMP/M.3732) Commission's decision of 
15.07.2005). 
2 See Art. 3(a) Reg. 6/2002 on Community designs, O.J. 2002 L 3/1. 
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enough protection. Furthermore, the registration process can be 
lengthy, and therefore design registration will usually only play a role 
for products with a sufficiently long product cycle. Finally, the 
registration costs may be a problem for medium and small suppliers. 
 
Trade marks 
 
A trade mark is a sign or indicator capable of being represented 
graphically, particularly in the form of words, designs, letters, 
numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, if such signs 
distinguish the products or services of one undertaking from those of 
other undertakings.1 It is often a name, symbol, logo and/or design, 
but can also be colours, smells or movement that distinguish 
particular goods or services from other products on the market and 
indicate their commercial source. 
 Trade marks also play an important role in consumer protection 
policy, allowing consumers to identify the origins and quality of the 
product and preventing them from being misled. For the same 
reason, they serve as an incentive for manufacturers to maintain the 
high quality of their products. 
 Apart from registered trademarks, some national legal systems 
protect unregistered trademarks. In general, in a legal context, it is 
allowed to copy packaging or products which do not have trade 
mark protection. However, copycatting may be considered an unfair 
commercial practice.2 
 The law of 'passing off' in common law tort enforces trademark 
rights through the protection of the goodwill of a business from 
misrepresentation that confuses consumers. The law protects the 
brand by preventing one from benefiting from somebody else's 
goods or business reputation.3 The party must show damage resulting 
                                                 
1 See Art. 4 Reg. 207/2009 on the Community trade mark, O.J. 2009, L 78/1. 
2 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property defines acts of 
competition contrary to honest practices in industrial and commercial matters as '[a]ll 
acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities of a competitor' (Art. 
10bis). 
3 Case United Biscuits (UK) Ltd v ASDA Stores Ltd [1997] RPC 513 provides a remarkable 
example of the use of the law on passing off by a manufacturer against a retailer over 
lookalike private label products. The UK's High Court ruled that the packading of ASDA's 
private label 'Puffin' bars, their colour and style of packaging, use of the Puffin 
from an act of unfair competition. In other words, in order to violate 
the law on passing off copycatting must create confusion among 
consumers. 
 In this context, the above mentioned Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive constitutes an important step towards improving the 
protection of brands from misappropriation. Although its scope is in 
general limited to B2C transactions,1 Article 11 of the Directive lists 
competitors among persons or organisations having a legitimate 
interest in combating unfair commercial practices, who should be able 
to take legal action or bring such unfair commercial practices before 
an administrative authority competent to decide on complaints or to 
initiate legal proceedings. Recital 14 of the Directive sets out the scope 
of the protection of brands in a way similar to the law on passing off, 
limiting it to the use of copycats which clearly confuse consumers as to 
the commercial origin of the product. 
 
7.2.2 Elements 
 
Intellectual property rights and unfair commercial practices 
regulation provide business with rights that they can invoke in a civil 
court of law. Apart from border controls and criminal law instruments 
against counterfeiting, no public law instruments provide official 
controls or sanctions. 
 EU involvement with IPRs can be based on the new Article 118 
TFEU. Previously, no specific competence in the EC Treaty applied. 
Therefore, Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 
on the Community trade mark was based on Article 308 EC. This 
article provides the competence to legislate by unanimity in the case 
that the Treaty does not provide the necessary powers necessary to 
attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of 
the objectives of the Community. 
 
7.2.3 Conclusion 
 
                                                                                                            
character, as well as shelving the product next to its branded counterpart, was 
deceptively similar to McVitie's Penguin biscuits.  
1 B2B transactions are covered by Directive 84/450/EEC relating to the approximation of 
the laws, regulations an administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
misleading Advertising, O.J. 1984, L 250/17.  
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Intellectual property law provides producers with tools to limit 
copycat packaging, although it is apparently unable to eliminate all 
forms of copycatting. Regardless of the efficiency of the current 
legislation, however, the question is whether producers can actually 
invoke their rights if they find themselves in a dependent position. 
Businesses that produce both industrial brands and private labels 
may be reluctant to stand up for their brand out of fear of 
consequences on the private label contract. More in general, 
suppliers may be reluctant to sue a retailer that is a major customer. 
In consequence, intellectual property rights may be insufficient to 
protect branded products against their copycats, in particular 
private labels. 
 
 
7.3 Problem of unfair contracting 
 
The increased use of private label products does not affect 
competition per se adversely. In fact, private labels increase 
consumer choice - unless they merely replace industrial brands - and 
are likely to lead to a fall in consumer prices. 
 In specific circumstances, however, the fact that retailers are 
becoming their suppliers' competitors may raise some concerns, 
especially in relation to the concept of 'buyer power', which has 
captured significant public attention in recent years. 'Unequal 
bargaining power' exists when one contracting party can obtain 
terms that are more favourable and has better alternatives than the 
other contracting party; in other words, when one party can impose 
conditions without risking that the proposed contract will not be 
concluded. Because unequal bargaining power may lead to 
business relationships that are considered unfair and unjust from a 
social or economic point of view, various policy measures have been 
developed to correct this inequality. 
 In the context of private labels, the abuse of buyer power is linked 
to problems faced by suppliers in their contractual relations with 
stronger retailers. Various policy tools can be used to tackle these 
issues, for example unfair commercial practices law, consumer 
protection law, codes of conduct or competition law. Below is a brief 
overview of these options. 
7.3.1 Contract law 
 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
 
Contract law is almost exclusively a matter of the national law of 
Member States. However, implementation of European measures 
may depend on the civil law infrastructure in individual Member 
States. The European Commission therefore requested an 
international team of experts to explore the common features of civil 
(private) law in the EU Member States.1 This team reported its findings 
in the form of a code, known as the 'Draft Common Frame of 
Reference' (DCFR).2 In this report, we use the DCFR as a 
representation of private law - contract law in particular - in Member 
States. 
 Generally, contract law treats parties as equal. They can arrange 
their contractual relations any way they agree upon. The DCFR does, 
however, provide some protection against the exploitation of a 
position of dependence by a dominant party. In certain 
circumstances, such protection may be relevant to address practices 
that are at issue in this section. 
 
Exploitation 
 
Classical contract law recognises that it may not be just to enforce a 
contract if one party to it was in a weaker position, typically because 
when giving consent the party was not free or was misinformed. For 
example, a contract concluded as the result of mistake or fraud, or 
that was the result of duress or unfair exploitation, can be set aside by 
the aggrieved party.3 
 
                                                 
1 See < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/policies_civil_contract_en.htm#cfr >. 
2 See < http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf >. 
This DCFR is partly based on the earlier Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). 
3 DCFR p. 65. 
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Table 7.1 DCFR on unfair exploitation 
II. - 7:207: Unfair exploitation 
1. A party may avoid a contract if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract: 
a. the party was dependent on or had a relationship of trust with the other 
party, was in economic distress or had urgent needs, was improvident, 
ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skill; 
and 
b. the other party knew or could reasonably be expected to have known this 
and, given the circumstances and purpose of the contract, exploited the 
first party's situation by taking an excessive benefit or grossly unfair 
advantage. 
2.  Upon the request of the party entitled to avoidance, a court may if it is 
appropriate adapt the contract in order to bring it into accordance with 
what might have been agreed had the requirements of good faith and fair 
dealing been observed. 
3.  A court may similarly adapt the contract upon the request of a party receiving 
notice of avoidance for unfair exploitation, provided that this party informs the 
party who gave the notice without undue delay after receiving it and before 
that party has acted in reliance on it. 
 
 It does not seem likely that the position of a producer in relation to 
a retailer will often qualify as dependence or economic distress in the 
sense of this provision or that any of the other conditions will be 
fulfilled. 
 
Remedies 
 
'Avoidance' is annulment or cancellation of the contract. This remedy 
may be helpful with regard to obligations that are retroactively 
imposed by the retailer. Generally speaking, however, the producer 
needs the contract to be continued on fair terms, not for it to be 
terminated. Sections 2 and 3 of Article 7:207 DCFR give the courts the 
power to adapt the contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
General contract law does not seem to provide much relief for 
producers. The available remedy of adjustment of the contract terms 
by a civil court seems relevant, but the conditions to invoke this 
remedy seem geared towards private persons rather than businesses. 
 
Elements 
 
Contract law provides business with rights they can invoke in a civil 
court of law. In the establishment of unfair exploitation, dependence, 
the other party's knowledge of this and the achievement of excessive 
benefits play a role. The courts can amend the contract. There is no 
public law instrument providing official controls or sanctions. 
 The competence of the EU to regulate on contract law is 
contested. A precedent of EU legislation on civil law is the Product 
Liability Directive (85/374). This directive is based on harmonization for 
the internal market. Harmonisation of elements of contract law could 
arguably be based on the same competence. 
7.3.2 Competition law 
 
Competition law is one of the few areas where the Treaties address 
businesses directly, and also one of the few areas where the 
Commission has powers of enforcement towards businesses directly. 
Commission officials - in cooperation with the competent authorities 
in the Member States - can inspect the premises and documents of 
businesses. The Commission can also impose sanctions on businesses 
in the case of infringements; these sanctions include fines of as much 
as 10% of a business's worldwide annual turnover. 
 Competition law covers three areas: the ban on cartels, the ban 
on the abuse of dominance, and merger control. In the context of 
merger control, the European Commission has given some 
consideration to the specific role of private labels. However, to 
address behaviour such as complained about by processors, the 
other two areas seem more appropriate. 
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The Commission on private labels in merger control 
 
The effects of private labels have been taken into account in the 
assessment of market power in a number of merger decisions. In 
Rewe/Meinl,1 the European Commission noted that private labels 
increase retailers' profitability, because in the case of private labels, 
contrary to national brands, consumers are not able to make a direct 
price comparison. Therefore, traders carefully price branded 
products because these products often serve as a 'yardstick' in the 
assessment of a particular retailer, whereas private labels can 
achieve a higher margin.2 
 Private labels clearly shift the balance of power between 
manufacturers and retailers in favour of the latter. Because a retailer 
has private label produced in accordance with its own specification 
and under its own logo, the actual manufacturer of the product 
becomes invisible and hence easily exchangeable. Billa's 'Heidi 
Teebutter' brand provides an illustrative example: the brand was 
initially produced by an Austrian company, and when production 
was taken over by a Dutch firm hardly any changes were made to 
the packaging.3 
 The market investigation in SCA/P&G ETC4 revealed that 
manufacturers that produce both branded products and private 
labels can easily react to shifts in demand between these two 
categories because this adjustment entails practically no costs. The 
introduction of private label products allows them to utilize spare 
production capacity. However, the Commission considers the 
number of manufacturers that produce both branded products and 
private labels to be very low: most private-label producers do not 
supply branded products because of high entry cost into the 
branded segment products and considerable investments in 
'building' a brand and consumer awareness. Consequently, the 
competitive position of private-label producers is asymmetric.5 
 The success of private labels leads to increasing shelf space being 
devoted to them, and also to increasing active advertising and 
                                                 
1 Rewe/Meinl (Case IV/M.1221), Dec. 1999/674/EC, O.J. 1999, L 274/1. 
2 Ibid., at 51. 
3 Ibid., at 112. 
4 Case No COMP/M.4533 - SCA/P&G (European tissue business), 05/09/2007. 
5 Ibid., at 24 
promotion of private labels, similar to those of branded products.1 
Because the retailers make space for private labels, the tendency is 
to limit the stock to one or two leading (or premium) brands for a 
category and private labels that provide direct price competition for 
the leading brands. In consequence, slower brands face the risk of 
being delisted (Ezrachi 2010, p. 261). As noted in Rewe/Meinl: 
 The presence of private labels endangers in particular weaker 
brands which do not number among the must-carry products. Such 
brands are quite easily replaceable by private labels. The presence 
of private labels therefore makes delisting threats against the 
producers of such brands even more credible than against 
producers of must-carry brands. 
 Because branded products bring higher margins than private 
labels, 'must-have' brands would still be actively supported by their 
manufacturers, and retailers would still be interested in offering these 
brands to consumers, even though these products would be subject 
to the intense competitive pressure from the existence of private 
labels next to them and resulting in a limited ability to raise prices.2 
The competition is especially visible on the market of 'low emotion' 
products, which are characterised by lower consumer loyalty and 
consumers easily switching temporarily between different brands 
depending on the best value-for-money offer.3 
 Consequently, private labels may in the long run lead to the 
foreclosure of suppliers. An example provided in Rewe/Meinl states 
that: 
 Billa has selectively delisted secondary brands or weaker 
producer's brands (not only of international branded goods 
producers but also goods of Austrian producers) and replaced them 
with private labels. Although must-carry products are as a rule not 
delisted, as they continue to be needed on the shelves as eye-
catchers, their share is reduced to the extent necessary for them to 
perform their eye-catching function, for example by limiting the 
                                                 
1 Ibid., at 18. 
2 Case No COMP/M.4533 - SCA/P&G (European tissue business), at 26. Interestingly, 
while the observation on margins is the opposite from the observation made in 
Rewe/Meinl, it is phrased as 'not changed significantly during the last years'. The 
observation is, however, limited to the parties at issue. 
3 Ibid., at 19. 
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range. By the same token, the private label share can be 
considerably increased.1 
 
Cartels 
 
Article 101 TFEU prohibits all agreements between undertakings2 and 
all practices that have as their object the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition and affect trade between Member States. 
Regarding business behaviour that does not affect trade between 
Member States, national systems of competition law often exist, 
reflecting the European approach. 
 Regarding business' behaviour that does not affect trade 
between Member States, Member States have their own systems of 
competition law often reflecting the European approach. 
 In this context, some forms of vertical agreement may concern 
producers and private label owners. Category management 
agreements may limit or disadvantage the distribution of certain 
suppliers. This may happen when the distributor, who also sells 
products under private label, may be interested in limiting the choice 
of other products, and excluding suppliers of intermediate range 
products (EC 2010, at 210). 
 It has to be noted, however, that Article 101 TFEU applies to 
agreements in which the parties have expressed a joint intention to 
conduct themselves on the market in a specific way. Thus, it does not 
apply to unilateral conduct of the undertakings. Such conduct, 
which is more relevant to the issues raised in this study, falls within the 
scope of Article 102 TFEU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Rewe/Meinl, at 114. 
2 For all practical purposes, the competition law concept of 'undertaking' can be 
considered equivalent to the concept 'business' used elsewhere in this report. 
Abuse of dominance 
 
Table 7.2 Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
a.  directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
b.  limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
c.  applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
d.  making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
 Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position that affects 
trade within the internal market. 
 Several of the practices complained about by processors would 
qualify as abuse if other requirements (dominance in particular) were 
met, for example excessive pricing,1 high listing fees,2 discrimination3 
and tie-in.4 
 In general, competition law is not concerned with particular 
contracts between parties. A practice that would be considered 
unlawful if applied by an undertaking with a dominant position on 
the market, is allowed for undertakings that do not have a dominant 
position. From a competition policy perspective, a problem arises 
only when contracting partners of the dominant undertaking do not 
have sufficient alternatives. 
                                                 
1 See Case 40/70, Sirena v. Eda, ECR [1971] 69, at 17;  ECJ 13 July 1989 (Case 395/87, 
Tournier, ECR [1989] 2521, at 38; Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemicals v. Commission, ECR 
[1991] I-3359, at 70-72; Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak v. Commission, ECR [1996] I-5951, at 44; 
Case C-202/07, France Telecom v. Commission, ECR [2009] I-2369, at 110-112. 
2 On unwarranted tariffs see: Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, ECR [1978] 207, 
at 249-251; Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon, ECR [1971] 487, at 19. 
3 Case 226/84, British Leyland, ECR [1986] 3263, at 27; Case T-30/89, Hilti, ECR [1991]  II-
1439, at 100;  Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak v. Commission, ECR [1996] I-5951, at 37. 
4 Case 22/78, Hugin v. Commission, ECR [1979] 1869, at 11. 
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 'Dominant position' is defined in EU law as: 
 A position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained 
on a relevant market, by affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers 
and ultimately of consumers (EC 2009). 
 Therefore, in the context of private labels, Article 102 TFEU will only 
find application if the market practices exercised by a retailer were 
connected to its dominant position on the market.1 
 Consequently, even if the effects of the increasing number of 
private labels and foreclosure of suppliers2 could be an observed 
practice of all or a majority of retailers on the market, those measures 
will not be considered subject to European competition law, unless 
they result from agreed and joint policies established collectively by 
the retailers (Article 101 TFEU) or are practised by an undertaking that 
holds a dominant position. 
 Thus, the matter of establishing dominance becomes important. 
Such a position is related to the relevant market defined by product 
and geography. If there are sufficient competitors on the relevant 
market, a business will not be considered to hold a dominant position. 
An important indication is market share. The tilting point is roughly 50% 
market share, but other factors are also taken into account. 
 The organisation of the food sector is typical in that producers 
largely depend on retailers to acquire access to consumers. The 
logistics needed by the perishable character of many food products, 
the use of private standards and other factors that contribute to 
organisation in chains, has so far not led to qualifying individual chains 
as separate markets. This in connection with high retailer density in 
many Member States will ordinarily mean that retailers will not be 
considered dominant on the basis of the presence of other 
(competing) retailers. 
                                                 
1 In this context it has to be noted that the bargaining power between retailers and 
suppliers also changes due to 'buying alliances' formed by independent national 
wholesalers and supermarkets against big supermarket chains. These European buying 
groups secure a number of benefits for their members, trying obtain the same prices 
from suppliers as large retailer chains. Examples of European buying alliances include 
AMS, Coopernic and CBA.  
2 As indicated by the Commission in Rewe/Meinl. 
 So far, no specific analysis of the position of private label owners 
exists in the context of Article 102 TFEU. The Commission has, however, 
addressed the topic in the context of merger control. 
Additional national legislation 
 
At the national level, some Member States have developed 
enforcement provisions encompassing a wider set of unfair 
commercial practices than those covered by EU competition law, 
including abuse, a better bargaining position or taking advantage of 
economic dependency. Examples include: 
- provisions on unfair practices resulting from superior bargaining 
power without having to prove harm to consumers (Germany); 
- law against abuse of dominant bargaining position (Italy); 
- competition law containing the concept of abuse of dominant 
position by retailers over suppliers (Latvia); 
- provisions on 'inadequate conditions in commercial transactions' 
(Slovakia); 
- law against abuse of the state of economic dependency 
(Portugal) (Van der Stichele and Young, 2009). 
 
 The majority of Member States, however, do not have legislation 
that can address unfair retailers' practices. Some authors suggest that 
vertical competition between retailers' private labels and industrial 
brands (as opposed to horizontal competition between suppliers at 
the same level) represents a gap in the current system and should be 
addressed by European competition policy (Ezrachi 2010). These 
arguments are reinforced by the fact that the general goals of EU 
competition policy refer to preventing an adverse effect on 
consumer welfare, which can be affected not only by higher prices, 
but also by limiting quality or reducing consumer choice. Consumer 
harm also occurs where competitors are prevented from bringing 
innovative products to the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138 
Elements 
 
Competition law provides businesses with rights they can invoke in a 
civil court of law. The European Commission is endowed with powers 
to inspect business behaviour and to impose sanctions in case of 
infringements. Most Member States have a national system of 
competition law with competent authorities endowed with similar 
powers. 
 Private label owning retailers are not generally considered in 
competition law to hold a dominant position. 
7.3.3 Liberalization law 
 
In several regulated markets, there are instruments to facilitate the 
transition towards a free market. Examples of such markets are 
energy (electricity and gas), postal services and 
telecommunications. A common feature in these markets is the role 
of physical or virtual networks to supply consumers. 
 In legislation on the transition, positions that do not qualify as 
dominance in competition law are often subject to provisions that 
ensure ex ante that they will not behave in ways similar to abuse of 
dominance. Such positions are labelled 'significant market power'. 
 
Significant market power 
 
For example, in the telecommunications sector, Directive 2002/21 EC 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services1 now equates the concept of significant 
market power to dominance. The previous Directive 97/33/EC on 
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring 
universal service and interoperability through application of the 
principles of Open Network Provision (ONP),2 however, applied a 
distinct definition: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 OJ 2002 L 108/33. 
2 OJ 1997, L199/32. 
Table 7.3 Article 4(3) Directive 97/33/EC 
An organisation shall be presumed to have significant market power when it has 
a share of more than 25 % of a particular telecommunications market in the 
geographical area in a Member State within which it is authorized to operate. 
 National regulatory authorities may nevertheless determine that an 
organisation with a market share of less than 25% in the relevant market has 
significant market power. They may also determine that an organisation with a 
market share of more than 25% in the relevant market does not have significant 
market power. In either case, the determination shall take into account the 
organisation's ability to influence market conditions, its turnover relative to the 
size of the market, its control of the means of access to end-users, its access to 
financial resources and its experience in providing products and services in the 
market. 
 Among the obligations of businesses with significant market power 
is that to grant access to networks on reasonable terms. 
 The network markets that are subject to liberalization share some 
characteristics with the food sector. Shopping shelves show some 
similarity to networks as means of accessing the consumer (Kuipers 
2009).1 
 The dependence of the producer on the supermarket as a 
gatekeeper and major customer will likely prevent the producer from 
seeking redress in courts. It is generally recognised that switching 
between distribution channels is difficult, costly and generally 
impossible in the short term (Ezrachi 2010). 
 
Elements 
 
Liberalisation legislation imposes specific duties on businesses that 
have significant market power. These obligations are listed in 
appendices to the legislation. Among them is the obligation for 
owners of networks to grant access on reasonable terms. 
 EU liberalization legislation is based on harmonization for the internal 
market. 
 
 
                                                 
1 For the - limited - competition law relevance of such similarity, see Case C-7/97, 
Bronner, ECR [1998] I-7791, at 41-46. 
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7.3.4 Consumer protection law 
 
The general approach in contract law where parties are considered 
equal unless specific dependencies are shown, is reversed in 
consumer protection. Consumers are considered weaker in their 
relation with businesses and the law provides protection to 
compensate for this inequality. 
 European legislation provides interesting examples of 
harmonisation of protection against unfair trading practices 
committed towards consumers. 
 
Table 7.4 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
Article 3 
1.  A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer. 
2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has 
been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to 
influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-
formulated standard contract. 
  The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been 
individually negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the 
rest of a contract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is 
nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract. 
  Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been 
individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent 
on him. 
3.  The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms 
which may be regarded as unfair. 
 
 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 27 October 2004 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection 
laws (the Regulation on consumer protection cooperation)1 requires 
the Member States to have a competent authority with powers of 
investigation (including document checks and on-site inspections) 
and enforcement necessary for the application of that regulation.2 
The Regulation focuses on intra-Union3 infringements. These are 
omissions or acts likely to harm the collective interests of consumers 
residing in a Member State or Member States other than the Member 
State where the act or omission originated or took place; or where 
the responsible seller or supplier is established; or where evidence or 
assets pertaining to the act or omission are to be found.4  
                                                 
1 OJ 2004, L 364/1. 
2 Article 4(1) and (3) Reg. 2006/2004. 
3 Intra-Community in the wording of the Regulation. 
4 Article 3(b) Reg. 2006/2004. 
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National competent authorities have to provide each other mutual 
assistance, exchange of information and enforcement on request.1 
 The enforcement powers the Regulation requires national 
competent authorities to have at their disposal, include the power to 
obtain from the seller or supplier responsible for intra-Union 
infringements an undertaking to cease the infringement and, where 
appropriate, to publish the resulting undertaking and the power to 
impose payments such as fines. 
 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interests2 already required Member States to provide the possibility to 
bring actions for an injunction requiring the cessation or prohibition of 
certain infringements against consumers' interests. The right to 
commence such proceeding should be granted to public bodies 
responsible for protecting consumers' interests and/or private 
organisations whose purpose is to protect such interests. 
 Both in Regulation 2006/2004 and in Directive 98/27 the 
consumers' interests at issue are laid down in legislation listed in an 
annex to the Regulation and Directive, respectively. 
 
Elements 
 
In consumer protection law, we find specific rights that consumers 
can invoke in a civil court of law. The law addresses contractual 
relations that are qualified as suspect. Consideration in the 
qualification is single-sided drafting of obligations in advance in 
combination with an annex to the law listing some unfair terms. We 
find possibilities for collective action. Finally, European law requires 
the Member States to have competent authorities endowed with 
powers to inspect business behaviour and to impose sanctions in the 
case of infringements. 
 
7.3.5 Code of conduct 
 
Retailer practices can also be addressed by codes of conduct that 
establish rules for transactions between retailers and their suppliers. 
An example at national level can be found in the UK, where - as a 
                                                 
1 Articles 6 to 8 Reg. 2006/2004. 
2 OJ 1998, L 166/ 51. 
result of the Competition Commission's1 investigation of the retailers' 
practices carried out between 2006 and 2008 - the new, 
strengthened and extended Groceries Supply Code of Practice 
(GSCOP) was developed to deal with power imbalances between 
large retailers (those with turnovers above UKP1bn per year) and their 
suppliers, and to tackle the economic issues related to the dominant 
position of the former, which often resulted in shifting unnecessary 
risks onto suppliers and charging them excessive costs. 
 The GSCOP came into force in February 2010, replacing the former 
Supermarkets Code of Practice. The GSCOP is meant to be 
incorporated into supply agreements so that its terms become part of 
the contract and will result in contractual breach if broken. It also 
provides for the establishment of an ombudsman to enforce the new 
rules and ensure their effectiveness. The ombudsman's role would not 
be limited to that of an arbitrator of disputes or an investigator of 
specific practices of retailers: he would also be vested with more 
comprehensive powers of investigating and penalizing retailers for non-
compliance with the Code. 
- Fair dealing is the overarching principle behind the GSCOP, which 
imposes constraints on the behaviour of retailers and limits the 
practices that have an adverse effect on competition. The 
GSCOP regulates the following key aspects: 
- payments have to be made within a reasonable time and 
according to the supply agreement; 
- unless provided in the agreement, a retailer cannot require that a 
supplier bears the marketing costs of the retailer; 
- a retailer may not require a supplier to pay for shelf space, except 
for promotions or other specific costs related to new product 
listings; 
- a retailer must not require a supplier to make any payment to 
secure a better positioning or an increase in the shelf space 
allocation, except for promotions; 
- a special procedure must be followed in the case of delisting, 
which may occur only for genuine commercial reasons.2 
 
                                                 
1 The Competition Commission is an independent public body that carries out 
investigations into mergers, markets and the regulated industries.  
2 The GSCOP can be found at < www.competition-commission.org.uk >. 
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Elements 
 
The GSCOP mainly gives requirements for the content of contractual 
relations. There is no mechanism to enforce compliance when 
concluding contracts. After inclusion in the contract, the general 
contract law instruments apply to compliance. 
 
7.3.6 Common Market Organisation 
 
Article 42 TFEU provides that provisions of the section relating to rules 
on competition apply only to the production of and trade in 
agricultural products to the extent determined by the European 
Parliament and the Council. 
 This power has been exercised in Article 176 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common 
organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for 
certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation). This provision 
still refers to the numbering in the EC Treaty. Article 81 is now 
numbered 101. 
 
 
Table 7.5 Regulation 1234/2007 
 
Article 176 
Exceptions 
1.  Article 81(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to the agreements, decisions and 
practices referred to in Article 175 of this Regulation which are an integral part 
of a national market organisation or are necessary for the attainment of the 
objectives set out in Article 33 of the Treaty. 
  In particular, Article 81(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to agreements, 
decisions and practices of farmers, farmers' associations, or associations of 
such associations belonging to a single Member State which concern the 
production or sale of agricultural products or the use of joint facilities for the 
storage, treatment or processing of agricultural products, and under which 
there is no obligation to charge identical prices, unless the Commission finds 
that competition is thereby excluded or that the objectives of Article 33 of the 
Treaty are jeopardized. 
 
 
  
2.  After consulting the Member States and hearing the undertakings or 
associations of undertakings concerned and any other natural or legal person 
that it considers appropriate, the Commission shall have sole power, subject 
to review by the Court of Justice, to determine, by a decision which shall be 
published, which agreements, decisions and practices fulfil the conditions 
specified in paragraph 1. 
  The Commission shall undertake such determination either on its own 
initiative or at the request of a competent authority of a Member State or of 
an interested undertaking or association of undertakings. 
3.  The publication of the decision referred to in the first sub-paragraph of 
paragraph 2 shall state the names of the parties and the main content of the 
decision. It shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the 
protection of their business secrets. 
 
 
 While the phrasing of this provision leaves much to be desired, it is 
clear that the Commission has been granted the authority to authorize 
agreements between agricultural producers that would otherwise 
come under the ban on cartels. 
 Such power can be used to grant agricultural producers the 
possibility to undertake collective action and in this way create 
countervailing power. 
 
Elements 
 
The most important element the CMO brings to the table is the 
application of a similar feature as found in consumer protection law: 
the possibility of collective action. Businesses are limited in collective 
action by competition law, as collective bargaining could be seen as 
collusion (cartel). The CMO gives the Commission the possibility to 
allow it. The CMO is based on the treaty provisions on agriculture. 
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7.3.7 Discussion 
 
Law and Power 
 
Generally speaking, the law treats people as equal. Where equality is 
distorted by an imbalance of power, the law provides countervailing 
measures. The greater the imbalance, the more drastic the measures. 
The State holds public authority ultimately based on a monopoly on 
violence (Weber 1919). This ultimate power over the citizens is 
compensated for by measures that together are known as 'the rule of 
law', including checks and balances, and review and adjudication 
procedures. At the other end of the spectrum is contract law, which 
is based on the meeting of minds of equals. In between we see a shift 
in emphasis. Competition law compensates for economic 
dominance (which is associated with a market share of over 50%) by 
banning abusive behaviour, a ban enforced by official controls and 
austere sanctions. Liberalisation legislation similarly restricts significant 
market power, which is associated with a market share of over 25%. 
The Common Agricultural Policy recognises that the agricultural 
sector needs to be protected from powerful customers - regardless of 
market share. To this end, the Treaty provides for a possibility to restrict 
the application of competition law to the agricultural sector. For all 
practical purposes, this means that the creation of countervailing 
power through cooperation, may be exempted from the ban on 
cartels. The Common Market Organisation provides the Member 
States with an instrument to implement this option. Consumer law 
regards the relations between businesses and consumers by 
definition as a relation between unequals, where compensation is 
due. 
 The various elements identified in this section are set out in table 
7.6. 
 
Table 7.6 Legal elements ensuring fair practices 
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IPR + - + Injunction 
Damages  
- - - 
DCFR + - + Injunction 
Annulment 
Damages 
- - - 
Competition 
law 
+ + + Injunction 
Annulment 
Damages 
+ Injunctio
n 
Fines 
- 
Liberalization 
law 
+ + + Injunction 
Annulment 
Damages 
+ Injunctio
n 
Fines 
- 
Consumer law + + + Injunction 
Annulment 
Damages 
+ Injunctio
n 
Fines 
+ 
GSCOP + - + + - ? - - - 
CMO - - - - - - + 
 
 Most of the involvement of the EU is based on the competence to 
adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
that have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market (Article 114 TFEU). 
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Roadmap 
 
On the basis of these elements, a roadmap can be sketched. This 
roadmap consists of several steps that can be taken subsequently, 
taking the next step if it is shown that the previous step did not 
satisfactorily solve the problem. This approach gives businesses the 
opportunity to take their own responsibility and helps the legislature 
not to intervene too much in the market. 
1. agreement on a code of conduct 
2. creation of countervailing powers 
3. formulation of legal requirements and access to court 
4. public law inspections and sanctions. 
 
 Insofar as it is agreed that the conduct complained about by 
processors is undesirable, a voluntary code of conduct can describe 
the do's and don'ts. This code of conduct should ideally be drafted in 
cooperation with the business sectors concerned (processing and 
retail). The GSCOP can be taken as a useful example. 
 The EU does not need specific powers to agree with stakeholders 
on a voluntary code of conduct. 
 If it turns out that a voluntary code of conduct does not lead to a 
sufficient level of compliance, the instrument of the CMO should be 
mobilised to ensure the possibility of collective action by the primary 
sector. A similar structure could be provided for other producers as 
well. 
 A third step in the development of the framework could be to lay 
down the content of the code of conduct in a regulation or 
directive. Liberalisation legislation and consumer protection law 
provide the example of listings of dos and - in particular - don'ts in 
annexes to the law. 
 The final step would be to put in place public law instruments of 
inspection and law enforcement. At least two models present 
themselves. The first is the one applied in Regulation 2006/2004 
requiring Member States to have an infrastructure capable of dealing 
with intra-Union infringements through cooperation, and inspiring the 
Member States to have a similar structure at the national level as well. 
The other model is at the same time both simpler and more radical. 
We have seen above that the behaviour complained about would 
be considered abuse of a dominant position if the retailer were to 
hold such position. We have also seen in liberalisation legislation that 
a position of dominance need not always be analysed on the basis 
of economic data but can also be defined by law. EU legislation 
could define that businesses engaging in behaviour contrary to the 
code of conduct are considered dominant for the application of 
Article 102 TFEU. From this it would follow automatically that the entire 
competition law infrastructure that is in place both at the EU level 
and in the Member States, including powers of inspection and 
sanctioning, would apply. 
 The competence to legislate can be construed in a similar way as 
in consumer protection law and competition law. In both areas, EU 
norms address intra-Union trade only. It is left to the Member States to 
follow the example or to adapt it to their own style and culture. This 
manner of harmonisation leaves more leeway than harmonisation via 
a directive. Subsidiarity will then be fully respected. But the model of 
Directive 85/374 (on product liability) is also conceivable. In that 
case, harmonisation would cover both intra-Union and national trade 
relations. From the point of view of ensuring a level playing field in the 
entire Union, this option is also defendable from the perspective of 
subsidiarity. 
 
 
7.4 Producer indication on private labels and liability 
 
Another concern voiced by processors is the position of the private-
label producers towards consumers. The producers perceive private 
labels as depriving them of identity and making them invisible on the 
market, because the direct link between them and consumers is 
broken. The bond between consumers and specific brands cannot 
be established and consumers cannot be reached through 
advertising. This situation places manufacturers in the position of 
being mere agents that are dependent on retailers, which decide on 
the product specification and marketing, and - finally - promote their 
own name on product labels and build loyalty with their customers. 
 In this regard, producer indication on the label is suggested as a 
step towards improving the position of private-label producers. The 
benefits of a system of producer indications 1 can be argued from the 
consumer's point of view - such a system enhances transparency and 
                                                 
1 Also known as 'chain transparency' or 'co-labelling'. 
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enables consumers to make more informed choices. It can be 
argued, however, that the initiative of introducing a mandatory 
system of producer indication is not desired by all manufacturers. This 
could especially hold true for manufacturers with high brand 
reputation. Those who are not interested in disclosing their brand 
name or product name on the private label could favour a voluntary 
system instead. In this regard, a framework where the retailer has to 
accept the indication of the producer's name on the label upon 
request of the producer could present a solution. In this regard, the 
system would be voluntary because  it would create no obligation to 
put the producers' name or its brand name/trademark. However, if 
the producer requests it, the retailer would have to accept it (it 
would become mandatory). 
 
7.4.1 Product liability 
 
A system of producer indication is not currently in place. Article 3(7) 
of Directive 2000/13/EC on the labelling, presentation and advertising 
of foodstuffs1 requires indication of the name or business name and 
address of the manufacturer or packager, or of a seller within the EU. 
This provision, however, seems only intended to allow those liable for 
the product - not necessarily the actual manufacturer - to be easily 
identified by final consumers. According to the rules on product 
liability laid down by Directive 85/374,2 the definition of the producer 
who may be held responsible for a damage caused by a defective 
product put on the market is very broad - it means not only the 
manufacturer of a finished product, but also the producer of any raw 
material or the manufacturer of a component part and any person 
who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature 
on the product presents himself as its producer. In principle, all these 
persons bear liability, which means that the victim can make a claim 
for compensation against any of them. 
 Under the liability provisions, the supplier is treated as the producer 
of the product, unless he can inform the injured person, within a 
reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the person who 
supplied him with the product.3 Producer indication on private labels 
                                                 
1 O.J. 2000, L 109/29. 
2 O.J. 1985, L 210/29. 
3 Article 1(3) Dir. 85/374. 
may thus have the effect of releasing the retailer of liability to third 
parties. This effect is marginal, though, as Regulation 178/2002 - which 
lays down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishes the European Food Safety Authority and lays down 
procedures in matters of food safety - sets out a system of 
traceability, according to which a food or feed business is able to 
trace and follow a food, feed or substance intended to be 
incorporated into a food or feed, through all stages of production, 
processing and distribution.1 
 Similarly, producer indication on private labels does not affect the 
liability of retailers for ensuring that foodstuffs satisfy the requirements 
of food law, even where they act as mere distributors marketing the 
product as delivered to them by the producer. Regulation 178/2002 
gives a wide definition of the operators who may be held responsible 
for infringements of obligations with regard to the safety of foodstuffs 
they put on the market.2 This has been confirmed by case law 
concerning the retailer's responsibility for infringements of the 
labelling provisions, imposing on the retailer administrative fines for 
inaccurate statements on the product label about the alcoholic 
strength by volume of the product that was delivered by the 
producer and simply marketed by the retailer.3 
 
7.4.2 Producer indications 
 
A small survey we conducted in a previous study4 shows that 
businesses value the mentioning of their names on product labels. 
Producers seem to believe that they can build a certain reputation if 
they are mentioned as the producer on the label of the brand 
holder. 
                                                 
1 Article 18 Reg. 178/2002, O.J. 2002, L 31/1. 
2 Article 17(1) Reg. 178/2002 provides: 'Food and feed business operators at all stages of 
production, processing and distribution within the businesses under their control shall 
ensure that foods or feeds satisfy the requirements of food law which are relevant to 
their activities and shall verify that such requirements are met.' 'Food business' means 
'any undertaking, whether for profit or not and whether public or private, carrying out 
any of the activities related to any stage of production, processing and distribution of 
food.' (Article 3(2)). 
3 Case C-315/05, Lidl Italia Srl v. Comune di Arcole, [2006] ECR I-11181. 
4 See Bernd M.J. van der Meulen, Reconciling food law to competitiveness. Report on 
the regulatory environment of the European food and dairy sector, Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, 2009. 
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Figure 7.1 Scores on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally 
agree) 
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
Mentioning name leads to more profit
Mentioning name increases exports
Mentioning name leads to more sales
Mean Standard deviation
 
 
 Producer indication can be perceived from two perspectives: that 
of businesses that produce their own brands and produce for private 
label holders, and the perspective of businesses that produce private 
label only. The former may not be overly pleased by producer 
indication, as the private label may be perceived as undermining 
their own label: premium brand's quality at private label price. Given 
the choice in a voluntary scheme, they will probably choose not to 
be indicated. Businesses that depend on a private label, however, 
will not be in a bargaining position to exercise their rights under a 
voluntary scheme, as the private label holder is likely to prefer to do 
business with operators who do not invoke their rights. In the survey 
we presented three options to stakeholders: 
1. a mandatory system requiring the name(s) of the processor(s) 
to appear on the label of the end product; 
2. a voluntary system giving processors the right to demand 
indication of their name on the label; 
3. a voluntary system giving the end-producer the choice to 
print names of processors on the label. 
 
 None of these models was greeted with much enthusiasm. 
 
Table 7.7 Opinions on co-labelling (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally 
agree) 
 Mandator
y 
Voluntary for 
processor 
Voluntary for end-
producer 
N Valid 28 28 29 
Mean 2.89 3.25 3.03 
Std. Deviation 2.114 2.255 1.936 
 
 The intended beneficiary of the scheme is not the business doing 
the labelling, but a business earlier in the chain. Such a scheme can 
only be expected to be effective if it is mandatory. The limited data 
available at this point do not show much support for such a scheme. 
 
7.4.3 Conclusion 
 
It is possible for the EU legislature to adopt the suggestion to require 
producer indication and brand or trademark indication on the label 
of food products. Such a system would have certain benefits, such as 
transparency for consumers and identity for processors. However, so 
far no clearly supported solution to a keenly felt problem seems to be 
emerging. 
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7.5 Conclusions 
 
In this section we addressed three legal aspects relating to 
processors' unease regarding their relation to private label owning 
retailers. 
 Intellectual property provides industry brand owners with 
instruments to uphold their rights in civil courts of law. There may be 
some practical issues such as costs to acquire protection, but if there 
is a specific issue in the relation between processors and private label 
owning retailers, it would seem to be rooted in the distribution of 
power in the food chain. As such, it is not a topic separate from the 
issue of contracting practices. 
 Several areas of law deal with inequalities in contractual relations. 
The perceived unbalance in power between processors and private 
label owning retailers does not in general seem to qualify for the 
application of any of these mechanisms. 
 However, the analysis shows that the EU legislature has the 
competence to address the issue if it believes this to be desirable and 
that elements can be taken from the existing models (Article 114 TFEU 
on harmonisation for the internal market). These elements can be 
grouped as steps that can be taken at different moments in time. The 
first step would follow the British example of a voluntary code of 
conduct delineating fair and unfair trading practices. In the case of 
compliance with commonly accepted requirements of fairness, no 
further steps need to be taken. In the case of non-compliance, that 
system can be expanded with legal requirements that interested 
parties can uphold in a civil court of law, and after that can be 
further expanded with public law powers of official controls and 
sanctions. 
 The introduction of producer indication on the label is possible 
from a legal point of view. However, because of the diversity of 
interests of processors, no form for such requirement presents itself 
that is likely to gain wide support. 
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 8 Synthesis 
 
 
This study investigated the impact of private label growth on the 
competitiveness of the European food processing industry, in 
particular the impact on the viability of SMEs and the innovativeness 
of the industry. 
 In the economic analysis, we established that the viability of the 
food and beverage industry is not at stake. The number of firms, and 
particularly the number of SMEs, in the food and beverage industry is 
decreasing. However, the decline does not hold for all countries and 
all sectors, notably those that produce consumer products. The 
decrease in the number of firms is not due to a fall in profitability, 
because profitability has not deteriorated, at least not before the 
financial and economic crisis. The decrease in the number of firms is 
probably due to an increase in economies of scale. 
 The growth of the private label share is both a challenge for and a 
threat to SMEs. French evidence shows that SMEs are less likely to 
produce private labels than large firms. This holds in particular for the 
meat, fish, dairy and other food sectors. On the other hand, the share 
of SMEs in private label production is larger than their share in total 
turnover. SMEs increasingly depend on private label production. 
 Innovation is not declining in the food and beverage industry, at 
least not in the sectors studied, with the exception of Spain. 
- In Italy, the number of brands is increasing for many dairy and 
cereal products. Private labels are gaining market share by 
extending product lines and by lowering prices relative to the 
market level. The growth in the numbers of brands is leading to 
market expansion: turnover per brand is growing. Innovation is 
high for products in which leading brand producers have a large 
market share. However, a growing private label share is not 
detrimental to innovation and, in some cases, may boost 
innovation by leading firms. 
- The number of new product introductions grew between 2005 
and 2009 for fruits and vegetables, dairy and cereal products, 
except in Spain where a reduction in the number of new product 
introductions by brands producers is due to the fact that they 
have limited access to a large part of the retail market. This is a 
result of two legitimate strategies of major retailers: the promotion 
of private labels and the reduction in the number of SKUs. In all 
other countries, product variety is still increasing and both private 
labels and industrial brands contribute in this respect. The share of 
private label in product introductions is growing, with the 
exception of the UK. Industrial brands are able to fight their way 
back in the UK. 
 The interviews illustrate that private labels create employment and 
value added in the R&D, marketing and design departments of 
retailers and in the companies of their suppliers. They also spur the 
innovation activities of brand suppliers, as is corroborated by the 
data analysis. Some of the brand suppliers interviewed indicated that 
private label growth gives them an incentive to innovate more (or at 
least, not less) and to improve their efficiency. 
 However, the interviews indicate that in some instances retailer 
practices, whether or not they involve private labels, may have a 
negative influence on the innovation efforts of brands suppliers and 
possibly on innovation at the industry level. Retailer practices can be 
addressed using codes of conduct, intellectual property rights and 
producer indications. 
 However, codes of conduct and legislation against unfair 
practices or protecting IPR have so far not led to fundamental 
changes in retailer and supplier behaviour or in their bargaining 
relations. There are two possible explanations for this. First, there is 
nothing to complain about: retailers do not have buyer power and 
on average behave competitively. Second, the policy measures 
taken do not take away retailer power and the ability to exert it one 
way or another. Food producers might not go to court or other 
administrative agencies if retailers are expected to retaliate using fair 
commercial practices such as delisting in due time. As a result, policy 
measures might have little impact on market performance. If retailer 
power is to be addressed, more fundamental issues have to be 
addressed, like the use of information by retailers and their dual role 
as customer and competing supplier. This should be considered 
under a broader view, where effects on overall social welfare and 
growth are evaluated. 
 This view is confirmed by the legal analysis. There is little case law 
dealing with supplier-retailer relations, either in general or with 
respect to private label development and production. There are two 
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complementary explanations. First, suppliers do not have cases to 
bring to court, because for example supplier complaints do not 
qualify for provisions for fair competition in current legislation. 
Contract law in principle presumes that parties act upon equality 
(see DCFR). Suppliers must have a strong case in order to establish 
unfair exploitation if they go to court. Competition law also does not 
offer many starting points for addressing competition issues related to 
supplier-retailer relations with the exception of merger control. 
Competition law would be applicable if retailers (respectively 
suppliers) form a cartel relative to suppliers (respectively retailers) or if 
they are in a dominant position. However, according to current 
competition law, food retailers are not dominant. Several countries 
have specific legislation dealing with economic dependency, but 
again there is little case law. Codes of conduct are introduced as a 
form of self-regulation, but they have had little impact so far. 
 Second, suppliers may be reluctant to go to court out of fear that 
legal action will have consequences for the continuation of 
commercial relations. Suppliers may let retailers infringe their 
intellectual property rights or impose unfair conditions if they fear that 
commercial relations will be cut off stopped or otherwise affected. 
 To conclude, current legislation offers little opportunity to go to 
court, even if suppliers want to. If the government perceives a 
problem with respect to supplier-retailer relations and existing 
legislation or codes of conduct do not work, it may consider 
stimulating countervailing powers (comparable to CMO for 
agriculture), promoting access to courts (e.g. collective action 
provisions) and finally applying public law inspections and sanctions. 
9 Impact assessment 
 
 
9.1 Problem description  
 
9.1.1  Motivation  
 
The competitive performance of the European food industry is poor 
compared to the food industry of other major economies. One 
possible explanation for this is retail concentration and changes in 
retail buying behaviour. Innovation may be under pressure due to the 
competitive pressure exerted by supermarket chains. For this reason, 
the High Level Group on the Competitiveness of the Agro-Food 
Industry recommended the EC to study the impact of private labels 
on the competitiveness of the agro-food industry, in particular the 
competitiveness of SMEs, and to examine whether it is feasible to 
address possible imbalances of power within the food supply chain. 
 The purpose of the impact assessment was 1) to identify possible 
imbalances in supply chain relations in the food supply chain and to 
analyse the effects of these imbalances; and 2) to provide possible 
solutions to the imbalances found. There are two possible reasons for 
imbalances. Either there is a lack of legislation, or current legislation is 
not fully used to remedy any market failures found. 
 
9.1.2 Key players  
 
The key players affected are:  
- Food processors. Processors (both SMEs and large firms) may be 
divided into producers of private labels, producers of industrial 
brands and producers of both. 
- Food retail. Retailers (both SMEs and large firms) may be divided 
into discounters, hypermarkets, supermarkets and convenience 
stores. 
- Consumers. 
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9.1.3 Causes 
 
Private label penetration is steadily increasing in all Member States, 
even though there are major differences between retailers, products 
and countries. Private labels strengthen retailers' bargaining position 
relative to their suppliers. Retailers derive bargaining power from the 
fact that they perform three interlinked roles in the supplier-retailer 
relation: they act as customers, they compete directly with suppliers 
(since they supply competing retail labels) and they supply the most 
crucial asset in the food supply chain, namely shelf space or access 
to consumers. Because private labels strengthen the bargaining 
position of retailers relative to processors, suppliers may be forced to 
accept a fall in wholesale prices and profit margins. The decrease in 
profitability may affect the ability to invest in R&D, product design 
and marketing, and thus the ability to innovate. Private label growth 
also has a direct effect on the profitability of brands: when private 
label replaces brands, the volume sales of brands go down. 
 
Figure 9.1 Problem description 
Private label
growth
Market access
for PL and
brands
Supplier/
retailer
bargaining
Supplier/
retailer
profitabilit y
PL and brands’
innovation
 
 
In theory, there are two mechanisms through which innovation at the 
industry level may be under pressure (figure 9.1). Profit margins may 
be reduced due to retail buyer power. Demand may fall, because 
brand producers no longer have access to parts of the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1.4 Role of EU  
 
Article 173 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
requires the EU and the Member States to ensure the existence of the 
conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the EU's industry. This 
gives the EU grounds to act. However, on the basis of the analysis 
provided, there is no reason to say that the competitiveness of the 
European food industry is deteriorating due to private label growth. 
 There is no deterioration either in the development of the number 
of firms or in industry profitability. 
- SMEs are not hurt by private label production. 
- Innovation continues, except in Spain where brand producers are 
developing fewer products, because their market access has 
been reduced by the growing market share of private labels and 
the tendency of some retail chains to reduce the number of SKUs. 
 As far as we know, there is no overall problem with the 
innovativeness of the European food industry. 
 The introduction of national systems of producer indications may 
affect the internal market. They may create (minor) barriers to entry. 
This would make it an EC competence. 
 
 
9.2 Objectives 
 
The overall objective is to promote the competitiveness of the food 
processing industry. Following the terms of reference and taking 
account of economic measures for performance, we identified three 
specific objectives. 
- To strengthen the position of SMEs 
- To increase value added, including profitability 
- To promote innovation 
 
 Static analysis of industry performance takes the income (value 
added1) generated by an industry as a benchmark (Scherer and Ross 
1990). Dynamic analysis of economic performance takes account of 
growth and innovation. Innovation lowers costs, raises product quality 
and enhances product variety. 
                                                 
1 Value added is the income from labour and capital (including land).  
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 These specific objectives were measured using the following 
indicators: 
- Development of the number of firms, in particular SMEs 
- Development of profitability, measured by gross operating profits 
- Share of SMEs in private label production 
- Innovation as measured by development of number of product 
introductions and number of brands. 
 
 
9.3 Possible policy options 
 
The introduction of producer indications on private labels may 
influence consumer perceptions of private label products and 
improve supply chain competition. Producer indications improve 
consumer perceptions of private label products provided that they 
rate specific food processors. This may strengthen the competitive 
position of private label products, as well as the position of the food 
processor relative to the retailer. It would raise the retailer's costs, 
reducing the incentive to switch to another food processor. This could 
enhance competition among food processors. They would have an 
incentive to become well perceived suppliers of private labels. 
 Based on the terms of reference of the study, we considered three 
options: 
1. no policy at all 
2. a voluntary system of producer indications 
3. a compulsory system of producer indications. 
 
 Because there are no legal impediments to the voluntary use of a 
system of producer indications, there is no basic difference between 
policy options (1) and (2). Producer indications already appear on 
many private label products throughout the EU. Producer indications 
include businesses’ names, brand names and trademarks. In the rest 
of this report, we therefore compare the current situation with a 
compulsory system of producer indications, unless there is a 
difference between option (1) and (2).  
 
 
 
9.4 Impact 
 
9.4.1 Economic impact 
 
International competitiveness and trade 
Producer indications may have a minor effect on international 
competitiveness if innovation in the European food industry is 
promoted. However, there is no reason to believe that a system of 
producer indications will have a profound impact on innovation. 
 
Competition in the internal market 
An obligatory system of producer indication would affect the internal 
market. Many food processors process both private labels and 
industrial brands. There is reason to believe that consumers would no 
longer buy industrial brands if they knew that there are cheap private 
label alternatives produced by the same producers on the market. 
This is especially likely for commodities. This would force the 
processors to produce either only private label or only brands. There is 
one way out of the processors’ dilemma to produce either private 
label or brands. If producers have the choice an under voluntary 
system to make producer indications compulsory upon their request, 
the dilemma no longer exists. However, retailers may threaten to 
terminate commercial relations if producers request the indication of 
their name, brand or trademark. 
 The impact on the number of firms, the number of brands and 
innovation is not clear on a priori grounds. Moreover, if firms are not 
able to produce both private label and brands at the same time, 
they will have fewer opportunities to optimise production capacity. 
This is likely to be detrimental to supplier profitability. The choice 
between brands and private label may not be necessary in the case 
of product heterogeneity.  
 An obligatory system of producer indications will not be effective if 
food processors create new legal entities to produce both private 
label and brands. Large processors already do this in, for example, 
Italy. SMEs may have fewer opportunities to do so. But even large 
processors may risk reputation effects in the long run. Some food 
processors run promotional campaigns to indicate that they do not 
produce private label. Legal solutions may not be able to overcome 
reputation effects in the long run. 
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 If food processors confine themselves to either private label or 
brands, sourcing opportunities for retailers will be reduced. Moreover, 
a system of producer indications may make it transparent that some 
producers produce private label for more than one retailer. And, as 
one SME retailer pointed out, if retailers demand exclusivity, SME 
retailers may have even less choice. 
 Consumers are likely to benefit from an obligatory system of 
producer indications, because they will receive more information. 
The market will become more transparent for them. The producer 
indication tells who the producer is. The system also makes it 
transparent what processors produce brands, private label or both. 
However, it is not clear whether consumers are really waiting for this 
information. 
 Changing suppliers will require changing packaging. This 
constitutes a transaction cost and a barrier to entry. This makes it less 
likely that retailers will switch suppliers for a short period of time. 
Ceteris paribus retailers are more likely to stick to current suppliers. In 
this sense, EU and/or national systems of producer indications may 
act as a barrier to entry to the Common Market. 
 
Operating costs 
Changing suppliers will become more expensive, because new 
packaging material will be required. Operating costs may even be 
higher, when one takes into account that one cannot predict supply 
and demand precisely due to the variability in agricultural supply and 
the fact that food products are perishable. 
 An obligatory system of producer indications may segment the 
food supply chain (see above). If so, both sourcing and distributing 
will become more difficult for individual companies. This may effect 
capacity utilisation, economies of scale, and input and output prices. 
SME suppliers and retailers may be adversely affected. However, 
French evidence shows that there is no difference in investment 
between small and large private label suppliers. 
 
Administrative costs 
A system of producer indications will entail some administrative costs, 
but we do not think that these costs will be substantial. 
 
 
 Innovation and research 
The number of products introduced and the number of brands are 
still growing in the sectors and countries studied (with Spain as the 
exception). This holds for both private labels and industrial brands. We 
do not think that a system of producer indications will lead to 
changes in innovation at the industry level. However, the system may 
lead to changes in the competitiveness of brand suppliers compared 
to private label suppliers. 
 A system of producer indications is not likely to affect the balance 
of power in the food supply chain. Retailer bargaining power is based 
on control over shelf space, their size combined with their multi-
product nature, and the fact that they act as both customer and 
supplier. Producer indications would not have a major impact on these 
points. If retail bargaining power has a negative impact on innovation, 
a system of producer indications is not going to change this. 
 
Consumers 
Following the terms of reference, the study focused on supplier-
retailer relations. We did not study the effect on consumers. However, 
we have no reason to believe that the effect on consumers would be 
substantial in terms of prices, product variety and quality, and 
innovation. But, of course, producer indications would increase 
transparency for consumers. 
 
Specific regions or sectors 
Retailers are already keen on supplying local and regional products, 
especially in southern Europe. This is not likely to change and will 
remain beneficial to local SMEs. 
 
Third countries and international relations 
The policy options consisting of introducing voluntary or compulsory 
systems of producer indications on private labels) are not expected 
to have a negative impact on traders. In fact, manufacturers often 
have to adjust their labelling in accordance with the language 
requirements of the country of marketing. The introduction of 
producer indications does not induce fundamental redesigning of 
the label. Furthermore, the system would not accord less favourable 
treatment to non-EU traders and products, although it is likely to raise 
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transaction costs. The perception of these transaction costs may be 
different between EU and non-EU enterprises. 
 The World Trade Organization regime recognises the legitimate 
differences in national regulations and standards aiming at the 
protection of human health and the environment and preventing 
deceptive practices. A majority of these regulations take the form of 
labelling requirements. The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT Agreement) states in the Preamble that 'no country should 
be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality 
of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or 
health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive 
practices, at the levels it considers appropriate'. These measures, 
however, cannot create unnecessary obstacles to trade, i.e. cannot 
create arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries or be 
more restrictive than necessary to attain the desired objective 
 
Public authorities 
An obligatory system would not have a major impact on the 
government budget. It does, however, imply an additional 
administrative burden on the government. 
 
The macroeconomic environment 
It is unlikely that this micro policy would have an impact on the 
macroeconomic environment. 
 
9.4.2 Environmental impact 
 
There is no reason to presuppose that the environment would be 
affected. 
 
9.4.3 Social impact 
 
There is no major reason to presuppose that measures would have a 
substantial social impact. If the measures were to lead to changes in 
production from one type of firm to other types of firms, employment 
would likely shift from one firm to another. In that case, some jobs 
would be created and others would be lost. 
 The growth of private labels may lead to the further rationalisation 
of food processing and distribution and lead to a loss of jobs. On the 
other hand, the loss of jobs is a sign of economic progress. 
 There is no reason to presuppose an impact on job quality, the 
social inclusion of particular groups, equality, private life, 
governance, health and safety, security or social access. The 
research focused on the economic impact based on the terms of 
reference. 
 By putting producer indications on private label products, 
producers would become directly liable for any damages inflicted 
upon a consumer. Consumers would be able to make a claim 
directly against the producer. Producers of private labels are 
currently indirectly liable, because retailers hold them liable. There is 
no reason to presuppose that there would be major shifts in liability in 
the supply chain. 
 
 
9.5 Summary 
 
A compulsory system of producer indications might: 
- Force some food processors that are currently producing both 
private label and brands to produce either only brands or only 
private label products. This would limit their possibilities to sell a 
variety of brands and private labels to a range of retailers and 
may have a negative impact on capacity utilisation. This would 
be detrimental to their profitability. It is unclear what the impact 
would be on innovation. 
- Further segment the food supply chain. Sourcing and distribution 
possibilities might become more limited for individual companies. 
SME processors and retailers are more likely to be hurt by market 
segmentation than large companies. 
- Make the food supply chain a little more transparent. It is likely 
that this would benefit processors that supply brands, and also 
make transparent what processors supply good private label 
products. 
- Create relatively limited barriers to entry to the internal market 
and to trade with third countries. 
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 Finally, as stated before, a system of producer indication would 
not address the balance of power in the supply chain. 
10 Conclusion 
 
 
This study addressed the impact of private label growth on the 
competitiveness of the European food and beverage industry. It 
focused on two aspects, namely the development of the number of 
firms and their profitability, and the innovativeness of the sector. 
 The conclusion is that the decline in the number of firms is 
probably due to increases in economies of scale, for example 
because average profitability is more or less constant. 
 Industry innovation is not decreasing. The number of both private 
labels and industrial brands being introduced is rising in most 
countries for the sectors studied (processed fruits and vegetables, 
dairy, and cereal products). Of course, this does not say anything 
about average product quality or developments in 'real' innovations. 
Italian evidence indicates that there is more innovation in firms that 
produce leading national brands, but also that private label growth is 
not detrimental to innovation or may even be a stimulus. 
 Private label production is not detrimental to SMEs. Although SMEs 
are less likely to produce private labels in France, their market share in 
private label production in that country is higher. SMEs that produce 
private label invest as much as their larger counterparts do. 
 It is increasingly more difficult for brand producers to get new 
products listed in countries like Spain. Because retail formulas that 
have a limited product assortment are growing in these countries, it is 
hard for brand producers to obtain high levels of distribution. This has 
a negative impact on product development by brand producers 
(but not by private label suppliers). Moreover, in some cases, such 
business practices as copycatting also have a negative impact on 
product development. 
 There may be reasons to address the business practices of both 
retailers and large suppliers. We are not convinced that a system of 
producer indications would do this job. If an obligatory system of 
producer indications were effective, it might compel food processors 
to produce either brands or private label, especially for commodities. 
This would segment the food supply chain and may very well limit the 
choices of SME processors and retailers. More importantly, we did not 
identify a clear-cut relation between an obligatory system of 
producer indications and innovativeness and value creation. 
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Appendix 1A 
Profits before taxes in Hungary 
 
 
Figure 1A.1 Profits before taxes in the Hungarian food and 
beverage industry 
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
2002. 2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007. 2008.
Total Small Total Medium Total Large Total Total
 
 172 
Appendix 1B 
Private label shares per product category 
 
 
Table 1B.1 Market share of private labels by product (2008) 
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Non-alcoholic beverages 32.4 12.9 18.3 24.4  
Alcoholic beverages 17.7 5.1 13.0 25.3 30.4 
 
 Table 1B.2 Market share of private labels for top-5 product categories 
in selected countries (2008) 
 France Germany Hungary Italy 
Number 
1 
Single frozen 
vegetables 
Fruit and milk 
drink 
Cottage 
cheese 
Frozen herbs 
 88.5 91.5 80.8 84.8 
Number 
2 
Frozen vegetables 
mixed 
Instant tea Gin Other salted 
meat 
 80.8 90.1 70.0 74.8 
Number 
3 
Food wrapping rolls Grainy cream 
cheese 
Frozen 
potatoes 
Fruit in syrup 
and juice 
 77.6 83.7 67.1 68.8 
Number 
4 
Vegetables in brine Butter 
baguettes 
Tomato juice Boiled green 
beans 
 74.7 82.2 59.1 67.4 
Number 
5 
Vinegar Spray cream Peanuts Frozen French 
beans 
 74.5 82.0 56.6 65.5 
 Netherlands Poland Spain UK 
Number 
1 
Refrigerated cakes 
and pastries 
Sesame snaps Peaches in 
syrup 
Fruit juice 
concentrate 
 94.8 64.7 80.7 100.0 
Number 
2 
Chilled ready meals Sweeteners Frozen 
vegetables 
Chinese sauces 
 71.9 52.5 74.8 99.3 
Number 
3 
Cooked potato 
products 
Frozen pizzas Ice cream Salad dressings 
 58.9 46.9 74.3 99.0 
Number 
4 
Eggs Chocolate 
spread 
Sunflower oil Hard cheese 
 52.9 45.8 74.2 98.8 
Number 
5 
Pre-packed bread Frozen 
potatoes 
Nuts Cooked meat 
 51.9 44.9 72.9 98.8 
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Appendix 1C 
Private label production by SMEs versus big firms 
in France 
 
 
Table 1A.1 is a comparison of private label production by SMEs and 
big firms in France with respect to investment and turnover in 2006. 
Across all agrofood sectors, the proportion of SMEs that produce 
private label is lower than the proportion of big firms that produce 
private label (21.1% vs 31.1%). This result is driven by firms in the meat, 
fish, dairy and other food products sectors (NACE 151, 152, 155 and 
158). In the other sectors, there is no statistical difference between 
SMEs and big firms. Moreover, SMEs that produce private labels have 
a higher turnover than other SMEs. This is not the case for big firms. 
One possible explanation is that private label goods are sold at a 
lower price than branded products, which leads to a lower turnover 
on private labels. 
 When a firm produces private label, the share of private label in its 
aggregate production does not differ significantly across the food 
industry. However, for 'other food products' (bread, biscuits and 
chocolate), the share of private label production in total turnover is 
larger for SMEs than for big firms. The results for this sector lead to the 
general conclusion that SMEs participate more in private label 
production than big firms. 
 Firms' investment rate does not differ across firms' size.1 This 
suggests that private label production could be motivated by 
production capacity use rather than investment in research and 
development. 
                                                 
1 Investment rate is defined as the ratio between the investment and the added-value 
of the firm at the market price (INSEE definition statistic). 
Table 1C.1 PL market shares and SMEs in 2006 
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Appendix 1D 
R&D expenditure in European food processing 
industry 
 
 
Figure 1D.1 Development of R&D expenditures in European food 
processing industry (euro, 2002 =1) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
Small countries include Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Hungary, Romania and 
Sweden. 
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Appendix 2A 
Questionnaire for suppliers 
 
 
Introduction 
This questionnaire is part of a study commissioned by the EC on the 
impact of private labels on the competitiveness of the European 
food processing industry, with a particular focus on the role of SMEs. 
The aim of the study to find out what effect private labels have on 
the innovativeness of the food processing industry. The study 
considers the impact on suppliers of private labels and industrial 
brands, as well as the impact on retailers. 
 According to economic theory, the ability and willingness to 
innovate depends on the ability to appropriate profits from 
innovations. For this reason, the questionnaire addresses not only the 
key problem statement, but also developments in bargaining 
relations between suppliers and retailers, profitability and the possible 
impact on innovation. 
 The research addresses the relation between suppliers and 
retailers, and disregards the consumer. Consumer well-being may be 
addressed in another study. 
 The questionnaire is made up of three parts: (1) a general 
introduction; (2) innovation in private labels and industrial brands; 
and (3) bargaining relations and the implications for profitability and 
innovations. 
 The questionnaire is anonymous. The name of your company will 
not appear in the final report. The research group will draft a general 
summary of the results without going into company, sector or country 
specifics. 
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Part 1 General 
 
Position of the interviewee: 
 
Try to find out whether the interviewee depends on a limited number 
of retailers and other customers. 
 
1. Do you supply domestic supermarkets chains only, or also foreign 
supermarket chains? Do you supply alternative distribution 
channels (e.g. traditional shops, food service outlets)? 
2. What type of supermarket chains do you supply? How have your 
customers changed in the last ten years? 
3. What is the market share of your largest customer, your second 
largest customer, etc.? 
Establish whether the interviewee sells private labels and industrial 
brands, and the strengths of both the brands and the suppliers. 
 
4. What policy does your company pursue with respect to private 
labels and industrial brands? What is the position of your products 
in the market? 
5. What are consumer preferences of the products you supply vis-à-
vis PL and industrial brands? 
 
Based on your experience, discuss the bargaining process and 
contract terms between the supplier and retailers. Make a distinction 
between PL and industrial brands. 
 
6. Can you characterise the bargaining process and the contract 
terms? 
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Part 2 The impact of private label growth on innovation in private 
labels and industrial brands 
 
Establish the impact of private labels on suppliers' performance. 
 
For private label suppliers 
7A. What is the impact of private label supply by your company on 
your company's 
- Sales, growth and employment? 
- Competitive position? 
- Investments and productivity? 
- What are the main mechanisms contributing to these effects? 
 
For industrial brand suppliers 
7B. What is the impact of private label supply by retailers on your 
company's 
- Sales, growth and employment? 
- Competitive position? 
- Investments and productivity? 
- What are the main mechanisms contributing to these effects? 
 
Find out how innovative the company is now compared to 5, 10 years 
ago. 
 
8. Does your company develop more or fewer new products than it 
did 5, 10 years ago? 
9. How difficult is it to introduce new products (either private labels 
and industrial brands) onto retailers' shelves now compared to 5, 
10 years ago? 
10. Can you give a concrete example of an innovation pursued by 
your company that was successful and one that was 
unsuccessful? Why was it successful/unsuccessful? 
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Characterise competitive relations between private labels and 
industrial brands in the industry the interviewee's company is active 
in. 
 
11. To what extent do private labels and industrial brands compete 
with each other? 
12. How are the number and the market share of private labels 
developing compared to industrial brands? 
13. Is there a difference in the way retailers treat private labels as 
opposed to industrial brands? If so, what is the difference? 
14. How is the innovation rate developing in the industry? 
15. Is copycatting an issue in the market in which your company 
operates? 
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Part 3 Bargaining relations between retailers and suppliers 
 
In this part we investigate to what extent the business practices 
mentioned below are common between suppliers and retailers. Note 
that both suppliers and retailers may apply these practices. The 
practices mentioned might have anti-competitive effects, but they 
might also enhance supply chain efficiency and competition. See 
whether there are differences between private labels and industrial 
brands. 
 
List of business practices 
 
16. What business practices are relevant to your relations with 
retailers? 
 
17. What about financial contributions required by retailers or your 
company? For example, listing fees, slotting allowances or 
contributions to promotional expenses. 
 
18. What about arrangements with your customers with respect to 
the distribution of risks and costs regarding perishability, buy-back 
of unsold products and payment periods? 
 
19. How do you and your customers deal with adjusting the contract 
terms, if required? 
 
20. How do you and your customers deal with terminating a 
contract? 
 
21. Are there any other business practices relevant to your relations 
with retailers? 
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Effects of business practices 
 
22. What are the main effects of the business practices discussed 
above on your company's competitiveness, supply chain 
coordination and efficiency in general? 
 
23. What is the impact of these business practices on your 
company's profitability? 
 
24. Are there any differences between private labels and industrial 
brands in terms of practices applied and the effect on your 
company's competitiveness and profitability, and supply chain 
efficiency and coordination? 
 
25. Does producing PL for a given supermarket chain have an 
impact on the business practices applied by the same 
supermarket chain in relation to your industrial brands? 
 
The European Commission is considering introducing a voluntary or 
obligatory system of producer indications on private labels. 
 
26. Would you favour such a system? Why/why not? 
 
27. What do you think about possible consequences with respect to: 
- Competitive relations between industrial brands and private 
labels? 
- Competitive relations between suppliers and retailers? 
- Liability of food processors with respect to private labels? 
 
28. Is there any other policy you would advocate in order to 
promote the competitiveness of the European food supply 
chain? 
 
Conclusion 
 
29.  Have you anything to add to the interview and/or the research 
question? 
  
183 
Appendix 2B 
Questionnaire for retailers 
 
 
Introduction 
This questionnaire is part of a study commissioned by the EC on the 
impact of private labels on the competitiveness of the European 
food processing industry, with a particular focus on the role of SMEs. 
The aim of the study is to find out what effect private labels have on 
the innovativeness of the food processing industry. The study 
considers the impact on suppliers of private labels and industrial 
brands, as well as the impact on retailers. 
 According to economic theory, the ability and willingness to 
innovate depends on the ability to appropriate profits from 
innovations. For this reason, the questionnaire addresses not only the 
key problem statement, but also developments in bargaining 
relations between suppliers and retailers, profitability and the possible 
impact on innovation. 
 The research addresses the relation between suppliers and 
retailers, and ignores the consumer. Consumer well-being may be 
addressed in another study. 
 The questionnaire is made up of three parts: (1) a general 
introduction; (2) innovation in private labels and industrial brands; 
and (3) bargaining relations and the implications for profitability and 
innovations. 
 The questionnaire is anonymous. The name of your company will 
not appear in the final report. The research group will draft a general 
summary of the results without going into company, sector or country 
specifics. 
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Part 1 General 
 
Position of the interviewee: 
 
Try to find out whether the interviewee depends on/buys from a 
limited number of suppliers both with respect to private labels and 
industrial brands. 
 
1. Do you source domestically and/or internationally? 
 
2.  How many suppliers do you have for the product/product group 
under consideration? How stable are the relations with your 
suppliers? 
 
3.  What is the share of your largest supplier in the purchases of the 
product/product group under consideration, the second largest, 
etc.? Is there a difference in the size of suppliers of private labels 
as opposed to suppliers of industrial brands? 
 
Find out for the retailer interviewed what the share and the role of 
private labels are in general and in the product group under 
consideration. 
 
4.  Describe your company's private label strategy and the position of 
your company's private labels in the market. 
 
Discuss the bargaining process and contract terms between the 
supplier and retailers in general terms. Make a distinction between 
private labels and industrial brands. 
 
5.  Can you characterise the bargaining process and the contract 
terms? 
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Part 2 The impact of private label growth on innovation in private 
labels and industrial brands. 
 
Establish the impact of private labels and industrial brands on retailer 
performance. 
 
For private labels 
6.  What is the impact of the private labels you sell on your 
company's 
- Sales, growth and employment? 
- Competitive position in relation to suppliers and rival retailers? 
- Composition and value of the category? 
- What do you think are the effects of private labels on your 
suppliers and on the overall supply chain? 
 
For industrial brands 
7.  What is the contribution of the industrial brands you sell on your 
company's 
- Sales, growth and employment? 
- Competitive position in relation to suppliers and rival retailers? 
- Composition and value of the category? 
- What do you think are the effects of private labels on your 
suppliers and on the overall supply chain? 
 
Discuss the innovativeness of the category and the retailer now 
compared to 5, 10 years ago. 
 
8.  Do you now develop and market more or fewer new PL products 
compared to 5, 10 years ago? Are there now more or fewer new 
industrial brands being introduced onto your shelves compared 
to 5, 10 years ago? Has there been a change in the success rate 
of new product introductions? 
 
9.  What are the differences in costs, benefits and risks in introducing 
a new PL product on the shelf compared to a new variety of an 
industrial brand? 
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10. Can you give a concrete example of a private label innovation 
that creates value for your category and company, and possibly 
your PL supplier? 
 
Characterise competitive relations between private labels and 
industrial brands in the industry under consideration. 
 
11.  To what extent do private labels and industrial brands compete 
with each other? 
 
12.  How are the number and the market share of private labels 
developing compared to industrial brands? 
 
13.  How do you expect private labels to develop in terms of 
competitive position and market share in the future? 
 
14.  Is there a difference in the way you treat private labels as 
opposed to industrial brands? If so, what is the difference? 
 
15.  How is the innovation rate developing in the industry? 
 
16.  Is copycatting an issue in the market in which your company 
operates? 
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Part 3 Bargaining relations between retailers and suppliers 
 
In this part we investigate to what extent the business practices 
mentioned below are common between suppliers and retailers. Note 
that both suppliers and retailers might apply these practices. The 
practices mentioned might have anti-competitive effects, but also 
might enhance supply chain efficiency and competition. See 
whether there are differences between private labels and industrial 
brands. 
 
List of business practices 
 
16.  What business practices are relevant to your relations with 
suppliers? 
 
17.  What about financial contributions required by either your 
company or your suppliers? For example, listing fees, slotting 
allowances or contributions to promotional expenses. 
 
18.  What about arrangements with your suppliers with respect to the 
distribution of risks and costs regarding perishability, buy-back of 
unsold products and payment periods? 
 
19.  How do you and your suppliers deal with adjustment of the 
contract terms, if required? 
 
20.  How do you and your suppliers deal with terminating contracts? 
 
21.  Are there any other business practices relevant to your relations 
with suppliers? 
 
 
Effects of business practices 
 
22.  What are the main effects of the business practices discussed 
above on your company's competitiveness, supply chain 
coordination and efficiency in general, and with respect to 
innovation and PL development? 
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23.  What is the impact of these business practices on your 
company's profitability? 
24.  Are there any differences between private labels and industrial 
brands in terms of practices applied and the effect on your 
company's competitiveness and profitability and supply chain 
efficiency and coordination? 
 
25.  Are these differences reflected in the selection of suppliers? 
 
 
The European Commission is considering introducing a voluntary or 
obligatory system of producer indications on private labels. 
 
26.  Would you favour such a system? Why/why not? 
 
27. What do you think about possible consequences with respect to: 
- Competitive relations between industrial brands and private 
labels? 
- Competitive relations between suppliers and retailers? 
- Liability of food processors with respect to private labels? 
 
28.  Is there any other policy you would advocate in order to 
promote the competitiveness of the European food supply 
chain? 
 
29.  Do you have anything to add to the interview and/or the 
research question? 
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